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PERSONALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY OF MANAGEMENT: AN OPTION FOR CRITICAL MANAGEMENT STUDIES

Ryszard Stocki¹

Abstract

Critical management studies try to address many management issues that traditional management studies haven't been able to solve for many years. In this volume we propose personalism to be an approach that may inspire critical management studies and offer new perspectives.. We start with two philosophical papers; one addressing the problem of self-determination and the other the problem of communication. They show how philosophical and anthropological concept influences the thinking in areas close to management studies. With the third chapter we enter the world of psychology and may see how personalistic approach changes the view of human predispositions and competencies. The fourth paper leads us further in understanding of human being into the world of goal-setting and goal orientations. The last three papers show CMS in empirical studies of management practice. First it is the issue of work related personal projects, then participative management of project teams and finally research on trust with conclusions on why employees either trust or do not trust their managers. In this paper I propose explanation how the presented papers could impact the critical management studies and how to continue this approach.

Keywords: personalism, person, critical management studies, personalistic psychology

Introduction

This issue of Nowy Sącz Academic Review is one of the rare attempts to view management from a personalistic point of view. The domain of critical management studies is slowly making its way to Polish Universities and Business Schools. Leon Koźmiński Academy with its seminar on Critical Organization Theory conducted by professors Gasparski and Kieżun was the first and probably most famous attempt which ended in publishing the book edited by Kieżun and Kubin (2004). Apart from the participants of the seminar and sociologists working on critical organization theory, there are a few Polish scholars who are consistently flirting with this approach such as Kostera at the University of Warsaw, Jemielniak at Leon Koźmiński Academy, Poprawski at Adam Mickiewicz University, Sułkowski at the Jagiellonian University and finally the group of psychologists at the WSB-NLU in Nowy Sącz (Stocki, Prokopowicz & Żmuda, 2008). The fact that critical management studies are almost nonexistent in Poland may be proven by the fact that out of 30 countries represented at the 6th International Critical Management Studies Conference at The University of Warwick, UK, there was not a single representative from Poland. As this approach may not be familiar to some readers, let us start with a quote from an overview of the field (Adler, Forbes & Willmott, 2007, p. 120).

Critical management studies (CMS) offers a range of alternatives to mainstream management theory with a view to radically transforming management practice. The common core is deep skepticism regarding the moral defensibility and the social and ecological sustainability of the prevailing forms of management and organization. CMS's motivating concern is neither the personal failures of individual managers nor the poor management of specific organizations, but the social injustice and environmental destructiveness of the

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broader social and economic systems that these managers and organizations serve and reproduce.

As we can see from this short introduction to the field critical management studies put practical applications and consequences of the management theory very high at stake. It does not mean, however, that it is focused on critical theory. It also reflects on organizational behaviour, industrial relations, strategy, accounting, information systems research, international business, marketing, etc. One of the main areas of criticism for CMS is the instrumentalism of organizations which fetishizes profitability and performance targets (Adler et al., 2007). Personalism, as revealed in the Christian doctrine was one of the first social approaches that openly criticized instrumental orientations of early capitalism, let us only mention the encyclical letter of the Pope Leo XIII *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and other that followed it – Pius XI's *Quadregesimo Anno* (1931), John Paul II's *Laborem exercens* (1981), *Sollicitudo rei socialis* (1987) *Centesimus Annus* (1991). It is not surprising that main overviews of CMS (Adler et al., 2007; Mills, Simmons & Mills, 2005; Alvesson and Willmott, 1992, 2003) do not view this personalist critical approach as part of CMS, probably because the catholic church is criticised for its patriarchal practices (e.g. Mills et al., 2005). The situation is somewhat similar to that of co-operativism or employee ownership having bad reputation in late Soviet Bloc countries. In our quest for truth we should try to overcome such prejudices.

The present volume proposes several concrete areas both critical management studies and psychology may gain if they include personalism in their research.

The heritage of Karol Wojtyła

The pontificate of John Paul II and documents he signed as the head of the Church somehow shadowed the philosophical works of Karol Wojtyła written before he became the Pope. The publisher of the English translation of his main philosophical work - *The Acting person* has even put John Paul II in pontifical clothes on the cover of this book, although the book was first published almost 10 years before he became the Pope. Certainly this association with papacy does not make the way to personalistic thought of Wojtyła easier among critical management scholars. It is a pity, because apart from setting philosophical fundamentals for key concepts that could be applied in CMS, he devoted the last chapter to what he called “Outline of participation theory” (Wojtyła, 1985) and which has direct relevance to management studies. His main point was that participation was not a value that may or may not be applied but rather the defining feature of a human being. So it is not in the domain of ethics but ontology. Interestingly, this point of view has its sound support in cultural anthropology with hunter-gatherers as an example of highly participative and sharing humans (Erdal, 1999).

Naturally Wojtyła's approach to participation had great consequences for the teaching of the Church about women. In *Mulieris dignitatem* (1988) he reinterpreted St Paul's statement that “man is his wife's head”. Although he has not equalled men and women in their access to priesthood, his many actions have certainly made the task easier in the future (Accottoli, 1997). Two of the authors in this volume directly refer to Wojtyła's revolutionary philosophical work.

Self-determination

Self-determination, the key concept for Wojtyła, should also be one of the key concepts in critical management studies if we want to enrich them with personalist perspective. The first author Rostworowski (2009), who knew Wojtyła personally before he

became the Pope is one of the scholars who tries to develop and explain Wojtyła's thought. This mainstream management studies are based on utilitarian perception of the human being as homo oeconomicus. Homo oeconomicus is determined by economic laws. But even in many approaches to management people are determined historically, biologically, socially. Self-determination assumes that human beings in their very essence (noumenal) are free to determine themselves. This has enormous consequences for management theory and practice. The author develops and explains the concept of the act. In mainstream management studies we often talk of behaviour (which may be determined) and human resources (human determined and perceived as an element of business process). Act is specific for humans but first of all it is based on will. It is the elementary unit of self-determination. When behaviour is substitute with act, nothing is the same again in organizational theory and practice.

One of the things which are never the same is the purpose of the organisation. Instrumentalism of the organizations is reflected in seeking and leading to goals outside, while personalism would also see the goals of self-fulfilment. This is another theme of Rostworowski's paper.

Homo communicans

In the second paper of the volume Drożdż (2009) develops Wojtyła's thought into the area which has the greatest impact on people's everyday life – media communication. Existence of many organizations is based on the image they create in the media though both corporate and product advertising. Communication is also one of fundamental internal aspects of management. By referring to Wojtyła's concepts Drożdż defines communication as an act. The situation with communication is analogous to that of personalism. We are communicating by our nature. If communication is an act we can speak about integration of the person in communication and transcendence of the person in communication. What is important here, the main condition of successful communication is truth. If we take this reflection on communication into the field of management studies we end up with practices like open book management (Stack & Burlingham, 2003 ;Case, 1998) to be the form of organizational communication that best fulfils the personalistic assumptions of homo communicans. This is why in CMS we may take advantage of person based theory of communication.

Personalistic psychology

Mainstream psychology is similar to mainstream management studies in restricting the reflection only to limited scope of phenomena, mainly to those which are empirically verifiable. The problem with empirical, and particularly experimental verification is related to determinism. It is much easier to verify empirically deterministic phenomena than those that are self-determined. This is why contemporary mainstream psychology is closer and closer to neurobiology. This is why management practitioners and theoreticians are prone to rely on mainstream psychologists. In this way one mainstream theory supports another. In the search of personalistic approach to management studies, we propose several papers of psychologists who find inspirations in person oriented psychology.

“Back to the future”

The third paper by Uchnast (2009) starts with an overview of personalistic or person oriented psychology. This overview itself may be an inspiring input for questioning many management studies propositions. But the author decides to come back to the works of William Stern to 1938 to be able to develop future prospect for personalistic psychology. Stern hoped to develop “a science about the person who is able to *have experience*”. In this

sense his approach is closer to Wojtyła's anthropology than his later followers Uchnast overviews in the introduction. Drawing on Sterns concept as well as Goldstein's human predispositions in abstract behaviour, Allport's personal knowing subject and Deci and Ryan's self-determination theory, Uchnast presents his own model of the dimensions of the structure of natural dispositions of the human person as a proactive agency subject. The model grasps much more than the author enumerates. It grasps the fundamental way of building character. It reflects the main dichotomy between “to be” and “to have”. It finally helps us to overcome the controversy between determinism and self-determinism. As on one extreme we will have persons who are more self-determined and on the other less self-determined. On one extreme we have personal life in a convergent world of values leading to introceptive, proactive, and cooperative personality on the other extreme vital life in the biosphere leading to general personal orientations toward self-protection and self-defence. This distinction based on personalistic psychology may have many consequences for understanding phenomena of organizational citizenship behaviour, psychological ownership, psychological participation in what the organization is doing etc.

Subjectivity in goal orientations and self-determination

The paper of Trzebińska (2009) views a topic more elementary than self-determination – mainly the subjectivity. Before self-determination is possible, there must be the subject. Drawing from motivational research on goal orientation the author proposes four goal orientations: learning orientation, avoidance orientation, self-enhancing ego orientation and self-defeating ego orientation. Although the author does not state this these would be more elementary processes that are responsible for later self-determination and character development. Goal orientations are different manifestations of subjectivity. What is important for critical management studies is the process of making one's identity through cognizing oneself and developing self-knowledge and self-awareness. The personalistically oriented management theory should also include those processes in management. Mainstream management theory and practice would either ignore such issues as self-knowledge and self-awareness or place it in private life domain.

Empirical verifications

We started with philosophical foundations, then were trying to show implications for the theory, finally, in the last part of the volume we presented three papers which were attempts to verify empirically the concepts of personalism in organizational context. We should be aware that this is still *terra incognita*, as any act which is not totally determined is not easy to study. Each of the papers present one different approach to studying persons acting in organizational context.

Personal projects

Work related personal projects are the first obvious reflection of self-determination. They may reflect real participation that is fulfilment of our personal nature. The study conducted by Żmuda (2009) and presented in his paper is a presentation of new methodology that maybe useful for the studies of person in an organization. It is not unimportant that the method is intuitively understandable for anyone who has experience in project management. Unlike many primitive methods of analysing and managing time allocation so popular in many software, this method starts with values and as such allows much deeper analysis of self-determined acts. The method yields huge amount of data that maybe used in critical management studies. The results presented by Żmuda are encouraging future research they

confirm the truth about human nature we postulate in personalistic approach. Participative projects lead to self-realization more often than non-participative projects as well as they are more controllable and perceived as more likely to end with success.

Project teams – defining effectiveness

Pyrkosz in cooperation with Żmuda (2009), propose another interesting approach to studying effectiveness of person-oriented, participative management. They first gathered declarations of what is the team members' preferred management style – autocratic or participative, and then observed the group in action to find out that the declarations do not overlap with the behaviors. It is symptomatic how mainstream management theory influenced the thinking of the researchers. Although the results confirm the superiority of participative management because, as predicted, members of participative project groups were more satisfied with the task they performed, and reported a more positive mood after the experiment while members of autocratic groups were less satisfied and reported a more negative mood after the experiment. In spite of this the researchers seem a bit disappointed as contrary to the hypothesis, no significant effects on effectiveness were observed. Mood and emotions influence our life in the long run. They may end up with differences in many areas including health and well-being of the participants as was found by Erdal (1999). Yet short term effectiveness measures, the mainstream measures reflecting the instrumental approach to organization are still prevailing in our mindset. One of the tasks of Critical Management Studies should be finding holistic measures of management in the long term perspective and in the wide perspective. Something started by Erdal and reflected in multiple bottom lines approach.

Truth and its substitute

The acting person can act only in the context and as a response to values. One of the values is truth. The importance of truth was found to be essential in communication and Drożdż's (2010) paper shows how important it is. We added here that what Drożdż finds crucial in media communication is also true in internal organizational communication. What happens if there are no data available in organizational context, or the information, if provided, is not understandable. The truth is substituted by trust. Prokopowicz's (2009) paper in this volume is devoted to trust. Trust is becoming more and more important as long as the management systems become more and more complex and as long as there is no direct contact of subordinates with their bosses. No wonder then that the phenomenon of trust finds its way as the key, if not the most important, aspect of management. Trust Index is the main measure of so called “Great Place to Work” a ranking of companies which care for their employees. Prokopowicz deepens our knowledge of this aspect of management and what is more, proposes further development of trust theories.

Conclusions

In the present volume we have made an intersection of what has to be done to introduce personalism to Critical Management Studies. First we need deepening of anthropological and philosophical thought in the area of management. As we have Acton Institute in economic and political thought, we need a similar institution to develop personalism in management. Two papers by Rostworowski (2009) and Drożdż (2009) are good examples of what kind of writing is required there. Then we need good disciplinary research based on personalistic thought. Papers of Uchnast (2009) and Trzebińska's (2009)

papers are good examples of how it should be done in psychology. The same should be done in other domains related to management – systems theory, sociology, macro- and microeconomics, etc. Finally we need empirical verification of what personalism means in practice. Żmuda (2009), Pyrkosz and Żmuda (2009) and Prokopowicz (2009) show how it may be done. There is a long way ahead. We hope, however, that with the readers of this volume, who are convinced by our arguments, we may show critical management scholars a new, interesting and promising research area.

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Abstrakt

Krytyczne badania w zakresie zarządzania starają się odnieść do wielu zagadnień z zakresu zarządzania, z którymi tradycyjne badania i teorie zarządzania nie mogą sobie poradzić od wielu lat. W tomie tym proponujemy aby personalizm stał się podejściem, które może zainspirować wielu i dać nowe perspektywy wielu krytycznym badaczom zarządzania. Zaczynamy od dwóch tekstów filozoficznych. Jeden dotyczy samostanowienia (Rostworowski 2010) drugi problemu komunikacji (Drożdż, 2010). Pokazują one jak pojęcia antropologii filozoficznej mogą wpływać na myślenie w dziedzinach bliskich studiom krytycznym. Wraz z artykułem Uchnasta (2010) wkraczamy w zakres psychologii i możemy zobaczyć jak podejście personalistyczne zmienia sposób patrzenia na predyspozycje i kompetencje. Artykuł Trzebińskiej (2010) prowadzi nas dalej do rozumienia świata stawiania celów i orientacji na cele. Trzy ostatnie teksty pokazują CMS w badaniach empirycznych praktyki menedżerskiej. Pierwsze jest to partycypacja w zarządzaniu projektami osobistymi związanymi z pracą (Żmuda, 2010), następnie zarządzanie zespołami projektowymi z różnym mniej lub bardziej partycypacyjnym podejściem, w końcu jest to problematyka zaufania i rola zaufania w zarządzaniu. W tym wstępnym artykule proponuję co przedstawione artykuły mogłyby wnieść do krytycznych studiów zarządzania.

SELF-DETERMINATION THE FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORY OF PERSON IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF KAROL WOJTYŁA

Tadeusz Rostworowski²

Abstract

The concept of self-determination is the central category of person in the understanding of Karol Wojtyła. He perceived and developed it thanks to the application of a phenomenological method so that in the full description of experience gained by man one arrives at the noumenal bases of man himself.

Keywords: experience, act, self-determination, truth.

Introduction

The concept of self-determination itself is one rarely used in philosophy., particularly in relation to anthropology. It does appear, however, in the field of the political sciences, and in particular in psychology. It is in this very context that one may find references that talk of the *self-determination* of the nations of the European Union. Raising the question as to whether, following the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the states joined by such a political system have not lost or given up a part of this effectuality of self-determination for themselves, or whether this is not the case.

It follows to state, however, that this concept of so-called *self-determination* functioned much earlier and continues to fully function within psychology (Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006; Ryan, Rigby, & Przybylski, 2006). It is our intention to present the philosophical conception of *self-determination*³ in the thought of Wojtyła. For him this is a key concept within personalistic anthropology (Wojtyła, 1974, 1978) one which he was to construct for many years.

In his main philosophical work *The Acting Person*⁴, which arose during the course of debate during the Second Vatican Council, he developed an entire theory of this concept. To which he was to return often in later years and upon which he based the views he expressed already as Pope John Paul II⁵. This is at the same time his very original contribution to the

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³ In *General Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii - 1995)*, published in Lublin, there is no entry for *self-determination*. This is a characteristic state of affairs for the concept does not fit within the Thomist philosophical categories represented by the Lublin School. Similarly, Ślipko, an extremely good Thomist ethicist, never involved himself in this concept.

⁴ The most important of Wojtyła's philosophical works, *Osoba i czyn* has already many editions (Wojtyła, 1969, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 2000).

⁵ Characteristic is that more often than not John Paul II referred to the concept of self-determination within the central catechesis, when he presented his theology of the body. John Paul II (1979 – 1983). See: www.vatican.va/.../john_paul_ii/audiences/catechesis_genesis/documents/hf_jp-ii_aud_19800213_en.html – 01.12.2010.

development of personalistic anthropology⁶. In this article the method applied will be that designated by the author himself, only after which will there be room for the second stage i.e. the assembly and presentation of the general theory of *self-determination*.

In the work *The Acting Person* the way of presenting and conducting analysis is linked with the phenomenological method. This means that all analyses are based on man's experience. This experience becomes the starting point and area of analyses conducted⁷. The basic question which initially appears is the following: **is the describing and interpreting of that which man has experienced something upon the basis of which one may come to the noumenal bases of man as an individual?**

The concept of experience

How does Wojtyła understand experience and what phenomenological method does he apply as description and interpretation?

So what is experience? First it follows to say after Wojtyła, that it is a great cognitive process. Within it man is the object and subject at the same time, the subject of his own cognition. This is based on empiric moments. In each of these man resides, for it is precisely the *I am me alone* that is contained in every experience. Experience is at the same time tied to understanding. It has its moments and its continuity. Therefore, here the matter concerns experience as a great cognitive process for man, this being linked with understanding. According to Wojtyła what should be understood? Understood was to be: 'intellectually to grasp the essence of a thing or the connections between things' (Wojtyła, 1985, p. 46).

It is with exactly that understanding of the process based on experience and its understanding that links the phenomenological method that the author uses. It follows to here make it clear at the very start that Wojtyła was not a phenomenologist, one who would have based his whole way of thinking and analysis of experience on phenomenology as a philosophical system. He fully uses the phenomenological method as an instrument in his work and research. Which is why he wrote: 'I understand through this reduction (phenomenological reduction) an operation conducted to the fullest and at the same time the most significant visualisation of a given content' (Wojtyła, 1985, p.100). Therefore equally a phenomenological method thus understood allows one to grasp and fundamentally capture the facts given within the experience. And hence he writes about the said in another place: 'A great service may be given in this case by the phenomenological method as well as the ability connected with it to exactly exploit the experienced data' (Wojtyła, 1985, p. 165).

The experience of act

In the description of this experience the matter concerns chiefly **act**. 'There is no proper expression in English for this notion; it will be instructive to see how the same notion can be expressed in other languages. We may take, for example, the Polish word <czyn> , and the German <die Tat>. They do not identify fully with the French <acte humain>, or the Italian <atto umano>, whose terms are literal translations of the Latin <actus humanus>, but not necessarily inclusive of the latter term **when it relates metaphysical depth of the latter term when it relates** to the objectivization of the dynamism proper to man as person. The

⁶ It would be worth comparing the concept of self-determination with what Boros (1962, after Boros, 1974) writes about death being the fullest decision of man.

⁷ According to Wojtyła 'It follows to commence from the experience: of that which is; of that which is; of that as is, and of that as it appears without any conditions *a priori* imposed either on the thing experienced or the experience solicited for it' (Styczeń, 1980, p. 269).

Polish term <czyn> seems to be equivalent in content to <actus humanus> just like the German <die (menschliche) Tat>, although in a different language **from more phenomenological**. The shade of meaning on the term <czyn> is expressed in Polish through a distinct verb <działać> (the Latin equivalent being <agere>), also the noun <działanie> which expressed different kinds of activity, for which reason one speaks for instance of the activity of animals, whereas <czyn> indicates all that St. Thomas expresses in his <actus humanus> as well as in his analyses of <volontarium>' (Wojtyła, 1976, p. 270). For an act given in experience constitutes to some extent a window through which the author desires to peer into the depth of the individual.⁸ In Polish as equally in German the word **act** represents an activity appropriate only for man as an individual. In the spirit of these languages one may say that only the activities of man may be termed an act. And since this is the activity of a person then it always possesses a moral dimension. That is to say that the activity of an individual is always good or bad, and therefore it is never morally indifferent; it is never devoid of these values.

We commonly say in colloquial language *to fulfil an act*. What does this common saying of ours, one functioning in colloquial language, mean? Within it an act becomes connected with the dimension of fullness; with fullness in the dynamic dimension, where fulfilment is an approach towards it but is equally not fulfilment. Man through his acts arrives at this fullness, though also refutes it, leading to unfulfilment. Which is some kind of existential destruction, negation. And here there arises the question: when does an act of man lead to fulfilment, speaking in language *man fulfils an act* and when does that not happen? One may most generally say that in the case of Karol Wojtyła *man fulfils an act*⁹, i.e. reaches fulfilment when the act within his structure appears as *self-determination*. If this is not the case then it leads to unfulfilment or the destruction of fulfilment.

Self-determination appearing in the fact of the experience *I want*.

What is *self-determination*?

In analysing the experience of man's activities one may state that I experience my own activity in particular in two basic dimensions:

- 1) The first is the active: **I act, I am the cause of my action**, its performer;
- 2) And secondly I experience that **something is merely happening within me**, over which I have no influence.

Within me myself there are played out many dynamic processes, over which I have no influence, which within me merely take place, they take place beyond the threshold of my consciousness. However I am aware of these processes when I direct somehow the magnifying glass of my consciousness on them. This occurs also when they stop to correctly

⁸ 'How to see one's very self? How to manifest oneself? Is it like a mirror in which one can see, view, some window where 'my world', my 'I' will be drawn back for me? Inact it is such a mirror, such a window – Wojtyła answers. This window is act, mine for you, yours for yourself. Yet in order to see in it one needs to gain as if an ability to read this mirror, to look through this window. Only then will it manifest itself to me myself, to you yourself, to we ourselves, to people, persons... Through a limited ability to read one will see at most only some coloured picture on the glass. With a good ability the window becomes increasingly transparent for the reader. One does not notice the window slowly, one sees in it straight ahead – although not without it – a person's world' (Styczeń, 1980, p. 269).

⁹ "Il fatto fondamentale *...io agisco – l'uomo agisce*, ci permette di afferrare e comprendere, e anche di intuire in modo evidente, la trascendenza dell'uomo (della persona) nell'azione. Sembra che l'interpretazione tradizionale dell'agire umano, dell'atto (*actus humanus*) non ne manifestasse la trascendenza nel suo significato proprio. *L'interpretazione tradizionale dell'actus humanus*, cioè dell'atto della volontà, interpretato – certo in modo eccellente – come atto fondamentale e fonte del rivolgersi dell'uomo verso il fine" (Wojtyła, 2003).

function and when there appears, for example, pain or some absence or disturbance within these regularities.

Whereby for what I am the instigator I am at the same time responsible for. Which means that I am responsible since I committed it. However the degree of this responsibility is dependant and connected with the personal maturity of the act. As equally the total consciousness of its commitment. Yet for that which is merely happening within me, dynamism in the dimension of activation, I bear no responsibility for it whatsoever. I am not answerable for all processes when they are beyond the threshold of my consciousness.

Here there appears a new dimension which is the moment of will. This **I want**. I fulfil that which it, will, indicates for me. As equally the determination which I myself have achieved as the undertaking of a concrete act, derives itself from will. Ultimately will indicates the dimension of freedom. Without it everything would become simply an activation, that is merely what happens in me, over which I have no influence whatsoever. While the designation **I want**, I can – I don't have to, but I want, I am not forced, this is not happening merely within me, this I want to occur, for that is my will which expresses my freedom.

Transcendence of the individual

Freedom and man's will point at the same time to the dimension of his transcendence. Why? I transcend myself (trans – scendere) striving for some aims – goods which are beyond me, but which are also within me myself.

In philosophical language the meaning of the word *transcendence* is bound with the crossing of the border of one dimension into another. The very word trans – scendere, as breaching/crossing, to go beyond is **already spoken of**. It is this transcending of one dimension into another that Wojtyła calls horizontal transcendence. He goes even further in his analyses speaking and writing equally about vertical transcendence. What does this mean? It plays itself out internally, of the person himself as an individual. It, in transcending its very self, strengthens itself at the same time. For it is the fruit of self-determination as an expression of objectivation within the orbit of the sphere of *I*, i.e. of pure subjectivity. This objectivation derives from the fact that self-determination has a cognitive character striving towards a truth about oneself and in oneself. “We are using in the present exposition the phrase *with reference to truth*, possibly *assigned to truth*. These expressions convey reality, and this is the idea, for we discover within the internal dynamic a relation to truth which is something else than the relation to the things of desire, something deeper than this. The relation to truth is not exhausted within the structure of wanting as intentional act, it does constitute, however, the enrooting of this very act in the individual. Every act of wanting, as it is a settlement or selection displays its dependence on the person. One may refer to this dependence as dependence in truth (Wojtyła, 1985, 170).

In fulfilling an act, in other words approaching fulfilment, being a person who acts, it is exactly through this acting that one becomes at the same time more human, for through acting one reaches fulfilment, one becomes fulfilled in one's action and through it as a person himself. Therefore to be a man – an individual, one becomes at the same time this by achieving its fulfilment specifically through action.

But in order for me to understand *myself* what is expressed by the term *self-determination* I first must possess myself and control myself. Therefore the first task of *self-determination* concerns me myself, in the dimension of vertical transcendence. ‘The simple experience *I want* cannot be correctly interpreted within the dynamic entirety of man if we do not take into consideration within it the said specific complexity peculiar to the person that is

brought about by self-possession. Only upon such a grounding is self-determination possible, while every true human *I want* is this very self-determination. It is this not as the content of an experience plucked from the dynamic structure of the person, but as the content deeply rooted in this very entirety (Wojtyła, 1985, p. 132).

And then may I only, that is to say when I contemplate my very self, within the dimension of *self-determination*, present my very self as a gift to another, as equally can I accept another as a gift; at times a difficult and demanding present!

The theory of *self-determination*

Self-determination points to the internal structure of an individual, which hides and at the same time appears in that very dimension of experience that is the fact: *I want*. This talks of the determination directed towards one's own interior, it is based on *self-possession and self-control*. In reality this is the case, for man in order to decide about something must earlier possess it. Within this process of *self-possession* nobody is able to replace anyone. I may merely decide what it is I possess in reality. Therefore equally in order to decide about one's very self, one needs to first possess the said. Hence it results that we talk of self-possession. For I must control that which I possess in myself. Events experienced reveal this fact in a dual form: *he who controls* – the aspect more dominating; *what is controlled* – the aspect more objective. However here the matter concerns the objectivation which is played out internally of the subject, therefore it is equally closely connected with the subjective dimension i.e. with the dimension *I* which rules. This is bound to consciousness within the dimension of experience. Within this internal structure of man this objectivation that is characterised by *self-determination* is inseparable from cognition.

Also therefore *self-determination* as that unceasing process of objectivation of that which is subjective within the internal structure of man, constitutes that entry into subjectivity. 'It follows to note that the term *self-determination* points at the same time to that the deciding (and acting) is itself only a subject i.e. the personal *I* as a subject determines its very self. Consequently in this dynamic relation the said *I* becomes the subject for its very self – the subject of will as the ruler of the deciding subject' (Wojtyła, 2000, p. 484).

For an act, as a conscious action of man manifesting itself in experience, as opposed to that *which only happens within him*, has its roots in the will which finds its explanation in the freedom: *I want – I am not forced*. Therefore also an analysis of act, in its rich and complex reality, must reveal one of two fundamental points, namely the volitive dimension, to speak in a more precise way the dimension of freedom for the individual. For it is in this very point that the person is revealed in the least complete way, and it is this that constitutes the bases of *self-determination*. 'The discovery of freedom at the root of an individual's causativeness allows us all the more to fundamentally understand man as a **dynamic subject**' (Wojtyła, 1985, p. 148).

The transcendence of a person displaying one's own freedom is both the motor as well as the source of his dynamism. This is first of all the dynamism which is played out internally within man, only later does it manifest itself as an act, through which it realises itself or not. Therefore equally this insane emphasis on *self-determination* as an essential category of person, within which there has to be fulfilled the deepest of his existential fate, is especially needed by the person himself.

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Abstrakt

Pojęcie samostanowienie jest centralną kategorią osoby w ujęciu K. Wojtyły. Uchwycił i wypracował je dzięki zastosowaniu metody fenomenologicznej, tak by w tym pełnym opisie przeżywanego doświadczenia człowieka dotrzeć do podstaw ontycznych człowieka.

HOMO COMMUNICANS – PERSONALISTIC DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNICATION IN CONTEXT OF MEDIA

Michał Drożdż¹⁰

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present the communication process as an act of a person who, as a communicating being, constitutes himself the basic criteria and determinants of communication. It means that communication as an act of human being is above all personally determined. Therefore, speaking about communication, we understand it mainly as a manifestation of human rationality, as a process of communicating in the context of human rationality, as an intrapersonal, interpersonal or collective process. In this article, above all, we try to use the universal meaning of the 'person in the action' and to accommodate the scheme of thinking and arguing of Wojtyła to the analyses of the presence and communicative acts of a person. Following this point of view, any communication, even through media, is an act of a person and a participation in communication relations with other people. Also our analyses endeavor to be a communication study through the prism of a person. Referring to the aforementioned Wojtyła's thought, in the course of our analyses we will try to show that a human being is an integrating subject of his communication activities and a platform of integration of intersubjective media activities. Therefore, it can be said that a person is *homo communicus* and *homo communicans* and, conversely, that *homo communicus* that becomes *homo communicans* is a person.

Keywords: communication, person, media, philosophy of media, personalism

Introduction - *homo communicans*

Every communication process has man¹¹ as its creator, actor or participant. Every act of communication is an act of a person and in each such act other people take part as well, according to the nature and the character of the communication. The basic thesis underlying our reflections is the statement saying that a man, being *homo communicans* and *homo communicus*, is a person. Boethius once defined this elementary truth about a man as a person, with the help of the notions of profound content, by describing a human being as a *rationalis naturae individua substantia*. Regardless of various attempts to define human being descriptively¹², which show different dimensions of humanity and indicate its elementary and constitutive features, man is a rational and free "subject, being the centre of reference for values and experiencing them" (Styczeń, 1993, p. 19). It means that a man as a person is the subject of communication.

The aim of this article is to present the communication process as an act of a person who, as a communicating being, constitutes himself the basic criteria and determinants of communication. It means that communication as an act of human being is above all

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¹¹ Polish word „człowiek” used in the original text refers to both men and women, so similarly the word „man” is obviously meant by the authors in this volume to refer to both sexes with no sexist (editor's note).

¹² Every philosophical current has worked out its own anthropological concepts, starting from the ancient description by Thales, to the effect that man is a „microcosm”, through Pascal's vision of man as “reed shaking in the wind”, to contemporary projects of man lost in the chaos of the universe. See also Szewczyk (1998, p. 41n)

personally determined. Therefore, speaking about communication, we understand it mainly as a manifestation of human rationality, as a process of communicating in the context of human rationality, as an intrapersonal, interpersonal or collective process. In this article, above all, we try to use the universal meaning of the 'person in the action' and to accommodate the scheme of thinking and arguing of Wojtyła to the analyses of the presence and communicative acts of a person. Following this point of view, any communication, even through media, is an act of a person and a participation in communication relations with other people. An act is – following Wojtyła's definition – an entirely conscious and free action of a man. It can be said that an 'act', 'action', 'fulfillment via action' are closely connected with what we call "personal communication" (Wojtyła, 1979a, p. 32; Wojtyła, 1976, p. 53-59; 1979c, p. 273-301; Wojtyła, 1993; Buttiglione, 1997; Smolka, 2002; Pokrywka, 2000; Podgórecki, 2000, p. 23-29; Filipiak, 2003, p. 13-53). Personal communication is to some extent a condition of the media communication. In this article we try to show and justify this elementary thesis.

It seems that the concept of a person in the action elaborated by Wojtyła contains a great heuristic, analytic and argumentative potential for analysis of communication processes. This concept has not been 'used' in any way in the philosophical analyses of communication and mediality. We can surely say that a man's act is of communicative character. It is an elementary media act because it becomes the first 'medium' of a person that communicates and, what is more, even transcends himself through the act. The notion of 'act' contains rich content explications, including communicative ones, that not only explain the nature and the character of human action but, most importantly, also indicate the subject of this activity. This explanation of the profoundness of the content of a human act is at the same time a gradual revelation of the reality that a human being is. Wojtyła maintains that a human being experiences in himself what is 'internal' as well as what is 'external'. Both the former and the latter can be consciously and freely communicable through acts (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 37-38). The direction of Wojtyła's research is relatively novel in comparison with traditional ontological approaches (*operari sequitur esse*). Traditional philosophy of Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas' explained human *agere* – we can add here human *communicare* – as human *esse*. However, Wojtyła states that *esse* reveals itself by *agere*. "An act assumes a person" – writes Wojtyła. This approach was popular in many fields of knowledge on human activity, especially in ethics. Ethics has always been a science about acting that assumes a person: a man as a person. In this study we are going to reverse this approach. Namely, it will be the study of an act that reveals a person, a study of a person through an act" (Wojtyła, 1969a, pp. 14, 29-30; 34-35; 1976, pp. 5-39; 1969b, pp. 5-24; Kowalczyk, 1995, p. 25). Also our analyses endeavor to be a communication study through the prism of a person. Referring to the aforementioned Wojtyła's thought, in the course of our analyses we will try to show that a human being is an integrating subject of his communication activities and a platform of integration of intersubjective media activities. Therefore, it can be said that a person is *homo communicus* and *homo communicans* and, conversely, that *homo communicus* that becomes *homo communicans* is a person.

Communication as a person's action

An act is – following Wojtyła's definition – an entirely conscious and free action of a man. In the philosophical tradition it is *actus humanus* that is the equivalent for the English word 'act'. Additionally, it should be emphasized that if any communication is to remain, the work of man should not extend the boundaries of *actus humanus*. An act is simply an activity characteristic of a man as a person. If the expression *actus humanus* shows this activity as some 'becoming' on the ground of the potentiality of a personal subject, then at the same time the notion of act introduces us to an extremely complex and rich world of man's communication. It can be said that 'act', 'activity', 'becoming' are most closely connected with all those things that relate to a man present and acting in the media space.¹³

The notion of 'act' contains rich content explications relating to the communication space. Man not only cognitively enters the world of communication and finds himself in this world as one of the essential elements of the processes going on there, but also becomes aware of his own active participation in the world of communication and media. It can be said that *homo communicus* becomes *homo communicans*. For consciousness not only reflects but also in a special way makes it internal, i.e. internalizes what it reflects and provides it with room in the 'I' of a person. According to Wojtyła – in a man it is possible to experience what is 'internal' and what is 'external' as well. Both the former and the latter can be consciously communicable (Wojtyła, 1969a, pp. 37-38)¹⁴.

Man acts not only consciously and in a free way but also according to self-reflection, which means that he is aware of the fact that he acts consciously. Therefore, man is aware of his action and of himself as the personalistic subject of act. Man is aware of the act and its subject in their dynamic correlation (Wojtyła (1969a, pp. 33-35). More on selected typologies of communication acts can be found in Stewart (2002, pp. 35-161) and Nęcki (2000, pp. 51-89). In Wojtyła's thought, a reversal of perspectives can be noticed, which is interesting from the methodological point of view. On the one hand, Wojtyła makes the inner human experience, acts of consciousness and freedom which constitute the basis for the ethical action, a point of departure. On the other, metaphysics of a human being, in the discussion conducted in such a way, becomes the destination point¹⁵. However, we can still encounter the opposite direction in Wojtyła's thought. A person transcending himself in his act is a point of departure, whereas different types of interpersonal relations and communication are an end. These two perspectives always show a human being in the centre. In whatever way we approach communication processes or media space, there will always be a man in their centre. A human being appears as the main basis and the main principle of communication ethics. Accepting a human being as the main basis of ethics can become the common platform for constructing media deontologies for many rational axiological orientations. The basis should be understood in a threefold way: as the beginning, the way, and the end. A person and his transcendence is at the roots of ethics because man as an acting subject experiences the foundations of his activity, experiences his rationality and freedom. an as a person is also a way of respecting the dignity of every other person. In this sense it becomes the basis for

¹³ In our former analyses we demonstrated that media communication has features characteristic of interpersonal communication. The latter notwithstanding, media message is a communication process in which a man is present together with his act (Wojtyła, 1969a), see also McQuail (2001, p. 97n).

¹⁴ Interioriation is very well dealt with in the psychology of communication studies, e.g.: Ratajczak and Zabierowski (2001, pp. 89-98); Lindsay and Norman (1984, p. 7n; 1977).

¹⁵ The first part of our study has show the dominant tendencies in contemporary theories of media. These are first and foremost pragmatic-functional, constructivist, structuralist and post-modernist approaches, all of which are characterised by negative attitude towards the metaphysics of a person. Lack of these references makes them as if suspended in the anthropologic-axiological void (Nęcki, 2000, pp. 90-119).

ethical valuation. And finally, man is the end of ethics oriented at his self-realization and improving his humanity.

Man as a person is himself the basis that unifies different elements and qualities: the spiritual and the material spheres, rational freedom and biological instincts, different attitudes, experiences, values, contexts and the like. Despite their dichotomic or alternative character man is a personal unity in the way that all those elements, being sometimes pairs of opposite qualities, form one structure of humanity on the strength of the personal essence of man. Man is a unity of the spheres of the spirit and the body. Both these spheres are integral and constitutive elements of the human being, regardless of whether they are defined and explained on the notional or methodological basis. The spiritual aspect of a person expresses itself through the body and due to this integrity of a person, human communication in the broadest meaning of this word is possible at all. Above all, we talk about media communication, though it consists of other forms of communication, for instance: expressing opinions, communicating cognitive acts, body language communication, communicating feelings, communicating values and so on. A simple but very important thesis can be put forward that media communication is possible because man as a person is *homo communicus* and *homo communicans* at the same time. It should also be indicated that it is man's rationality that is at the bottom of man's communication abilities and at the same time it is the basis for ethical valuation.

Communication – a person's transcendence “in truth”

Each communication process must be performed in the atmosphere of truth, which, in other words, means that no communication is possible without reference to truth¹⁶. We can therefore say that an act is fully human and communication is fully human only if they are „true”. The guarantor and the source of that truth is a person's transcendence in the truth. Understood as a dynamic property of a person, transcendence may be partly explained by comparison to the dynamism of nature. The ability to decide about oneself needs to be respected and put higher in regard to any condition of human communication. That supremacy, which takes its origin in the possibility of human self-possession, allows people to transcend all their limits. Rejection or denial of that superiority causes man to reduce himself to perform the role of the object of external interactions or the subject of acts determined by or conditioned by instincts (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 124). In the first case, we are dealing with the person acting in action itself or through action (*in actu persona*), in the other, we consider the person as *individuum* who functions through his response and action (*individuum in actu*). If in any theory of the media this operation of *in actu persona* is rejected or denied, man will reduce himself merely to the role of *individuum in actu*. In this way man will deprive himself of what is fully human, and thus he will become only a natural „individual”. For every act, including all types of communication, the right formula for man is to meet and implement personal actions, rather than actions of an individual. No communication in the strict sense can be realized where man is not able to submit his own „dynamics”, „acts”, „expressions”, „relationships”, „ties”, and other human activities, to his personal „true self” (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 125).

In the proper understanding of the basics of personal communication it is vital to refer to two important phrases, namely: 'assignment to the truth „and „relation to the truth.” Both of

¹⁶ The discussion on this subject reaches quite wide at the moment and is very diverse because many authors speak differently about the same matter, see Seifert (1988, pp. 37-47), Jonkisz (1999), Jaskóła & Olejarczyk (2003), and Jabłoński & Wygoda (2002).

these phrases define the essence of the dynamics of human action. Relationship between the act and the truth does not end in the structure of volition, defined as an intentional act. Basically, this relationship profoundly determines – not only in the psychological sense – how deeply a given action will take roots in the person. Each act of volition shows a peculiar dependence on the person, because it is most profoundly connected with resolving and taking a decision. This particular dependence between a person's volition and his essential being becomes also a dependence on a person and on the truth. „Dependence on the truth” – as Wojtyła puts it – seems to finally explain a person's transcendence in the person in action, his superiority in relation to his own dynamism” (Wojtyła, 1969a, pp. 144-145).

Searching for the bases of personal communication, it is worth considering once again „relation to the truth”, already mentioned here. In every process of communication there has to be at least one moment of truth. It seems that by this „moment of truth” Wojtyła understands the personal criterion of truth, which is the realization of the person in truth (Siemianowski, 1986, p. 76-103; also, in a wider context: Styczeń, 1988, pp. 47-57). In other words, we can understand “the moment of truth” as the very presence of a person in the process of communication. Apart from being evident, the truth is an undeniable value of human dignity. Without truth no communication or judgment or even forming an opinion would be possible. Thus understood, „the moment of truth” goes well beyond the authenticity of the communication process, as well as beyond every necessary criterion of truthful communication. It transcends the subjective determinants of communication, pointing out the truth about the subject of communication, who is a human being in his full dignity, and it shows a person as the basis of every ethical evaluation. If we refer to the human experience, with particular emphasis on the experience of truth in morality, we will find there the foundation of ethical decisions which are based on man's relation to the truth about his own dignity. “Thus there is no way in which individual choices or decisions of human will are always true. The same applies to communication. Man quite often wants something that is not really good and he often chooses what isn't really good. Such a solution, however, or such a choice cannot be regarded as a mistake, (...) as a mistake takes place in human thoughts, not in human will. A solution or a choice that takes as the subject something that is not real good, especially if it is made against what has already been acknowledged as real good, bears all resemblance of guilt and is evil.

However, this very reality of guilt and moral evil known from the experience of morality emphasizes even stronger the fact that in human volition the relation to the truth as well as interior dependence on that very truth is always present (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 146).” If taking a decision or making a choice were not based on that “moment of truth”, or, in other words, were those choices or decisions to be taken without any reference to the „moment of truth”, the whole ethos of human action, all the morality space which forms a vivid reality to a person – all this space would lose its sense and purpose. It is important for that reality to discern between moral good and evil. Indeed, it is important to discern between moral good and evil. The distinction is not only based on the relationship of man to the truth, especially truth about himself, but, indeed – in communication understood in a wider sense – it significantly expands the relation to the truth. In short, to distinguish between good and evil, which is so important for morality, and in its space relevant also to the ethics of media, it is assumed that cognition and volition of any object is realized on the principle of the truth about the real good of the very object. Knowing and wanting evil is always a destruction of that relationship, and a more or less destruction of one's own humanity, because man cannot destroy the truth (which dwells within him) about his purpose and his dignity.

Manifestatio of a person by means of communication

The basic thesis of Wojtyła's thought is the assertion that "a person manifests himself through act." Human act reveals a person in man, which is because Wojtyła regards the experience of act as the basic human experience.¹⁷ If every human act has relation and communicativeness inscribed into it and if communication is the basic human act, consequently – in the spirit of Wojtyła's thought – it follows that every single type of communication reveals and manifests man as a person as well. In other words, man manifests himself as a person in communication processes. Wojtyła believes that every act is at the same time a person's experience. An entire human being participates and most fully expresses himself in an act. An analysis of an act can thus lead to obtain a picture of man which contains various aspects and dimensions of human existence. Human act is a reality that can be experienced in two ways. First, it is experienced from within, the lived-through and conscious side; second, it is perceived from without, both by the acting person and other people. An act is thus perceived as a phenomenological reality which stems from experiences of a perceiving awareness, and as an ontic, objective and ethical reality, for it also undergoes ethical evaluation based on objective criteria (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 29n).

Personalistic communication is – generally speaking – an expression of human causality. Man is the creator of and the participant in communication processes. Communication processes do not occur in isolation from man, but against an entire dynamism of man and in strict, organic connection with him. „It is all about intentional dynamism, which is given to us in total human experience. Not all that constitutes it finds its reflection in consciousness. For instance, the entire vegetative dynamism characteristic of the human body does not find its reflection in consciousness. Similarly, not all facts which constitute total human dynamism are consciously experienced (...). Nonetheless, the dynamism characteristic of man not only finds the basic reflection in consciousness, but man is also aware of the major directions of his dynamism, which is connected with experiencing them. After all, man experiences acting as something essentially different from happening” (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 62). A genuine personalistic communication becomes possible due to the fact that man as a person is to be characterized by means of causality peculiar to himself. With reference to the analogy of being, it is possible to view both human action and whatever happens in man, as a fulfillment of a certain potentiality. The first as well as the other are a realization, or – to use Aristotle's expression – a dynamic unity of act and potentiality. Since communication is a *sui generis* personalistic „coming out” beyond a man and towards another man, then a man can „transmit” to others the whole human dynamism, reflected in his own action. Additionally, the acting man (announcing or getting into contact) can transmit and manifest himself, both in what constitutes the context and content of his action and in what “happens” in and next to him. All of this takes place on the grounds of human rationality, i.e. in a free and conscious way.¹⁸ Man thus manifests himself in communication processes in an entire complexity of his world of values, but – above all – in his personalistic dignity and merit. The statement is primarily of use in interpersonal communication, but also pertains to media communication, in which – as we keep trying to demonstrate – man participates and is constantly present.

¹⁷ A lot of factors were decisive in this case. It seems that the time of the influence of the Marxist concept of act in Poland was not insignificant. Wojtyła's concept formed a strong and efficient polemic with theoretical and practical Marxism. Wojtyła definitely rejects the narrowed concept of *praxis* that was favoured by Marxism, and demonstrates the human act to be a deep personalistic reality, which is worthy merely of man, who is also capable of “participating” in acts of other people. See also Wojtyła (1979b, pp. 9-20), Niemiec (1993-1994, pp. 179-182).

¹⁸ On psychological aspects of communication and media see more in: Chio (1998, p. 14n) also see e.g. some publications on the psychology of media, [online], access: 14.06.2010, <http://www.apa.org/divisions/div46/>.

Accordingly, media communication has a human dimension, becoming a space of and for human acts, which in turn reveal his personalistic merit. Man's manifesting himself by means of communication processes can become an appropriate platform of ethical evaluation of any and every human act which takes place in the space of media communication.

Personalistic communication is an expression of human causality. It is worth mentioning here that broadly understood communication has two objective structures inscribed: that "man acts" and that "something happens in man". The structures determine two basic directions of the dynamism characteristic of man. The directions are in a sense contrary inasmuch as in one of them what becomes revealed and realized is communicable activity, whereas in the other its inaction and passiveness. If the latter is perceived as such by other persons, it can be understood as a resignation from human communication activity or as the attitude of a simple media consumption.

It is also worth a mention that all that is „passive” in man is connected with communication processes. Following Wojtyła, two aspects of passiveness can be distinguished which can be expressed in the following sentences: "there's something going on in a man" and „there's something going on with a man". Colloquially, the sentences are often used interchangeably; not infrequently when we say that there's something going on with a man, do we mean that there's something going on in a man. Properly speaking, however, the phrase what happens „with a man” points at his receiving something from the outside. It is such a kind of passiveness that can even be an element determining the shape of communication. Man is then not the dynamic subject of happening whose origin is in him, but rather an object to which another subject or even another force (e.g. media technology) does something and he is only affected. Such a type of passiveness manifests itself particularly in every media manipulation or in media consumption processes.

The other expression, "there's something going on in a man", introduces us to the area of human secrets, which can be revealed only when the subject himself has evaluated these experiences, introduced them within his own consciousness and is willing to entirely or at least partly transmit them outside. The transmission is usually executed in communication processes, with the help of media, which of their own nature belong to external determinants of communication. In this context there appears an entire area of various types of media content creation, transmission and reception determinants. These determinants largely shape media communication, co-create media space as well as condition ethical evaluation of the processes that actively take place therein. It can thus be seen that the two objective structures of human communication, i.e. the fact that it is "man who acts" in media space and the fact that "man passively lets things happen in himself", have not only practical consequences as far as the functioning of media is concerned, but possess also their axiological consequences. They form the actual platform of ethical evaluation, which – after all – is accomplished in the context of what pertains to both human action and to something "happening" with and in man (Wojtyła, 1969a, pp. 62-65; Czarniecki, 2001, pp. 34n; Gajda, 2002a, pp. 45-77).

Communication as rooted in the rationality of a person

Communication is a conscious act of man. What is more, man as a person is also aware of his action. Man not only acts consciously, but is also aware of acting consciously. Human communication is – generally speaking – carried out in the space of rationality. It is so because consciousness accompanies human action which thanks to it can manifest its personalistic roots. The manifestation is somehow inscribed in any and every type of a person's mediality. Consciousness has its continuity and identity, which are different from the constitution and identity of every human act. Man's consciousness and freedom, i.e. human

rationality, constitute a ground for human acts to be rooted in, including all communication processes.

Each process of communication stems from rationality and leaves a “trace” of its presence in human consciousness. Consciousness accompanies an act and reflects it when it is born and carried out. The proper function of consciousness is the cognitive function. Consciousness recognizes and reflects what “happens in a man”, as well as what a man “acts”. The “happening” and “acting” can be transmissible, that is communicable to other persons (Wojtyła, 1969a, pp. 35-36).¹⁹ The fact that communication is rooted in the rationality of a person means also a connection between communication and autonomy of a person.

Autonomy not only pertains to consciousness but also to man’s freedom and its role in shaping both a person and his acts. Man’s inner freedom is reflected by means of his acts, which is to say by means of human communication. Inner freedom – according to Wojtyła – “manifests itself (...) not so much as an internal property of an act carried out by a person but as a property of a person who is capable of committing acts only because he is in possession of such a property. This relation can be reversed only to assert that it is a person who becomes manifest by means of will – and not only will – and in a person. Every act confirms and simultaneously reifies this relationship, in which will demonstrates itself as a property of a person” (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 109). A person – thanks to his freedom – becomes a communicable reality. This dynamism of man, which consists in self-revealing himself as a person by means of his own action, makes up the crux of autonomy.

Autonomy is connected with an entire dynamism of man, of a person’s *fieri*. Thanks to the *fieri* communication is also possible. This is *fieri* of a person who has his own ontic distinctness as well as axiological dimension. One and the other dimension point at morality as the natural area of human action. Both emphasize the moral character of human action and contain elements of ethical normativeness. It goes beyond any doubt that autonomy, which is expressive of an entire dynamism of a person’s freedom, is a complex reality. A person is someone who owns himself and, simultaneously, someone who is owned only and exclusively by himself. Self-possession as a peculiar structural property of a person manifests and confirms itself in action by means of free will. Will also reveals itself by means of communication, which is a peculiar way of human action. A simple experience of “I want” cannot be read properly unless the entire dynamic reality which is self-possession is taken into consideration. Man can “acquire” a lot and he can own a lot, too. He also can – to a larger or a lesser extent – become “appropriated” by media, thereby becoming much less himself and restricting at the same time his freedom of action. Self-possession is also connected with the other inner relation that takes place in the very structure of man as a person, and concurrently most strictly bound up with man’s will and inner freedom. It is an inner ability of a person to execute self-control. On one hand, it enters the entire dynamism of a person; on the other, in the person’s all manners of communication. The person, on the one hand – respecting his entire complexity – executes self-control; on the other, the person is someone who he himself controls. This self-control, as a person distinguishing property, assumes self-possession and constitutes its larger reification (Wojtyła, 1969a, pp. 109-111).

It seems useful to our analyses to recall here what Marcel wrote about ownership in “To be and to have”: “Actually, everything boils down to a distinction between what one has and what one is. The trouble is, it is unspeakably difficult to express it in a conceptual form, which should, after all, be possible. What one has, comprises most evidently something

¹⁹ If consciousness and its cognitive skills become in any way distorted by media, we deal then with a broadly-understood manipulation, e.g.: Lepa (1995, p. 23n).

external in relation to one's 'I'. This externality is not complete, however. In principle, what one has is things (or whatever can become similar to things, and to such an extent that this similarity is possible). Strictly speaking, I can only have what exists (...) independently of me. In other words, what I have becomes added to me; moreover, the fact that something is owned by me is added to those properties, qualities, etc. that belong to the things that I have. I only have what I can (...) dispose of; in other words, inasmuch as I can be treated as a force, as a being equipped with potentialities. Only what one has can be passed on" (Marcel, 1986, p. 134)²⁰. All that means that a man can transmit, communicate who he is and what he has.

Media communication is most frequently considered in the context of transmission or message. The message, however, does not deplete the total of communication processes, as has already been remarked. Both personalistic communication and media communication are complex processes which contain a wide range of relations and interactions of various character. Man communicates mainly himself as a person endowed with a personal quality and dignity in media space in which also *communio personarum* is accomplished. Autonomy and self-possession, which are in a way two dimensions of a person's autonomy, reveal and manifest the order of „being a person” as well as the order of the person's rational uniqueness, which cannot be closed up in patterns of objectified media world. In other words, media communication is rooted in the rationality of a person and the subjectivity of human action originating therefrom. Therefore, the foundations of education and of the role of media in education must also be of rational and subjective character.

Integration of a person in communication

Man lives in a rich area of values; what is more, he is the subject of ontic and qualitative values through which he realizes human nature. Man and the community of persons not only dwell in a world of values but, first and foremost, they participate in it. The participation emphasizes the subjective dimension of human activity in relation to a world of values. What is more – owing to that participation, a human being can fully develop. A human being can also – by means of various ways of personalistic communication – pass the values onto other persons. The problem of values and their transmission has been the subject matter of a wide axiological reflection, especially in the last century. In many studies of the kind the world of values used to be treated either like a reality subjectively generated by and dependent on man or viewed in such abstract terms that it ceased to have any vital connections with a person. In the first case, we can speak about extreme subjectivism and axiological relativism; in the other, about various types of axiological idealisms. Discussion over the status and nature of values is still open, involving a lot of philosophical orientations and generating various types of theoretical attitudes (Finance, 1968, p. 267n). It is moving

²⁰ Marcel also analyses the possibility of communication via body. He writes: „I cannot focus my attention upon what, strictly speaking, is „my body” – contrary to the body as a thing which a physiologist has in mind – without stumbling against an almost inscrutable concept of ownership. Can I, after all, say that my body as such is a thing? If I treat it like a thing, then who am I, who treat it like that? In the end – as I wrote in ‘Metaphysical Diary’ (p. 252) – we reach the following statement: ‘my body is a thing, I am nothing’. Idealism will fall back on the statement that ‘I’ is an act which constitutes the subjective reality of my body. Is it not a conjuror's trickery? – I would add. I am afraid so. Between this idealism and pure materialism there is only one difference, somehow vanishing (...). It is the difference in the manner of reducing man (...). Isn't killing oneself disposing of one's body (or one's life) in the same way as one disposes of what one has, that is, of a thing? Whatever is that inscrutably mysterious relation between one's 'I' and oneself? Isn't it clear that the relation is fundamentally different in the case of a person who refuses to kill himself because he does not claim such a right, as he does not belong to himself? Do we not notice that underneath this – as it were – minute difference of phrasing there is an unfulfillable chasm which can only be examined step by step” (Marcel, 1986, pp. 134-135). See also: Wojtyła (1979a, pp. 285-299).

over to the world of media, which, after all, are a space where values are communicated. Regardless of many dimensions of that axiological polemic and its argumentation, we make an assumption that ontic values upon which we particularly focus here are of objective character and are included in the subjectivity of man.

The world of values is integrated with the personal nature of man. Values can be passed onto others so long as they are endowed with the quality of objectivity and, secondly, provided they are integrated with the person who passes them on, who communicates them. The ethical value is not a subjective construct of, for instance, human emotionality, but it is a value in itself, endowed with the quality of objectivity. It is also necessary to notice another important factor of ethical values, that is, their subjective rooting, their integration with man as their subjective carrier. A value then becomes “personalized”, which does not mean that ethical value gains the status of an anthropological ontic value; rather, it means that man as a person becomes a subjective platform of integration, values rooting, and the space for them to be realized. Values “personalized”, that is, linked, integrated with a human being in such a way can be, directly or via media, communicated to others. Depending on what kind of ethical values are “personalized” in man, we can speak about ethical integration or disintegration of man.

Apart from a lot of connotations, the notions of “integration” and “merging”, have in the first place, an ethical and legal resonance. Ethical integration seems to point at no so much making a whole of what used to be separated, but rather at a realizing and manifesting of the wholeness and unity of the world of ethical values on the ground of man’s subjectiveness (Wojtyła, 1969a, pp. 202-203) as well as an unfolding of man’s integrity in the world of values.

It seems that in order to better comprehend what personal participation in values is and what communication of values is, it may be necessary to refer to the original concept of a person’s integration in act, which was put forward by Wojtyła. Following his line of reasoning, we once again start from “a man’s experience”, from the fact that a man “acts” and “communicates” within the area of that action. This experience reveals a person’s causality, based upon rationality, which reveals the freedom and consciousness of a person in action. The experience that man is “the author” of an act conditions the action and differentiates the action as an act of a person from all other numerous indications of human dynamism. All that takes place within man as a subject, highlights even more strongly the dynamic peculiarity of an act shaped by the world of values. To put it in a different way, it is in and through his act that man articulates what values are important for him and what values are realized in him as well as which of them he passes onto others.

The notion of integration is also connected with the notion of a person’s transcendence in the action. The thought was particularly stressed by Wojtyła. „In a sense, we deduce the notion of integration from the notion of transcendence – he wrote – as the former is complimentary to the latter, whereby we can grasp and determine the other necessary aspect of reality contained within the experience ‘man acts’. It is necessary as without it, the very transcendence would hang in a structural emptiness. Going even further back, to the issue of a person’s autonomy, we deduce the notion of integration from reflections on the issue of causality and subjectivity of the human “I” in the action. Man experiences himself as the author of his own action; as a result, he is its own subject. He also experiences himself as the subject although experiencing subjectivity is different from experiencing causality. Man also experiences himself as the subject of whatever happens in him. Experiencing subjectivity always contains a kind of passiveness; experiencing causality is active to the very core – which is exactly why it constitutes human action. Nevertheless, every act contains a certain

synthesis of causality and subjectivity of the human 'I'. If, then, causality is, as it were, the area for a person's transcendence to manifest itself, subjectivity fulfills the same role in reference to integrity" (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 201).

Running the risk of a generalization, it can be stated that an integration of values also takes place on the ground of personalistic subjectivity. It is thanks to this that a person becomes not only a carrier of values, but he can also participate in them. Experiencing values becomes connected with recognizing values. A person is a ground integrating the axiological sphere with the sphere of intellectual cognition. Both cognitive grounds form the foundation of man's self-knowledge, in which all is about man understanding himself, about a kind of cognitive permeation, of both the very one and unique value – a *sui generis* value – that is the very person, and of all other values which serve a person's integral development. Self-knowledge is a cognitive act; consequently, it objectifies the totality of value experience, allowing man to recognize them more accurately (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 38). One concept is worth emphasizing here, namely that any anthropology that disregards values is incapable of providing and expressing the entire knowledge about man, naturally within the limits of its methodological competence. Similarly, the same can be said about theories of media. The concepts of media which on principle exclude the axiological dimension of the media space cannot constitute an appropriate ground for ethical analyses. As A. Szostek rightly observes, even though morality and man are two different realities, it is morality that cannot function without man and that cannot be considered in separation from man. Man lives in the space of morality. "Morality is a certain property of a human action – and of man himself, who becomes good or evil via his acts. Man, on the other hand, is not a property of morality; he constitutes a more autonomous reality, albeit hidden in its structure. And he manifests himself by means of communication" (Szostek, 1980, p. 287). What needs to be added here is that all this occurs thanks to a person's integration in the action, who in turn communicates – via the action – the world of values integrated with it.

A person's integration in the action takes place in the area of natural determinants of human life, which is to say in determinants of the somatic as well as psycho-spiritual spheres. In no way can they be regarded as determinants of human life; still, they form appropriate framework of a fully human action, in which the spiritual sphere remains independent of the somatic sphere, of which it is in command. Both the spheres are open to external interactions. There is no doubt nowadays that media can more and more efficiently influence man, affecting positively or negatively the two spheres of his life. Therefore, man either becomes integrated or disintegrated in the media space.

Disintegration of a person in communication

The notion of „integration” and the process of integration of a person in communication is connected with the notion of “disintegration” (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 213). Man can also become an integrational ground for anti-values, that is he can become ethically disintegrated. Discussing the meaning of a person's integration, Karol Wojtyła also touches the other theme, namely disintegration. He not only deals with the analysis of the very term “disintegration”, but above all with the analysis of the entire reality that comes with it. “Disintegration” is an ambiguous term. It pertains to various fields of human social and cultural activity, and to analyses referring to human personality in the first place.²¹ Most often it is used within the area of psychology, where mention is made even about so called positive

²¹ See more on positive disintegration combined with a theory of communication: Korporowicz (1996, pp. 57-77).

disintegration. In such various contexts symptoms of disintegration are observed to arise in what in any way deviates from human normality or is unable to reach it.²² It seems that the colloquial – and at the same time scholarly because applied in various specific fields of knowledge – meaning of disintegration is the basic one. In the context of ethics, disintegration always has a negative resonance. Inner disintegration would mean a person's integrating of anti-values whereas outer disintegration is nothing else but manipulation. Both, however, pertain to the inner sphere of man.

The basic meaning of disintegration is to be uncovered in the context of the basic meaning of integration. "That basic meaning of integration – Wojtyła writes – is always in a way a person's integration in the action and remains in strict relation with the structure of ownership and self-control, which is so essential for a person. It is a structure fundamental to being oneself even though it becomes accomplished in an act and in an act it manifests itself. What we call psychological personality or moral (ethical) personality is in relation to the very being a person something derivative, secondary and somehow aspectual. Integration – as well as disintegration – in the basic meaning is herein considered in relation to the basic structure, and not only in relation to derivative structures even though we use these terms as pertaining to those structures as well (...). In this way, then, by disintegration in the basic meaning of the term will be understood what becomes exposed in the structure of self-possession and self-control suitable for a given person as a lack or defect in that very structure" (Wojtyła, 1969a, p. 205). A person's disintegration can be accomplished in two fields or dimensions. The first of them is the inner, basic dimension. It is connected with a man's relinquishing his own ability to self-own and self-control. In the case of basic disintegration man as a person seems to be devoid of the abilities of his own accord, by integrating within himself and passing on anti-values. The other type of disintegration is of an external character and results from a negative, communicative external interaction. In such a case man becomes disintegrated as a result of external manipulation in which media perform a more and more efficient role. Generally speaking, a person's disintegration in a communicative act is merely a distortion and destruction of values with which the act is connected.²³

Thanks to the autonomy in truth man owns and controls himself. Disintegration means a kind of – more or less profound – incapability of executing self-possession and self-control by means of autonomy. Furthermore, a disintegrated person is unable to subdue himself to the truth itself and to communicate positive values. Defects and lacks of value integration in a person become, consequently, defects and lacks in the communication of these values. The inability to properly execute autonomy on the part of a person leads also to a weakening of the capability of self-cognition as well as of the recognition of the world of values, which will finally negatively reverberate when it comes to the quality of human action. Disintegration also negatively affects the criteria and the very process of ethical evaluation and also the

²² Wojtyła puts it in the following way: „In this formulation an integrated man is simply a normal man, a disintegrated one – is abnormal or not fully normal. A question arises what these scholarly disciplines view as norm, that is the measure of human normalcy. It seems that the measure is to a large extent accepted intuitively: simply, a sane mind will immediately distinguish between a normal person and one who is abnormal or not quite normal. Disciplines dealing with human personality – based on such an intuition of a norm – have been able to examine very thoroughly particular symptoms of disintegration in an appropriate dimension. The dimension is expressed by means of the term „psychological personality”, which is profoundly penetrated by man's moral personality” (Wojtyła (1969a, p. 204).

²³ “Cases of such profound and thorough disintegration are very well known to exact sciences; they also have their psycho-medical qualifications. It is these facts that we refer to here, in a manner of speaking by way of example, since we are not after a very diversified phenomenal description, but after a formulation of the basic meaning of disintegration. This meaning – as has already been stated – is connected with the dynamic structure of a person” (Wojtyła (1969a, p. 205).

possibility of making right choices. “The term disintegration leads to a better understanding the basic meaning of integration, i.e. the aspect of the dynamic reality of a person that we want to have designated by means of the term (...). Diverse dynamisms appropriate to man in the somatic layer and in the mental layer of his natural potentiality are involved in human action. Every act is a kind of “merging” them (Wojtyła, 1969a, pp. 205, 210). This merging, pertaining also to the merging of values and occurring due to man’s capability of autonomy, helps him shape and develop, not only the integrated world of positive values but, above all, the integrity of a person.²⁴Man is always the subject of all communication processes. They will be efficient and ethically right so long as their foundation is a value-integrated human being (Szlaga, 1996, p. 150).

Conclusions

Man is a source of communication, which means that human rationality is inscribed in the very nature of communication. The necessary presence of man in the communication space means that the basic dimension of all the processes taking place therein should be the human dimension, the dimension of humanity. It is from here that a simple and yet fundamental conclusion can be derived, namely that the dimension demands ethical evaluation. The presence of man in the communication space implies the need for ethics on the one hand, and, on the other, points to the very man, to his dignity and merit as the basic norm of ethical evaluation. The notion of human dignity is a term applied in many fields. It is used in anthropological, psychological, sociological and moral perspectives. Human dignity is easier to experience and to sense than to perceive and describe because it contains such contents as: veneration, respect, good fame, reputation, esteem, prestige, honor, human quality and the like. Man as a person possesses dignity, which determines his personal quality, the latter being comparable with nothing else. For any ethics of communication, it is of fundamental significance whether and to what extent it takes into account that constitutive and indispensable foundation of human dignity.

²⁴ Analyzing the meaning of integration Wojtyła seems to understand the notion in Aristotelian and Thomistic terms. In his explanation Wojtyła uses three other terms, namely: “reactivity”, “vegetation” and “reproduction”. When man runs short of life-giving integration, then he pushes himself or is pushed by others into the sphere of reactivity. “In the constitution of human organism the ability to react to stimuli is directly connected with the nervous system, which ‘serves’ the whole body and determines particular directions of its reactive dynamism as well as the somatic potentiality which lies at its roots” (Wojtyła, 1969a, pp. 223-224).

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Abstrakt

Człowiek jest źródłem komunikacji, to znaczy, że w samą naturę komunikacji wpisana jest ludzka racjonalność. Konieczna obecność człowieka w przestrzeni komunikacji sprawia, iż podstawowym wymiarem wszystkich procesów w niej zachodzących powinien być wymiar ludzki, wymiar człowieczeństwa. Obecność człowieka w przestrzeni komunikacji z jednej strony implikuje potrzebę etyki, a drugiej strony wskazuje na samego człowieka, na jego godność i wartość, jako na podstawową normę wartościowania etycznego. W toku prezentowanych analiz staramy się pokazać, iż osoba ludzka jest integrującym podmiotem własnych działań komunikacyjnych oraz platformą integracji interdmiotowych działań medialnych, dlatego też można powiedzieć, że osoba jest homo communicus i homo communicans i odwrotnie, że homo communicus, które staje się homo communicans jest osobą.

HUMAN PREDISPOSITIONS AND PERSONAL COMPETENCES

Zenon Uchnast²⁵

Abstract

The topic of personal psychology is presented from a perspective of achievements in humanistic psychology (M. Kinget), proprium psychology (G. Allport), personalistic psychology (J. DuBois), and also with reference to the assumptions of the Self-Determination Theory of E. Deci and R. Ryan. Nonetheless, a particular subject of interest are the assumptions of W. Stern's personalistic approach crucial in psychology and its way of psychological interpretation of natural, human personal predispositions, which are the basis of development of personal competences to perform specifically human activities. With reference to W. Stern's conception of the person as the subject of psychological analysis, I present a model of the dimensions of the structure of dispositions of the human person as a proactive subject. Next, I point to the possibility of formulating research hypotheses and their empirical verification in the scope of individual differences between empirically distinguished character types, which are described after Stern as determinants of personal life orientations in the dimension of cooperation – self-preservation.

Keywords: agency subject, character, person, personality, personalistic approach, personal disposition.

Introduction

The topic of the human being's personal nature still seems to be rather a subject of philosophy than psychology. Modern academic psychology, since the time of Wilhelm Wundt (1832 – 1920), most often treated as one of the natural sciences, has been oriented to a great extent at describing and explaining biological and environmental determinants of human and animal behavior. An exception to this was the work of William Stern, especially his handbook: *General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint* (New York, 1938). G. W. Allport (1953) promoted this kind of approach in personalistic psychology, describing himself as “person-centered”. In the years 1950 – 1970, there was a significant increase of psychologists' interest in the topic concerning the person in the wide trend of humanistic psychology. C. Rogers (1955) formulated the challenging question: *Persons or science?* He also made an attempt to establish empirical foundations in professing academic personal psychology, which he presented in the work under the notable title: *Becoming a Person* (1961). M. Kinget, cooperating with Rogers, made an effort to systematize the views of representatives of the humanistic orientation, stating the following: The focus of humanistic psychology is upon specificity of man, upon that which sets him apart from all other species. It differs from other psychologies because it views man not solely as a biological organism modified by experience and culture but as a person, a symbolic entity capable of pondering his existence, of lending it meaning and direction. (Kinget, 1975, p. v).

Among specifically human personal characteristics, Kinget distinguished: reflective consciousness, historical and prospective awareness as a sense of time, and symbolic capacity as a key to man's uniqueness, culture making, interpersonal creativity, freedom and responsibility, self-transcendence, ultimate concern, and religious behavior.

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In the 1990's, James Dubois adopted a personalistic approach in psychology in *The Nature and Tasks of a Personalist Psychology* (1995), published under his editorship. The assumptions of this approach were published in the form of an appendix to the book published under J. Dubois (1997) which was titled, "*Philosophical Principles of the Institute for Personalist Psychology (IPP)*". The ten principles of IPP are: (1) *The nature of evidence (...)*, as any way in which a truth reveals itself (...) as one approaches peculiarly personal phenomena such as love, freedom, ethical action, and religious practice; (2) *Human beings as personal beings (...)* must not be viewed simply as "higher animals" but must be seen in their specifically personal dimension; (3) *The spiritual dimension* of the human person; (4) *The objectivity of values*; (5) *Rationality*. It arises from the ability of persons to transcend themselves and respond to reality appropriately; (6) *Human freedom*; (7) *Moral responsibility*; (8) *The religious dimension*; (9) *The limitations of the human person*; (10) *Society and the family*. Human beings are social by nature, and develop intellectually, spiritually, emotionally, and morally within a variety of social settings. (Cf. Uchnast, 2002).

However significant the assumptions of personal psychology formulated by M. Kinget are, as well as of the founders of IPP, it nonetheless seems that we still lack a coherent psychological theory on the basis of which the postulated trends in psychological research can be realized, research hypotheses formulated and tested with the aid of empirical methods. I believe that the propositions of William Stern (1871 - 1938) in this respect, presented in *General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint* (New York, 1938), are still valid. In the introduction to this work he stated that he strives to develop psychology as a science about the person who is able to *have experience*.

William Stern's conception of psychology as a science of the human person

Stern (1923, 1930) stated that the category of person enables a holistic understanding of the complexity of the living being as a unity in multiplicity (*unitas multiplex*) of physical, vital, psychic, and specifically human, that is, spiritual characteristics. This unity, according to Stern, is formed and perfected in the process of interaction of the living being with its surroundings. Thus, assuming the concept of *person* as the primary determinant of a psychological research perspective, Stern (1938) described it as follows:

The "person" is a living whole, individual, unique, striving toward goals, self-contained and yet open to the world around him; he is capable of having experience. (p. 70)

Commenting on the above description of the person, Stern drew particular attention to the fact that he considers all of the characteristics of the person as a living whole, with the exception of the predisposition to *have experience* as compulsory, that is, as a result of either a biological or psychic mechanism in reactive behaviors, or merely in the release of internal psychophysical energy. Meanwhile, the predisposition to *have experience* is prerequisite for differentiation and development of specifically human personal dispositions that are manifested in the ability to recognize meaningful objects or situations in life which are possible to achieve in one's environment. This ability is interpreted by Stern (1939, p. vii) as a characteristic of an overall orientation of the person to close or distant aims which are objectively meaningful to him, or a challenge posed by the environment. Therefore, in his view, the ability to *have experience* correlates with a specifically human openness to the surrounding world, which affords an increase in both internal coherence, and one's own ability for their adequate realization.

The human person, *having experience* of objectively meaningful purposes in the world surrounding him, reveals volitional dispositions in realizing them, even in situations of encountered difficulties or obstacles. Of particular significance for Stern in this regard were

observations of the developmental process of Helen Keller, who from the age of 18 months was deaf and blind. Stern (1905, 1910) stated that a turning point in her life was the discovery of the ability to communicate with her environment through the sense of touch. Developing and improving this ability, she ceased to be hyperactive and difficult to raise, learned sign language and verbal language, and successfully completed her higher education. Not only had the coherence and direction of her inner experience changed, but also her surrounding world. In her original world of casual and chaotic stimuli and experiences, the scope of a convergent world of meanings, values, goals, and challenges had become distinguished and expanded. Helen Keller, as a living personal whole which was co-created by the world of possessed experiences and her world of meanings, challenges, objectives, and ways of their realization, was for Stern convincing evidence of specifically human personal abilities, which could be manifested and actualized in a manner adequate in interpersonal and social relationships. The human person thus appears as a *unitas multiplex*, consciously developing in the process of convergent interactions with the environment.

Kurt Goldstein's concept of specifically human predispositions in abstract behavior

The conception of personal dispositions as described above can refer to the natural human approach to *abstract behavior* as conceived by K. Goldstein, which manifests itself in the ability to broaden the scope of freedom in choosing a preferred and suitable way of actualizing oneself in a given situation, to go beyond the limitations of a specific situation, and to think in terms of "possibilities".

Goldstein (1940, p. 62), a psychiatrist, found that patients with a damaged brain reveal a complete dependence on immediate stimuli of the external environment. These patients seem to be so fused with their surroundings that, like animals, they are not able to maintain a distance in relation to them, to separate themselves from them. The result is not only a "*shrinking*" of their personalities, but also of their world of experiences. Goldstein referred to this kind of behavior as *concrete behavior*.

Meanwhile, the functioning of healthy people, according to Goldstein, is characterized not only by broadening the range of perception and understanding it from different perspectives, but also of the ability to evaluate and select a strategy that is most adequate and effective in the realization of chosen objectives. Goldstein described such behavior as either *abstract behavior*, or an *abstract attitude*.

Goldstein mentioned that he had doubts about the use of the word "abstract" in this instance. Nonetheless, according to Goldstein, the abstract attitude enables a broader comprehensive understanding of the range of behavior, and thus broadens the range of possible choices of more appropriate behavior in a given situation.

Furthermore, Goldstein concluded that the abstract attitude is one of the primary forms of organization of behavior of every normally functioning, healthy human person. In this sense, actions of a specific nature performed by a healthy human individual, i.e., of one free of organic brain damage, have their origin in the ability to assume an abstract approach to the whole of one's situation, the choice of appropriate forms of behavior, and control of their course. Nonetheless, in situations of particular risk to the individual, a healthy person may also reveal a tendency for specific behavior which, because of the exceptional nature of those situations, Goldstein described as "catastrophic reactions."

A total distinction and qualitative differences between these two forms of organization of human behavior were the subject of particular emphasis on the part of Goldstein (1940, p. 60): Even in its simplest form [...] abstraction is separate in principle from concrete behavior.

There is no gradual transition from the one to the other. Abstract attitude is not distinguished only by a greater degree of complexity by introducing a new factor determining behavior; it is actually a completely different activity of the organism.

In any case, Goldstein also mentions that some healthy people exhibit a tendency for specific forms of behavior. However, these persons, if the need arises, are also able to move to a higher level of organization of behavior that is characteristic of an abstract attitude. On the other hand, for pathological individuals, i.e., for patients with brain damage, it is completely impossible to achieve, even in situations where they are provided with external assistance in this regard. Moreover, Goldstein found that in healthy individuals specific behavior is, in a certain way, based on the ability for an abstract attitude with reference to a given life situation. Thus, he regarded it as a basic precondition for every specific human behavior.

Gordon Allport's conception of the personal knowing subject

Allport (1988) considered certain important elements of psychological analysis of the personal ability to have experience in his own conception of personality development as a process of becoming an individuality through the actualization of that which is most personal (the *proprium*). Allport distinguished eight functions of the *proprium*: a sense of one's own body, a sense of identity, self-love, the extended self, being rational, self-image, personal aspirations and being a knowing subject, while he regarded the last function of the *proprium* – being a knowing subject – as the central and most personal function of the self.

Having distinguished between the (first seven) different functions of the *proprium* (and we can regard all as particularly our own), we can consider whether the subject has been exhausted. Do we not also have a cognitive self – a knowing entity, which is beyond all the other functions of the *proprium* and keeps an eye on them? (p. 46)

We learn not only things, but also the empirical traits of our own *proprium*. It is I who has bodily sensations, I sense my own identity from one day to another, *I am aware* of my will power, the expansion of my own self, of my own rationalizations, interests and aspirations. So when I think about the functions of my *proprium*, I easily see that they occur together, and sense that they are closely related to cognitive function itself (Allport, 1988, p. 47, emphasis by ZU).

Of particular importance is the fact that Allport regarded the subjective cognitive function of the *proprium* as the central function of the human personality. Its development, according to Allport, is prerequisite for such cooperation of all the functions of personality, and ultimately the human being as a living whole, a specific human person, has a sense of being an agency subject.

The individual may therefore possess a sense of *having experience*, rather than being only an expression of a casual course of sensations in the stream of consciousness – in as much as he accepts the various aspects (functions) of his own personality (*proprium*) and treats each of these functions as a partial manifestation of himself and a co-created personal coherence and unity in multiplicity (*unitas multiplex*).

The Self-Determination Theory of E. L. Deci and R. M. Ryan

Deci and Ryan (1985, 2000) stress the importance of the primary nature of intrinsic motivation, referring to K. Goldstein's (1938, 1940) organismic approach in the psychology of self-actualization, and R. White's conception (1959) of the need for abilities as a basic category in the psychology of motivation.

Intrinsic motivation stimulates and maintains spontaneous behavior, action motivated by curiosity, novelty, importance of challenges and personally meaningful activities, expanding the range of one's abilities to act effectively, or simply from the satisfaction of acting effectively in a certain direction and in a certain way. Meanwhile, external motivation is stimulated directly or indirectly by external factors that control the way and direction of behavior not only through coercion or passive imitation of patterns, but also through a mechanism of causal conditioning, that is, by selective rewarding or punishing.

Intrinsic motivation, according to Deci and Ryan, is expressed in three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relationships with others (relatedness), i.e. bonds, belonging, and community with others. Developing and meeting all these needs, according to Deci and Ryan, is prerequisite for normal development and a well-being.

The basic distinguished needs are treated in the SDT as complementary, and therefore their adequate development and realization are a condition for the growth of internal integrity. For example, the need for autonomy is fulfilled and developed not only with the increase of one's independence from others and one's own sense of authorship, but also because of the need for adequate relationships with others, through an increased capacity for cooperation and responsibility for competent realization of undertaken roles and commitments towards others.

The Human person as an individual structure of possibilities of actualizing oneself and development in a world of values: Towards a synthesis

Referring to W. Stern's psychological approach to the human person, I describe him not only as a living entity, but also as a conscious human existence, an individual structure of possibilities of different ways of experiencing meanings and activities in the world lived by the person, possessing natural abilities to maintain internal coherence and openness to the surrounding world, to actualize his developmental potentialities and improvement of his activity in relation to preferred values and objectives, especially in dialogical interpersonal and community relationships.

Personal abilities are defined as basic human natural potentialities in adequate personal experience and action whose actualization and development depend particularly on a given person's own activity in the world he experiences.

Thus, in understanding the human being in terms of his natural personal dispositions, we define him not so much in terms of categories distinguished in a given philosophical system which define the essence of human nature, but rather in terms of his specific dispositions in ways of being, whose actualization or inhibition, or their development depends to a great extent on their subject, i.e. the specific person. Therefore, personal dispositions are considered as basic and natural as those which are described in general psychology as human dispositions for abstract behavior (K. Goldstein), or human innate *universal grammar*, which is the basis for the development of language dispositions for symbolic communication (N. Chomsky, 1957).

Below (Fig. 1) I present a model of the dimensions of the natural structure of dispositions of the human person as a subject operating in the surrounding world, oriented at an increase of internal coherence and at effective realization of meaningful goals, values, and challenges of the surrounding world.

The proposed model of the structure of natural dispositions of the human person should be read from the center, i.e. assuming the central position of the subject possessing the ability for different ways of having experiences and action (agency subject). Such an entity should not be understood as a kind of homunculus, or mental apparatus, of which Freud

wrote. The personal agency subject is a living, functional whole, a symbolic existence (Kinget, 1975), a living individual Gestalt, internally coherent and open to the same as others. The psychic and personal dispositions which co-create him are integrated and organized by the personal agency subject. Dispositions of the person, as understood from this primary perspective, therefore, are those which the acting person has at his disposition, i.e. which can be used by him in terms of realizing preferred objectives or undertaken tasks and challenges of life.




Figure 1. Dimensional model of the structure of natural dispositions of the human person as a proactive agency subject. (Drawn up by ZU)

The human person, with the ability to have experience of possibilities, to realize his potential either through actualization of his psychic and biological dispositions, or through actualization of his own personal dispositions to a receptive openness to the world of values, shapes the volitional dispositions proper to himself, his individual character. W. Stern distinguished two main orientations of character in this respect as a basis for determining psychological differences of individuals: (a) orientation to self-protection and self-defense in the world which is strange, dangerous, or threatening to oneself, and (b) orientation to introception of the sense of symbolic values in the surrounding world, establishing close relationships and interaction with others, and a willingness to take on challenges of life. Stern (1938, p. 439) regarded these two personality orientations as a basis for a typology of character, distinguishing three basic types: the autistic (self-preservation, self-development), heteristic (hypertelic, syntelic, ideotelic), and introceptive character as an ideal type. Stern's typology was of theoretical and intuitive nature. Nonetheless, with the help of Uchnast's Action Styles Questionnaire (KSD), one can distinguish similar types of character in the dimension of interaction – self-protection. Currently, empirical verification is being conducted of the diagnostic effectiveness of KSD and the measurement of personality correlates

of empirically distinguished character types (Uchnast, 2008; Brachowicz and Chemperek, 2009; Bulzak and Celińska-Miszczuk, 2009).

Conclusions

However much the topic of personal psychology is still being ignored in textbooks of general psychology, more and more attention is being paid, nonetheless, to its essential significance in developing a more holistic approach to the human being as a specific, and in many respects, unique subject of psychological research. Furthermore, psychologists are increasingly aware that if we make the human the subject of psychological research, he would have to be considered in his ecological niche, i.e., in the context of the world he experiences, because he is not only formed by environmental or social and cultural factors, but he can also be an active participant, or even a co-creator. Therefore, we should bear in mind that these particular elements of psychology as a science of the human person, defined more specifically by W. Stern, can be a particular source of inspiration for the development of psychology as a science going beyond the analysis of specific traits, states, their structures and functions, towards psychology as a science of the human person, which can have at his disposition the experience of his habits or personality traits from a perspective of undertaken tasks or chosen objectives. Moreover, he can also be guided by a sense of commitment or responsibility towards himself or others, for their adequate realization.

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Abstrakt

Problematyka psychologii osoby prezentowana jest najpierw z perspektywy osiągnięć psychologii humanistycznej (M. Kinget), psychologii *proprium* (G. Allporta), personalistycznej (J. DuBois) oraz w odniesieniu do założeń E. Deciego i R. Ryana *Self-Determination Theory*. Niemniej, szczególnym przedmiotem zainteresowania są W. Sterna założenia podejścia personalizmu krytycznego w psychologii i jego sposób interpretacji psychologicznej naturalnych ludzkich dyspozycji osobowych. W nawiązaniu do Sterna koncepcji osoby jako przedmiotu analizy psychologicznej prezentuję model wymiarów struktury dyspozycji osoby ludzkiej jako proaktywnego podmiotu działania. Następnie wskazuję na możliwość formułowania hipotez badawczych i ich empirycznej weryfikacji w zakresie różnic indywidualnych między empirycznie wyodrębnionymi typami charakteru, które określa się za Sternem jako wyznaczniki osobowych orientacji życiowych w wymiarze współdziałanie – zabezpieczanie się.

GOAL ORIENTATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY

Monika Trzebińska²⁶

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to present goal orientations in terms of manifestations of human subjectivity. Subjectivity is a collection of attributes that make a person influence the way of his or her own actions. These attributes belong to the cognitive, emotional, motivational, and executive spheres. Goal orientation is a good example of a complex construct, covering all these spheres. Goal orientation is a way in which an individual interprets, evaluates and reacts to achievement situations. Four goal orientations are distinguished: learning orientation, avoidance orientation, self-enhancing ego orientation and self-defeating ego orientation. They are a combination of two forms of achievement motivation (approach and avoidance) and two orientations under the competence definition adopted by subject – ego involvement and task involvement. The article presents the possibilities of concluding on subjectivity on the basis of the structure of goal orientations and analyses the opportunities and constraints related to regarding the goal orientations as manifestations of subjectivity.

Keywords: human subjectivity, goal orientation

Introduction

Defining and operationalization of subjectivity constitute an unquestionable challenge. Problems with the definition of subjectivity translate into problems with studying them. Subjectivity, defined mostly as a set of attributes, can be studied by identifying and understanding these attributes. Since subjectivity is manifested, among others, in the cognitive, motivational, and executive spheres (Jarymowicz, 2008), it is worth looking for constructs covering all these areas. One example of such a construct may be goal orientation. The developing trend of research on motivational orientations provides a number of important characteristics and research tools that can be used in the study of subjectivity.

The purpose of this article is to present goal orientation in terms of manifestations of subjectivity. The article starts with the definition of subjectivity adopted by the author. Then it presents a selection of the most significant studies in the field of goal orientation. In the next part, the opportunities and constraints related to regarding the goal orientation as manifestations of subjectivity are examined and the possibilities of concluding on subjectivity on the basis of the structure of goal orientation are presented.

The Essence of Subjectivity

The category of subject is quite often identified with a human being - a man who exists and who acts. Where there are several properties that make up this 'existence' and 'action', subject provides integration and substrate for synthesis. In the process of subject's

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cognition, we are dealing with these specific properties while subject is located, it is hiding beyond them or it manifests via them. However, the most complete manifestation is through action. Subject is therefore the source of its experiences and activities, it fulfils them and manages them (Majczyna, 2000). The nature of subject is characterized by such properties as concreteness, individuality, separation, autonomy, authorship, temporality, integrity and originality, and thus the unity and uniqueness of subject (Majczyna, 2000).

Subjectivity is a collection of attributes that make a person influence the way of his or her own actions (Jarymowicz, 2008). The development of subjectivity is related to the man's ability to cognize himself and the developing self-knowledge and self-awareness. Self-knowledge and self-awareness make adopting attitudes toward oneself possible, articulating intentions to change oneself possible. The complexity, accuracy and thoroughness of self-knowledge may be different, so that objectives pursued by subject may be implied by its different areas and aspects. Self-knowledge and self-awareness are manifestations of subjectivity in the area of cognition – they are, among others, ways to make one's identity more complete. They may also be used to build the desired visions of self (Jarymowicz, 2008).

Human subjectivity is manifested not just in the cognitive sphere, but also in the emotional, motivational, and executive ones (Jarymowicz, 2008). In the emotional and motivational sphere it allows for assessments of self and the world, defining the criteria of good and evil, guiding by one's own will in making decisions, formulating objectives and plans and anticipating their consequences. In the executive sphere, in turn, manifestations of subjectivity may include the ability to self-control and perpetration, managing self and one's development, and responsibility for one's own actions (Jarymowicz, 2008).

Achieving the status of subjectivity depends on the development of intellectual capacities, thus enabling transgressions that are designed to increase personality, manifested, among others, by deepening self-awareness and self-control (cognitive and causal) (Jarymowicz, 2008). Personality fundamentals allow actions of the subject, which consists of, among others, increasing motivation.

One of the manifestations of subjectivity could certainly be a goal orientation – a construct in the field of psychology of motivation that contains not just motivational components, but also cognitive, emotional, executive, and social ones.

Goal Orientations - Characteristics

Goal orientations concepts have grown on the basis of research on learned helplessness and achievement motivation in children of school age (Dweck, 1975; Nicholls, 1975, 1984). Dweck (1975, 1986) found that children, who do not differ in abilities, reacted in a different way to failures at school. Some children behaved in an adaptive way – they attributed failure to insufficient effort (while maintaining it or intensifying it), tackled successive challenges, had positive expectations. Other children, however, adopted non-adaptive pattern of behaviour – they treated failure as a result of lack of competence, they avoided challenges, decreased their endurance and effort, while maintaining negative expectations.

At the same time, Nicholls (1975), while analyzing motivation of achievements amongst pupils and levels of personal goals, disclosed that they define success differently. Some define it in relation to their previous achievements, whilst others take achievements and level of performance of others as a benchmark.

The analysis of research results, which were the basis for distinguishing two groups of students: focused on assessments and on the learning process, leads to similar conclusions (Eison, 1979 cited in Payne, Youngcourt and Beaubien, 2007; Eison, 1981).

Currently it is believed that the implicit theories of intelligence operating in the field of knowledge (Dweck, 1986; Elliott and Dweck, 1988) are responsible for the above-mentioned differences in the way of defining the objectives, responding to success or failure, or for accepting certain goal orientation. These theories, which normally operate at the preconscious level, are the cognitive structures which play an important role in directing and shaping human behaviour. Taking into account the criterion of the implicit theory of intelligence, humans can be divided into incremental and entity theorists (Dweck, 1986, 1991). Entity theorists believe that intelligence is fixed and immutable, while incremental theorists believe that intelligence and competence can be developed through efforts one undertakes.

Nicholls (1984), in turn, attributes the differences in the used goal orientations to the concept of abilities adopted by subject. The first, less differentiated one, states that an individual determines the level of current capacities and the difficulty of the task by reference to its current knowledge and level of performance. According to the other, differentiated concept, an individual identifies those properties in comparison to other people - members of the normative group. When a man describes his capacities in relation to himself, the perceived difficulty of the task is directly proportional to the probability of failure in this task. At the same time, the more difficult the task is and the more effort it requires, the higher the level of competence felt after reaching success. When defining an individual's capacities compared to the normative group, the difficulty of the task is determined based on the performance level of others. An individual experiences the high level of competence if the execution of the task takes less time, is of better quality and requires less effort than that of other persons.

The consequence of an individual's acceptance of one of the theories of intelligence (Dweck, 1986) or the concept of abilities (Nicholls, 1984) is the goal orientation that is relevant to it. When a man is looking for an opportunity to demonstrate skills in relation to members of the normative group, it reflects the ego orientation, also known as the performance orientation (Elliott i Dweck, 1988). The ego orientation is more likely to be adopted by entity theorists. However, if an individual defines its skills by comparing to itself, we are talking about task orientation, in other ideas also known as learning orientation (Elliott and Dweck, 1988), or mastery orientation (Ames and Archer, 1988). This orientation is consistent with the definition of intelligence being acknowledged by incremental theorists.

Ego orientation and task orientation, though initially regarded as the ends of one continuum, are independent from each other and are separate dimensions (Ames and Archer, 1988). Although the ego orientation and task orientation allowed for accurate differentiation of people with respect to tasks they preferred, the results suggested a need for an additional distinction within the ego orientation. The essence of ego orientation is to direct attention to oneself and to how others perceive us, to involvement in social comparison and assessment of competence in relation to standards (Skaalvik, 1997). It has been proven, however, that this orientation is not homogeneous. But within it, two other, different with the quality of the manifestations and the goals pursued may be distinguished. (Skaalvik, Valas and Sletta, 1994, cited in Skaalvik, 1997; VandeWalle, 1997). The self-enhancing ego orientation is an orientation, which focuses on being the best and the desire to demonstrate one's own competence. The self-defeating ego orientation is characterized by avoiding demonstration of low competence and avoiding environment's negative reactions. Adoption of the self-enhancing ego orientation is associated with searching for an opportunity to confrontation,

and the experience of being competent is shaped by gathering positive feedback from the environment. This orientation is also called prove performance goal orientation (Elliott and Harackiewicz, 1996; VandeWalle, 1997). In contrast to the self-enhancing ego, there remains the self-defeating ego that avoids confrontation, while gaining the sense of being competent by protecting itself from negative feedback from the environment. Another name of this orientation is avoid performance goal orientation (Elliott and Harackiewicz, 1996; VandeWalle, 1997)

A similar dimension, but within the task orientation, has been identified by Skaalvik (1997). Assuming that a task orientation denotes tasks perception as a means of learning through factorial analysis, Skaalvik found that also within this orientation tendencies both to drive and to avoid, known respectively as: task orientation and avoidance orientation can be identified. The task orientation is characterized by a desire to develop one's own skills, search for challenges and the feeling of competence is here the effect of overcoming difficulties and achieving a higher level of certain skills. Avoidance orientation, in turn, focuses on avoidance of work and of making any effort. It is associated with reluctance to engage in tasks, irrespective of their nature.

Finally, four main goal orientations have been distinguished (Cury, Elliot, Da Fonseca and Moller, 2006; Elliot and McGregor, 2001; Harackiewicz, Durik, Barron, Linnenbrink-Garcia and Tauer, 2008; Skaalvik, 1997), which are a combination of two forms of achievement motivation (approach and avoidance) described by Atkinson (1964 cited in Łukaszewski and Doliński, 2004) and two orientation under the competence definition adopted by subject (Nicholls, 1984; Dweck, 1986) – ego involvement and task involvement. It should be however noted that some researchers continue to apply the three-element concept, with regard to only one aversion orientation (Murayama and Elliot, 2009; Seijts, Latham, Tasa and Latham, 2004; Yeo, Sorbello, Koy and Smillie, 2008).

Although initially goal orientation was treated as relatively stable characteristics of an individual, today it is understood that they may have both a dispositional, trait-like and a state form, which is confirmed by research results (Payne, Youngcourt and Beaubien, 2007). Goal orientation as a disposition affects situational orientation adopted by subject in the specific natural or experimental context. It is not, however, the only factor determining the type of situational goal orientation. Other variables e.g. context, the definition of the task, the presence of the audience or the system of penalties and rewards are also of great importance. Ego involvement is also encouraged by e.g. competition situation, the presence of the audience, stimulation of social self-awareness or definition of the tasks as the fitness one. Ego involvement enhances the external attributions. Task involvement occurs more often in situations of learning, in the absence of competition and enhances making internal attributions (Nicholls, 1984).

The relationship between dispositional and situational form of goal orientation is shaped like with other psychological constructs such as self-efficacy, self-esteem, anxiety (Payne, Youngcourt and Beaubien, 2007).

In conclusion, the goal orientation focuses on how an individual interprets, evaluates and reacts to situations related to achievements (Dweck, 1986). All types of goal orientations are independent from each other, and they are separate constructs. The adopted goal orientation is a function of psychological characteristics of an individual and the features of the situation or the environment. An individual usually adopts the goal orientation it prefers, but distinct features of the environment may cause adopting the orientation to fit the environment (Ames and Archer, 1988). Adoption of the specific goal orientation is associated with adequate patterns of emotions, cognition and behaviour. It is also associated with the

choice of suitable tasks and activities in which an individual is involved (Cury, Elliot, Da Fonseca i Moller, 2006). What an individual sets as goals depends on his or her beliefs regarding their own potential to achieve these goals (striving to change the status quo versus maintaining the status quo), the socialization process (self-improvement orientation, competition or conservative performance, or some kind of stagnation), on the characteristics of an individual (e.g. the degree of susceptibility to anxiety, tendency to self-concentration, etc.) (Tokarz and Kaleńska, in press).

Goal Orientations as a Manifestation of Subjectivity

As already stated, subjectivity manifests itself in cognitive, emotional and motivational, and executive spheres (Jarymowicz, 2008). In these areas, goal orientations might be observed and based on this, subjectivity might be determined and concluded on. In the cognitive field, this is, first of all, self-consciousness on which a preferred goal orientation is based. All orientations differ, however, in sources of self-knowledge. While the task orientation is mainly based on self-observation and knowledge of one's past achievements (see Bąbel, 2009; Niedźwieńska, 2009), ego orientation focuses on the information derived from public sources (see Kossowska and Śmieja, 2009).

Adoption of the ego orientation makes us focus on the opinions of people from our social environment. These are not just people in the normative group (e.g. classmates for a student), but also persons who may express a binding opinion regarding the competence, such as a teacher. Adopting the task orientation allows us to focus on the self – one may exactly watch one's own achievements, analyze them, evaluate and compare with past experiences. To achieve a sense of competence it is not necessary to enter into any social interaction, which is necessary with the ego orientation. It should, however, be noted that the peculiarity described here relates to the area of self-knowledge, which is base for the goal orientation. Preferring single goal orientation and focusing on an adequate source of self-knowledge does not make that all other areas of self-knowledge are built based on the same principles.

In the emotional sphere, domination of negative emotions and defensive tendencies that are present mainly in the self-defeating ego orientation and the avoidance orientation may lead to limitation of the development of subjectivity (Jarymowicz, 2008). The self-defeating ego orientation and avoidance orientation are correlated positively with the fear for failure, and negatively with competence expectancy (Elliot and Church, 1997). The self-enhancing ego orientation is also correlated positively with fear for failure, however, it has positive correlation with competence expectancy. The task orientation is correlated positively with competence expectancy and is not related to fear for failure (Elliot and Church, 1997). Taking into account the emotional correlates of the goal orientations, it can be concluded that the approach orientations and, in particular, the task orientation, will be conducive to the development of subjectivity, because of the slightest connection with the defensive tendencies.

One of the manifestations of subjectivity of action is the growing motivation (Jarymowicz, 2008). Taking into account this criterion, it can be stated that the task orientation is evidence of a higher level of development of subjectivity than the ego orientation. The task orientation has features of the growing motivation - the objective here is to achieve a standard of excellence, transcending one's own barriers and acquisition of new competences. Adopting the ego orientation will cause focusing on the social assessments, and skills development and knowledge acquisition does not matter a lot, in fact. The task orientation, as the only one, is transgressive - actions dictated by it are implied by a conscious, reflective evaluation, and one's own decisions. It is the task orientation that best

becomes an inseparable part of the assumptions of the transgressive model of man (Kozielecki, 2007; Tokarz, Trzebińska and Piechota, in press). According to this concept, man is aware of choice, is an inner-direction system, the source of behaviour, an internal-growth-oriented perpetrator.

In the executive sphere, such manifestations as the ability to self-control and perpetration, manage oneself and one's own development, and responsibility for one's own actions, are also extremely conspicuous amongst task-oriented persons. Task-oriented persons undertake activities which they are interested in (Harackiewicz, Barron, Tauer, Carter and Elliot, 2000) and are not dependent on external rewards such as those who are ego-oriented. It should however be noted that the task orientation and self-enhancing ego orientation have a similar impact on self-motivation and commitment to perform the task, and are associated with the same, promotion self-regulatory focus (Elliot and Harackiewicz, 1996). This may mean that in the executive sphere, the task orientation and the self-enhancing ego orientation yield similar effects, and the differences between them are not significant (Tokarz, Trzebińska and Piechota, in press).

Furthermore approach orientations, compared with the avoidance orientations, exhibit greater diversity of manifestations in the executive sphere (Tokarz, Trzebińska and Piechota, in press). Avoidance is associated with a clear direction of action, while the pursuit leaves a range of options by which they might be implemented. Motivation to avoid is usually stronger and more intense than the approach motivation (Franken, 2005). Avoidance is related to evolutionary trends aimed at eliminating hazards. Motivation to avoid is more homogeneous and distinct than approach motivation. Avoiding, in any form, has the same effect - an individual shuns the situations in which it may test its competence. The approach, in turn, may take various forms (e.g., overcoming difficulties or demonstrating one's own achievements to others), and yield different results, which ultimately come down, however, to obtain a sense of competence and self-esteem and importance.

Dispositional form of the goal orientation certainly expresses human subjectivity much more than the situational form. Presenting specific dispositional goal orientation is primarily determined by an individual and its psychological properties, not by the task itself, the context or a system or external positive and negative reinforcements. For dispositional goal orientation, manifestations of subjectivity in the cognitive sphere, as well as self-knowledge and self-awareness are primarily responsible (Payne, Youngcourt and Beaubien, 2007). While, therefore, dispositional goal orientation and conduct that manifests it provide an important condition to draw conclusions regarding subject and its properties, situational orientation is a source of knowledge regarding subject to be treated with much greater caution. Observation of behaviour in the task situation should therefore be supported by thorough analysis of the environment in order to determine as precisely as possible whether we are dealing with the expression of subject properties or with the response to the specific situation. The impact of situational factors in fact determines the extent to which the goal orientation (which is an expression of personality) is going to disclose.

Subjectivity is manifested by goal orientations in different areas - cognitive, emotional, motivational, and executive ones. Based on the goal orientation (especially in the dispositional form), one may conclude on the level of development of subjectivity. Differences between the specific orientations of antecedents and consequences indicate that each of these orientations represents a different form of subjectivity, expresses different characteristics of subject.

Judging on subject on the basis of the goal orientation, one should be aware of certain limitations of such an operation. First, the goal orientations can be both of dispositional and

situational nature, which makes it necessary to look at the features of the environment before drawing a conclusion regarding subject. Secondly, the goal orientations might be subject to training (Stevens and Gist, 1997) – they can be stimulated and strengthened, and so, although they are regarded as relatively stable characteristics of individuals, they may not be regarded here as constant, which is typical for e.g. personality characteristics. Work on the development of goal orientation can therefore lead to the development of subjectivity. Thirdly, the goal orientation can occur in people in different configurations (Yeo, Sorbello, Koy and Smillie, 2008) – despite the fact that we are usually able to extract the dominant goal orientation, some other persons' orientations may be comparatively strong, which means that only the knowledge of the full configuration allows to conclude on subject. Fourthly, it is most commonly adopted, which is also confirmed by the majority of studies (Dweck, 1975, 1986; Nicholls, 1984; Phillips and Gully, 1997; VandeWalle, Brown, Cron and Slocum, 1999; VandeWalle, Cron and Slocum, 2001), that the most advantageous and most adaptive is the task orientation. Meanwhile, it appears that in some contexts it is the self-enhancing ego orientation which may bring better results and be more beneficial to an individual than the task orientation (Elliot and Harackiewicz, 1996; Hendricks and Payne, 2007; Kohli, Shervani and Challagalla, 1998; Leondari and Gialamas, 2002; Silver, Dwyer and Alford, 2006), which also makes the unequivocal determination of subjectivity more complicated. After all it is flexibility, self-control, ability to manage one's own activities and to pursue designed goals that is regarded as manifestations of subjectivity. (Jarymowicz, 2008). So if an individual notes that self-enhancing ego orientation would be in the specific situation more effective than the task orientation, then it can provide evidence of a high level of development of subjectivity, manifesting by the ability to match appropriate resources to the goal pursued. Apart from the adopted goal orientation, the subject's motivation, which stays behind such a decision, must also be taken into account.

Goal orientations, as constructs of complex nature are manifestations of subjectivity rich in information, and hence a source of knowledge about subject. Detailed analysis of the goal orientation, knowing its capabilities and limitations, can be an important complement to the diagnosis of human subjectivity, not only in task situations.

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Abstrakt

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie orientacji na cele w kategoriach przejawów podmiotowości. Podmiotowość jest zbiorem atrybutów, które sprawiają, że osoba wpływa na sposób własnego funkcjonowania. Atrybuty te obejmują sferę poznawczą, emocjonalną, motywacyjną oraz wykonawczą. Orientacja na cel jest przykładem złożonego konstruktów, obejmującego wszystkie te sfery. Orientacja na cel to sposób, w jaki jednostka interpretuje, ocenia i reaguje na sytuacje związane z osiągnięciami. Wyróżniamy cztery orientacje na cele: orientację na uczenie się, orientację na unikanie, orientację na ego ofensywne i orientację na ego defensywne. Orientacje te stanowią kombinację dwóch form motywacji osiągnięć (dążeniowej i unikowej) oraz dwóch orientacji wynikających z przyjętej przez podmiot definicji kompetencji – zaangażowania ego i zaangażowania w zadanie.

Artykuł przedstawia możliwości wnioskowania o podmiotowości na podstawie struktury orientacji na cele oraz analizuje szanse i ograniczenia związane z uznawaniem orientacji na cele za przejawy podmiotowości.

Słowa kluczowe: podmiotowość, orientacja na cel

PARTICIPATIVE PERSONAL PROJECTS - -A CHANCE FOR MEANINGFUL AND FULFILLING OCCUPATIONAL LIFE? WORK RELATED PERSONAL PROJECTS ANALYSIS

Grzegorz Żmuda²⁷

Abstract

Although research on employee participation is of interest to many managers, psychologists, sociologists and organizational scientists, studies on psychological aspects of participation are not satisfactory. This paper presents an alternative approach to examining organizational participation by using personal projects perspective which allows to examine psychological aspects of the individual person acting together with others in the organizational context. The results imply that participative projects lead to self-realization more often than non-participative projects as well as they are more controllable and perceived as more likely to end with success

Keywords: participation, participative management, job satisfaction, Personal Project Analysis

Introduction

Employee participation has been in the scope of interest of organizational researchers for a long time. Glew, O'Leary-Kelly, Griffin and Van Fleet (1995) find elements of scientific reflection on participation in the book of Munsterberg (1913) and reports of Hawthorne Studies (Mayo, 1933; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939). Prokopowicz, Stocki and Żmuda (2008) date the presence of research on participatory management in the organizational research mainstream in the fifties. Since then employee participation has been of interest to many managers, psychologists, sociologists and organizational scientists (Heller & Yukl, 1969; Vroom & Yetton, 1973; Locke & Schweiger, 1979; Harrison, 1985; Wagner & Gooding, 1987a, 1987b; Cotton, Vollrath, Froggatt, Lengnick-Hall, & Jennings, 1988; Vroom & Jago, 1988; Cotton, Vollrath, Lengnick-Hall, & Froggatt, 1990; Leana, Locke, & Schweiger, 1990; Pierce, Rubinfeld & Morgan, 1991; Cole, Bacdayan & White, 1993; Wagner, 1994; Cheney, 1995; Glew et al., 1995; Mumby & Stohl, 1996; Wagner, Leana, Locke, & Schweiger, 1997; Cheney et al., 1998; Heller, Pusić, Strauss, & Wilpert, 1998; Vandenberg, Richardson & Eastman, 1999; Forrester, 2000; Seibold & Shea, 2001; Perotin & Robinson, 2002; Summers & Hyman, 2005). Despite the fact that research on participation can be found in almost every field of contemporary psychology (see: Cheney et al., 1998; authors present other scientific disciplines where studies on participation are also present, including sociology, political science, economy etc.), it is hard not only to find conclusive results on what the conditions or effects of participation are, but also what participation is. The need for adequate and conclusive studies on participation is growing even faster as we are entering the time when many different companies around the world achieve extraordinary

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results implementing total participation management (the term was used first by Graham and Titus (1979)). Companies like Semco, SAIC, Harley Davidson, SRC Holdings Corp. and many others can hardly count on support from the scientific field. The practice of participative management seems to be a way ahead of theoretical reflection and scientific research.

Defining participation

There is a whole spectrum of different approaches to organizational participation that stem from different assumptions, use different measures and postulate different outcomes of participation. Heller et al. (1998) write:

Definitions of participation abound. Some authors insist that participation must be a group process, involving groups of employees and their bosses; other stress delegation, the process by which the individual employee is given greater freedom to make decisions on his or her own. Some restrict the term 'participation' to formal institutions, such as work councils; other definitions embrace 'informal participation', the day-to-day relations between supervisors and subordinates in which subordinates are allowed substantial input into work decisions. Finally, there are those who stress participation as a process and those who are concerned with participation as a result. (p. 15)

Participation is not always even labeled as 'participation', sometimes scientists use the term employee involvement, work democracy, empowerment or self-directed work teams (Cooper, 2002). The most popular approach uses participative decision making as a synonym of participation (Locke & Schweiger, 1979). The latter approach very often excludes delegation, although some scientists include it in their definitions (Heller, 1971; Cotton et al., 1988). Dachler and Wilpert (1978) proposed four different orientations towards organizational participation: production and efficiency, democratic, human growth, development and socialist. Summers and Hyman (2005) divide employee participation into two groups – financial and work-related participation. Financial participation involves distribution of shares to employees or organization members and “concerns flexibility of pay, where an element of remuneration varies with profitability or other appropriate performance measures” (Summers & Hyman, 2005, p. 2). Authors divide work-related participation into two forms - individual vs. collective and direct vs. indirect. Apart from these forms, participation can also be task-related or strategic and then ordered into communicative, consultative or negotiative types. Heller et al. (1998) analyze informal-formal, direct-representative and financial participation. Apart from the form of participation, the range of issues is taken into account (IDE, 1976 after: Heller et al., 1998). These issues can be categorized according to time perspective (short-term, medium-term and long-term) and to subject matter (work/social conditions, personnel and economic).

Disagreement among researchers starts with the question whether participation is a “value-in-itself” or should be treated instrumentally as a means to a certain end (Heller et al., 1998). The majority of scholars claim the latter statement is true. Locke and Schweiger (1979) state that the role of participation is to contribute to organizational efficiency. Employees' job satisfaction, self-realization and goal commitment are also treated as a means to achieve organizational goals. The reason why it is hard to achieve consensus and advance research on participation is probably that most of research focuses on organizations and not on people, on organizational effects and not on psychological aspects.

Heller et al. (1998) agree that it is logical in organizational research to take an assumption that participation serves as a “means” to a certain “end”, however we have to remember about other “ends” participation serves. These “ends” according to Heller et al.

(1998) are the fundamental anthropological individual and social functions. Lafferty (1979 after: Heller et al., 1998) writes:

Participation is a basic well-being. [...] Not to participate in decisions which symbolically control the emotional value (status, legality, worth, etc.) of my action world is quite simply to choose a lesser degree of humanism [...] for both myself and community. (p. 10)

Similarly, Allport (1945 after: Heller et al., 1998) stresses the importance of participation: [...] people have to be active in order to learn...to build voluntary control...unless (a person) is in some areas ego-engaged and participant, his life is crippled and his existence a blemish on democracy [...]. (p.127)

Participation can be treated as a realization of human nature as it was understood in philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła (1985) described in details in Prokopowicz et al. (2008). Wojtyła (1985) writes: (Participation) is the person's transcendence in the action when the action is being performed "together with others" - transcendence which manifests that the person has not become altogether absorbed by social interplay and thus "conditioned," but stands out as having retained his very own freedom of choice and direction - which is the basis as well as the condition of participation. (p. 333)

Therefore the concept of participation that has grown out of the Wojtyła's theory and focuses on psychological aspects of participation is more useful for our paper. In this paper we would like to focus on a person acting in social (organizational) context and for that matter we need a psychological definition of participation.

Wojtyła's definition of participation mentioned earlier points out some crucial aspects of participation. First of all, it emphasizes the person as the subject of participation, then participation is defined as "transcendence in the act". Then, as Żmuda, Prokopowicz and Stocki (mimeo) point out: "we have two important forces of participation – one is the act being performed "with others" and possible absorption and social play which may condition the person; on the other hand, the second force is the freedom of choice and direction". Authors propose the definition of participation that goes from anthropological terms into psychological ones:

Participation is the process of the person's individual development in social interaction which is conditioned both by social meanings (cognition) and voluntary (conative) acts of the person.

This definition is very useful for this paper and we will use it in the context of organizational participation, with one exception however. The implication that participation is a process of the person's development may lead to conceptual confusion and make it impossible to falsify hypotheses derived from the definition. If we define personal development as a condition of participation, we will never be able to prove that participation may have any negative consequences – if something goes awry it is not participation. Although we agree that participation is strictly connected with personal development, self-realization etc., we would rather treat these phenomena as effects of participation, and the relationship between participation and personal development or self-realization should be treated as a hypothesis (H2), not a definition. For that reason we will exclude the clause: "the process of the person's individual development". We would also like to make it more coherent with Ryan and Deci's (2000) concept of self-determination closely related to participation which is connected with both autonomy (full sense of choice) and reflection. Therefore, we propose that participation takes place whenever:

A person performs actions oriented towards common good in the social context (with others) with the highest level of reflection and guaranteed freedom of expressing one's will.

From this definition and the definition by Wojtyła, a number of basic participation conditions arise. Firstly, there must be a person – an agent that decides to participate or not. Common good condition requires that an action is oriented on achieving balance of individual and organizational goals. There is also a social context – other actors, institutions etc. – that may encourage or discourage and even make participation impossible. Participation is always an act “performed with others”. The agent’s will, although crucial, is not enough to participate, to some extent he or she is limited by the environment. It does not mean that participation is possible in participative environment only – people tend to break their limits and for that reason can participate even when the environment is hostile to participation. Some of such behaviors were described by Landy and Conte (2007). Also Wojtyła's authentic attitudes of protest and solidarity are examples of participation in hostile environment. To participate considerable knowledge is required about what, how and why something is to be done. It cannot be a matter of reaction or unconscious behavior but one that is based on understanding the situation. That is what reflection stands for. The freedom of expressing one’s will means that a person is given an opportunity to act on his or her own without being forced to do something. There must be considerable amount of autonomy included, which is similar to Deci and Ryan’s approach to self-determination. The definition we propose can be easily applied to every field of human social activity – family, school, politics and, of course, organizational life.

Goals and Personal Projects

In Kelly’s personal construct theory every person is a “lay scientist” who observes events, puts forward hypotheses (named personal constructs) and always tries to anticipate the future (Pervin, 2002). Through personal constructs individuals view themselves in their context (Little, 2000b). The goal of every person is to develop as adequate theories of the world as possible and people do it by revising their personal constructs in the light of their experience. A human is active, self-creating and exploring the world around him. Although Little (Little, 1999a) agrees that humans are scientists he claims that they are somewhat selectively scientific. They are “specialists” who display different attitudes towards different ecological domains and objects. Some domains are more important than others and people are more affectively, cognitively and behaviorally engaged in some than in others. In his personality theory, Little prefers using personal projects as analytic units instead of less dynamic personal constructs. Personal projects are “extended sets of personally salient activities in context” (Little, 2006, p. 423). As Little (2007) explains “extended” refers to the fact that projects are not momentary behavior but are extended temporally and spatially. Personal projects are not single actions but rather their interrelated “sets”. Projects are personally salient because the person defines them and is the “owner” of the projects. “Activity” points out the conative aspect of projects, and finally personal projects are always performed in the specific “context” - physical, cultural, social, organizational, historical etc.

Personal projects can range from trivial pursuits (e.g. preparing supper) to great and long term plans (e.g. build civic society in my country). They can be self-initiated or forced by someone else, solitary concerns or shared commitments, isolated and not important or complex and connected with the core of our life (Little, 1989). Personal projects are described by Little (1987a, 1989) as “natural units of analysis for a personality psychology, that chooses to deal with serious business of how people muddle through complex lives”. It is significant for Little that every person when acting is a “subject” to many different influences of both intentional and contextual nature. Personal Projects are the way that people deal with various influences (biological, cultural, environmental, social etc.). People plan and act to succeed in

well-being. The content and the way people build their personal projects tell us not only about somebody's peculiar views, skills and thoughts, but also tells us a lot about the specific environment a given person is embroiled in. Personal projects allow to understand human behavior and attitude without distortions caused by traditional methods. In Personal Projects Analysis (PPA) people are treated like experts on themselves and the role of the researcher is to cooperate with subjects instead of treating them like the "objects" of investigation. PPA ensures that human behavior is analyzed in the specific context it occurs. Personal projects are explicitly conative – they are volitional undertakings and pursuits that have the meaning for individuals. PPA takes into consideration the fact that we are not only managing one project at a time, but the whole set of them. In that way we may be able to analyze effects of participation on what people do, plan and think in the organizational context.

Personal projects in organizational life

As Grant, Little and Phillips (2007) write: (Personal project) serves as a conceptual carrier unit and as a measurement unit that inherently links persons and contexts. At work, the personal project connects individuals to their groups and organizations by examining individual pursuits that occur in conjunction with, are directed toward, and are enacted on behalf of other individuals, groups, and the organization as a whole. That is, personal project captures cognitions, affect, and behaviors that influence and are influenced by the contexts in which they take place (Little, 2000a). (p. 223)

Another important advantage of personal projects is that they are able to capture personal saliency. Task, jobs and other organizational requirements are something external to the acting person (Taber & Alliger, 1995 after: Grant et al., 2007). Personal projects represent those actions that are created and performed by employees and therefore are the most relevant to employees' experiences. People in the same organization and on the same position may significantly differ in defining what specific activities their jobs consist of (Morrison, 1994). Examining participation in the level of job assignments or certain tasks may not detect relevant and important issues. Grant and his colleagues write: Because employees can identify the same actions at different levels, and reshape their tasks and jobs, assessing an employee's experience on the basis of an external definition of a task or a job may not accurately capture the employee's activities, pursuits, and experiences. Conversely, a focus on the personal projects of employees highlights the activities and pursuits that are the most salient in their work experiences. (p. 226)

It is important to emphasize that organizational systems and climate are very strong environmental factors and, as a context to the persons' actions, affect them in a significant way. Therefore it is much easier to be engaged in the participative personal projects in a participative company, although it is not necessarily impossible to have participative projects in totalistic organizational environment. As Grant et al. (2007) state, it is possible to use personal projects to better understand organizational climate.

Authors emphasize the fact that personal projects are the best known compromise between simplicity and accuracy. It allows to examine the internal structure of actions performed in the workplace which are less general than whole jobs (and therefore it is more accurate) but more general than tiny tasks (and that is why the method is more generalizable). Personal projects "aggregate employees' experience into personally salient chunks" (Grant et al., 2007).

Weick (1999, 2004 after: Grant et al., 2007) states that the way projects are formulated has important implications for the meaning (sense) they are making of their jobs. Weick (1999) described the case of firefighters who lost their lives while being on duty because they

could not switch from “suppressing the fire” project into “escaping the fire”. Grant et al. (2007) argue that it is a set of personal, not formal projects that shape the meaning of employee’s action. It is important to discover what makes the employee’s projects meaningful and therefore what makes his or her work meaningful as a whole.

Personal project analysis may contribute to one of the most important questions in organizational studies in the last decade – what the conditions of job satisfaction are. The social ecological model answers that well-being depends on sustainable pursuit of core personal projects (Grant et al., 2007; Little, 2000a). The basic well-being was proven to correlate with project control, efficacy and absence of stress (Slack-Appotive, 1982; Yard, 1980 after: Grant et al., 2007). Other factors that are said to influence well-being, directly or indirectly, are goal importance, goal personal importance, success prediction, goal commitment or competences.

When it comes to productivity it has been suggested that employees were more productive when they saw productivity as a path towards achieving their own goals, and projects that were leading to the productivity were salient and important to them (Georgopoulos, Mahoney & Jones, 1957 after: Grant et al., 2007). Probst et al. (1998) discovered that residents and staff members who perceived that their organization supports their autonomy and achievement of personal projects were more effective in teaching. When people are given freedom and can make real decisions about their job, their projects become more manageable (controllable) which constitutes the basis for one of our hypotheses (H4). Other factors that may lead to higher performance is projects significance, excitement and commitment.

Effects of participation

Despite the amount of research on participation, the data regarding psychological effects of participation are not satisfactory. Research shows some impact of participation on job satisfaction (Miles, 1965; Heller, 1971; Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981), general well-being (Stocki & Bielecki, 2007), motivation (Mulder, 1977; Deci & Ryan, 1985), different aspects of personal development or fulfilling the high-level needs (Mendel, 2001). Inconsistent and very frequently contradictory effects of participation have been shown on self-realization and self-fulfillment (Drehmer, Belohlav, & Coye, 2000; Locke & Schweiger, 1979; Wagner & Gooding, 1987b; Leana et al., 1990). Interesting research on effects of perceived subjectivity (not the employee subjectivity per se) was conducted by Daniecki (1998). Results show that perceived subjectivity may influence productivity work in a different way depending on employees level of education, hired on different job positions. The only consistent conclusion was that the more people know about the company they work for, the more they are willing to cooperate and have lower tendency to confront.

The results of Cotton et al. (1988) show that different forms of participation may lead to different outcomes, very often inconsistent but generally positive. Their research found positive influence of different forms of participation on job performance, productivity, job satisfaction, job involvement, motivation, identification with organization and so on. This research was however criticized by Leana et al. (1990) starting a discussion that “challenged the very core of the meaning of participation” (Glew et al., 1995; p. 396). In a similar way Wagner (1994) reanalyzed the Cotton et al. data and failed to reach similar conclusions. There is no agreement supported by contradictory results of different studies about outcomes of participatory management. Heller et al. (1998) summarize research on participation with the claim that it has been shown to have neutral or slightly positive impact on company. As Summers and Hyman (2005) write, there is plenty of research that found no association or

even a negative association between the company performance and participatory management (ex. Kelly & Kelly, 1991; Ben-Ner & Jones, 1995; Voughan-Whitehead, 1995 after: Summers & Hyman, 2005). Not only cannot the causal direction of the relationship be discovered (Cooper, 2002) but there is also no simple answer to the question how participation works, and the discussion on motivational vs. cognitive explanation is still in progress (Wagner et al., 1997).

Again, such discussion is strictly connected to the different views on whether participation is a “means” or an “end”. It is not the goal of this paper to decide which approach is more relevant but to show that different assumptions may move the scope of research to very different issues. Some scholars will be then interested only in the organizational effects of participative management while others may want to focus on the person and individual effects of participation.

For this study the results obtained by Latham and his colleagues are especially relevant (Latham & Marshall, 1982; Latham, Mitchell & Dossett, 1978; Latham & Saari, 1979a, 1979b; Latham & Steele, 1983; Latham, Steele & Saari, 1982; Latham & Yukl, 1975b, 1976). Latham and Yukl (1975b) proved in an experiment among uneducated loggers that participatively set goals were achieved more often than goals assigned by supervisors. It led authors to conclude that participatively set goals lead to higher goal acceptance and commitment. In this study we would like to check whether this will also be true for participative projects employees pursue in their organizational life. We will examine to what extent participative projects are more important for people (H3), and are perceived as more likely to be completed successfully (H5).

The effect of high performance presented in the described studies was probably caused by the higher, more ambitious goals set in the participative groups. The connection – the higher the goal, the higher the performance – was proven in both laboratory (Locke, 1968) and field experiments (Latham & Yukl, 1975a). In another study Latham and Yukl (1976) found no significant differences between performance, goal acceptance or difficulty levels. No differences on goal acceptance or satisfaction between participatively set and assigned goals were found by Latham et al. (1978). To summarize, most of Latham and his colleagues studies showed that although participatively set goals can lead to setting more difficult goals and higher levels of performance of employees, the effects on performance are very often no different from non-participatively set goals that are also difficult, specific and accepted by the employees. Locke (1968) suggested that participation can be effective only to the extent it affects a person's goals. If any other means may lead to setting, accepting and commitment of specific demanding goals, participation is irrelevant (Locke & Schweiger, 1979).

We agree with the statement that participation may be effective to the extent that it affects personal goals. Contradictory results obtained by Latham and his colleagues may be a result of a limited understanding of participation they apply in their studies. The participants of their experiments could only participate in setting behavioral goals (levels of performance) not the more general goal itself, the way it should be conducted, not to mention the influence on more crucial aspects of organizational life. As Glew et al. quoting Wagner (1994) write: limited participation gives limited effects. The reason is that people in most of organizations do not participate in every aspects of its functioning. Although there are some organizational systems that support participation, others do not, and even if a system is participation-oriented, not everybody in the organization participates. People have different attitudes and different work-related goals that are different from those listed in a job description. For example somebody can be responsible for a customer service and has a lot of more specific tasks, but all of these tasks are then processed by an employee who sets specific, personal

salient goals or projects. The approach that focuses on organizational outcomes or treating partial participation as if it were the ultimate participation, ignores the fact that everything - organizations, job descriptions, sets of tasks - is just an environment for the acting person. That is why organizational studies on participation fail to understand its real nature, ignoring an individual person in the research process.

It is also important to clarify that although it is possible that in a given time and circumstances a person can participate in every aspect of organizational life on a regular basis (total participation), it is also possible that a person participates only in some aspects of organizational life while not in others. In a similar manner it is possible that in organizations that support participative acts some people will not participate as well as it is possible that in totalistic organizations some people may find a way to participate. From that statement our first hypothesis (H1) arises - people at the same time are engaged in actions or projects out of which some can be participative and some non-participative regardless of what organizations they work for. Organizations and people acting within their borders cannot be treated as if they were either 100% participative or 100% non-participative. It is the acting person in the specific context who participates in some aspects of organizational life and does not participate in others. Therefore the most adequate approach is the one that allows to examine psychological aspects of the individual person acting together with others in the organizational context. Brian Little's perspective of personal projects and personal projects analysis (Little, 1983, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989, 1993, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2005; Little, Lecci & Watkinson, 1992; Little & Ryan, 1979; Little, Salmela-Aro & Phillips, 2007) that grew from an attempt to integrate Kelly's (1955) theory and his view of people as "scientists" with ecological perspective on personality development seems to be the best suited to our assumptions.

Hypothesis

After defining participation as actions oriented towards common good in the social context, with the highest level of reflection and guaranteed freedom of expressing one's will, and taking into consideration the described characteristics and links between participative character of personal goals and their psychological outcomes, we propose the following hypotheses:

- H1. People will be engaged at the same moment in both participative and non-participative projects.
- H2. Participative projects will lead to self-realization more often than non-participative projects.
- H3. Participative projects will be perceived as more important for the person than non-participative projects.
- H4. Participative projects will be perceived as more controllable than non-participative projects.
- H5. Participative projects will be perceived as more likely to lead to the success than non-participative projects.

Method

Participants

13 people (out of 44 invited) from different companies took part in the study. The basic demographic data is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Demographic structure of the sample

| Demographics | Category | Frequency |
|--------------|-------------|-----------|
| Gender | Female | 7 |
| | Male | 6 |
| Age | <25 | 3 |
| | 25-26 | 5 |
| | >26 | 5 |
| Education | High school | 3 |
| | MA | 10 |
| Tenure | <1 year | 3 |
| | 1-2 years | 7 |
| | >2 years | 3 |

Measures

Modified Personal Project Analysis (PPA-M) inventory (Little, 1989, 2007) was applied during the study. It was, such as in the original version, divided into four main phases: 1. Project Elicitation Lists; 2. Project Rating Matrices; 3. Phrasing Level Analysis; and 4. Cross-Impact Matrices. The list of modifications includes new dimensions reflecting our study purpose. The dimensions are described below. Participants rated their project on these dimensions on the scale from 0 to 10 and each project rated as 6 or more was categorized as participative, as well as each project rated as 5 or less was categorized as non-participative.

Participativeness of personal projects

According to the definition of participation we accepted earlier, we will measure the participativeness of the project using the scales consisting of autonomy, self-efficacy, reflection, responsibility and common good (oriented at the person's and company's good). Projects are participative when all of these conditions are fulfilled (score 6 or more on the 10-item scale in each condition), and non-participative if at least one of them is not fulfilled. Below we describe how each of these aspects was measured.

Autonomy

As autonomy we understand the autonomy of choice of a certain personal project. It is measured by the answer to the question "To what extent did you make the choice to be involved in this project on your own? Are you willingly engaged or does somebody else want you to do this?". Subjects were answering using a 10 point scale, from 0 – "I'm conducting that project only because of another person or for another person" to 10 – "I'm conducting that project completely on my own free will".

Self-efficacy

Self-efficacy is strictly connected to the possibility of doing something, performing an act, having an influence. In this study it is measured by the answer to the question "To what extent did you decide yourself what, when and how to do when conducting this project?". Subjects were answering using a 10 point scale, from 0 – "All decisions were made by someone else" to 10 – "I completely decided about the realization of this project".

Reflection (Big Picture)

Reflection in our understanding is similar to the concept of Big Picture which is also connected to the general knowledge about consequences of somebody's action. It is measured by the answer to the question "To what extent do you possess knowledge about where to place the particular project in the "Bigger Picture"? Do you know why you are involved in it, what are the effects for others and the company, what is going to be done with the effects of your efforts and who will be responsible for that (even if you are the main beneficiary)? Subjects were answering using a 10 point scale, from 0 – "I don't know anything about it" to 10 – "I have complete knowledge about it".

Responsibility

Responsibility is directly connected to efficacy and reflection. A person can be responsible for something if he or she is conscious of the consequences of an action and can really decide about what and how he or she can do. It is measured by an answer to the question "We are dealing with responsibility only when we have both complete knowledge and decision-making powers to perform a certain action. In other cases responsibility disperses or disappears. To what extent are you responsible for conducting each project?". Subjects were answering using a 10 point scale, from 0 – "I'm not responsible at all" to 10 – "I'm completely responsible for this project".

Interests achieved – subject and the company

Every work related project serves some interests – personal, organizational or both. Subjects were asked two questions. 1. "To what extent does the realization of this project serve your own interests?" (answers on the scale: 0 - "This project doesn't serve my interests at all", 10 – "This project serves my interest to a great extent"), 2. „To what extent does this project serve your company's interests?" (answers on a scale: 0 – "This project doesn't serve my company's interests at all", 10 – "This project serves my company's to a great extent"). If the answers to both questions were 6 or higher, we classified it as a "common good" achievement, if it is high on personal interests and low on company's interests it is "individualism". The opposite situation is "totalism". When both scores are low it means that such a project is either nonsense or has more in common with a play than a job.

Importance for the subject

Importance is one of the most common dimensions in PPA. It was measured by the question "Some personal projects are very important for us, while others are almost not important at all. How important is a particular project for you?" (answers on the scale: 0 – „This project is not important at all" to 10 – "This project is very important").

Control

Control over the project is measured by the question "We control some of our projects in 100%, while others are not controllable at all – it may be the case of coincidence or some constraints made by others. To what extent do you control each project?". Subjects were answering using a 10 point scale, from 0 – "I do not feel any control over the project" to 10 – "I feel complete in control over this project".

Success prediction

Perceived probability of finishing the project with success was measured by the question "Even at the beginning of the project or on the level of planning it is possible to

predict its chances for success. In your opinion, will the project result in success?”. The subjects were answering using a 10 point scale, from 0 – “I’m completely sure the project will not end with success” to 10 – “I’m completely sure the project will end with success”.

Difficulty

Perceived difficulty of each project was measured with the question „Personal projects range from very easy to very hard. How difficult is each project for you?”. Subjects were answering using a 10 point scale, from 0 – “This project is not difficult at all” to 10 – “This project is very difficult”.

Self-realization

Self-realization connected to each projects was measured with the question „To what extent do you self-realize yourself as a human being conducting particular projects? Subjects were answering using a 10 point scale, from 0 – “Conducting the project I don’t self-realize myself as a human being at all” to 10 – “Conducting the project I completely self-realize myself as a human being”.

Procedure

Subjects were asked to fulfill the modified version of Brian Little’s Personal Project Analysis Inventory. In this study we have provided participants with an electronic version of PPA in the form of a MS Excel spreadsheet. It turned out to be a very difficult task for the subjects – it required reflexivity and a great deal of mental effort as well as from 1 to 2 hours to fill out the electronic questionnaire that was sent via email. As a result only 13 out of 44 participants sent back filled questionnaires, which made a significant part of data useless and forced us to reconstruct measures. During the research participants were provided with an instruction on the nature of personal projects, additionally, every question in the questionnaire had a short instruction and an explanation. Participants received information that it is advisable to fill in the whole document during one session, if not possible to save the document and come back to completing it as soon as possible.

During the Projects Elicitation List phase participants were asked to list up to twenty work-related personal projects. Subjects were asked to focus on the work domain and were given freedom to generate projects that are connected with their current job and occupational life. In the second step subjects were asked to pick six projects that would be the best for anyone interested in understanding their situation in organizational context. In the second phase of the PPA participants rated projects they had selected in the first phase on different dimensions that are valid for our study. Respondents were asked to rate each project on a scale from 0 to 10 for each dimension.

The third phase was Phrasing Level Analysis. The goal of this module of PPA was to discover the inner context of the projects. Personal projects can vary from very simple (at molecular level – like “wash my hands”) to very complex and important ones (at molar level – like “encourage people to be better for others”). Naturally, most of the projects occupy the middle level between these two extreme ends. In that method it is done by left and right “laddering” procedure. Starting with the project from the list generated in the first phase, respondents are asked “Why?” they are engaged in a given project. They write the answer to the right of the project description. This is the first step of the ladder. Then we keep asking “why?” until respondent will tell us that he reached the core value. In the same way we could ask the question “how?” but that element of the procedure was not used in our study.

The fourth phase – Cross-Impact Matrices is the last part of PPA and concentrates on discovering the outer context of projects. Respondents may rank whether a given project has positive or negative impact on other ones (using scale from -10 to +10). Due to confusion this part of the method resolved on the subject and it will not be used in further analysis.

After the whole procedure subjects received an information with a request to send the Excel spreadsheet back via email.

Results

Hypothesis testing

Hypothesis 1

According to the score on six scales - autonomy, self-efficacy, reflection, responsibility, personal interests and company interests – participative and non-participative projects were identified. Projects that scored 6 or more on the 0-10 scale on each scale included were labeled as participative, those which scored less than 6 on at least one scale included were labeled non-participative. From a total number of 72 projects (11 people picked 6 projects, 1 person picked 4 projects, 1 person picked 2 projects) 23 can be classified as participative and 49 as non-participative. As we present it in Table 2, only three participants are engaged in non-participative projects only, ten other participants evaluated some of their projects as participative and some as non-participative. The sample size used in the study is insufficient to draw general conclusions from, but it suggests that participants indeed can be at the same time engaged in both participative and non-participative projects. For complete list of participants' personal projects see Table 3.

Table 2. Participative and non-participative projects among participants

| Participant | Number of participative projects | Number of non-participative projects |
|-------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | 0 | 6 |
| 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 3 | 4 | 2 |
| 4 | 0 | 2 |
| 5 | 1 | 3 |
| 6 | 2 | 4 |
| 7 | 4 | 2 |
| 8 | 2 | 4 |
| 9 | 0 | 6 |
| 10 | 2 | 4 |
| 11 | 2 | 4 |
| 12 | 3 | 3 |
| 13 | 1 | 5 |
| Sum | 23 | 49 |

Table 3. Complete list of personal projects

| |
|--|
| <i>Participative projects</i> |
| finish my application; be a good lawyer; be more effective; read carefully all emails worth reading; organize closed case folders; spend more time on learning; take part in the students contest of data bases and XML; read and process "Thinking in Java" book; take part in more trainings; take part in the project concerning methodology of X*; design own analysis connected with different scores; use own ideas to make most of the educational data; deepen experiences with Java EE platform; strengthen the knowledge on programming and coding; study; go to England; work on my English; not to act impulsively; increase professional qualifications (ACCA); learn English (B2/C1); finish my postgraduate studies; self-development in data processing; |
| <i>Non-participative projects, common-good oriented</i> |
| pass the examination; read more expert literature; understand QTP better; test current project; cooperate with universities; promote exact sciences among young people; write technical specification; get promoted; get a rise; work in department of X* - to get new ideas and more money; gain extraordinary experience in Agile methodologies; assemble didactic materials; create language exercises database online; participation in conferences for teachers; work out the skill of conducting difficult conversations; get a managerial position; |
| <i>Non-participative projects, totalistic</i> |
| take care of educational needs in the company; improve and finish the project; recalculate scores weekly; design research, analyze data and write reports; present data concerning X*; do desk research; translate; |
| <i>Non-participative projects, individualistic</i> |
| finish my PhD dissertation; set up the publishing house; earn more money; move to X* and find a better job there; collect more information on how to set up a company; publishing market analysis; change my job; move; educational program for students interested in informatics; pass CAE exam; use more of the company's social funds (sports); take part in project X; balance work and personal life; learn Italian; find additional job; double up earnings; work on own development path; find alternative position in the company; find alternative position outside the company; change the job; |
| <i>Non-participative projects, non-sense</i> |
| get promoted for a position of contributor and then senior developer |

* removed to ensure anonymity

Hypothesis 2

The means and standard deviations of the self-realization in participative and non participative projects were $M = 8.91$ ($SD = 1.12$) and $M = 6.96$ ($SD = 2.87$). A two-tailed t-test showed that this difference was significant ($t(69) = -4.14, p < .001$), Levene's test indicated unequal variances ($F = 12.05, p < .001$). It is noteworthy that although participative projects lead to self-realization in a more significant way, the mean for non-participative projects is also high. Detailed scores are presented in Table 4 and 5.

Table 4. Self-realization and participative and non-participative projects – means and SD

| Projects' participativeness | N | Mean | SD | Std. Error Mean |
|-----------------------------|----|--------|---------|-----------------|
| No | 49 | 6,9592 | 2,86472 | ,40925 |
| Yes | 23 | 8,9130 | 1,12464 | ,23450 |

Table 5. Self-realization and participative and non-participative projects – means and SD

| | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|------|------------------------------|--------|------------------------|---------------|------------------------|---|----------|
| | F | Sig. | t | Df | Sig. (2- tailed) | Mean Diff. | Std. Error Diff. | 95% Confidence Interval of the Diff. | |
| | | | | | | | | Lower | Upper |
| Equal variances assumed | 12,052 | ,001 | -3,149 | 70 | ,002 | -1,95386 | ,62041 | -3,19123 | -,71649 |
| Equal variances not assumed | | | -4,142 | 68,567 | ,000 | -1,95386 | ,47167 | -2,89493 | -1,01279 |

Hypothesis 3

The means and standard deviations of the importance for the person in participative and non participative projects were $M = 7.96$ ($SD = 2.05$) and $M = 6.86$ ($SD = 2.68$). A two tailed t-test showed that this difference was not significant ($t = -1.911$, $p = .061$). Detailed scores in Table 6 and 7.

Table 6. Projects importance and participative and non-participative projects – means and SD

| Projects' participativeness | N | Mean | SD | Std. Error Mean |
|--------------------------------|----|--------|---------|--------------------|
| No | 49 | 6,8571 | 2,68483 | ,38355 |
| Yes | 23 | 7,9565 | 2,05555 | ,42861 |

Table 7. Projects importance and participative and non-participative projects – t-test

| | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|------|------------------------------|--------|------------------------|---------------|------------------------|---|--------|
| | F | Sig. | t | Df | Sig. (2- tailed) | Mean Diff. | Std. Error Diff. | 95% Confidence Interval of the Diff. | |
| | | | | | | | | Lower | Upper |
| Equal variances assumed | 1,584 | ,212 | -1,737 | 70 | ,087 | -1,09938 | ,63295 | -2,36175 | ,16299 |
| Equal variances not assumed | | | -1,911 | 55,137 | ,061 | -1,09938 | ,57517 | -2,25198 | ,05322 |

Hypothesis 4

The means and standard deviations of the control over the project in participative and non participative projects were $M = 8.61$ ($SD = 1.27$) and $M = 6.31$ ($SD = 2.39$). A two-tailed t-test showed that this difference was significant ($t(69) = -5.328$, $p < .001$), Levene's test indicated unequal variances ($F = 6.01$, $p = .017$). Detailed scores in Table 8 and 9.

Table 8. Perceived control over the project and participative and non-participative projects – means and SD.

| Projects' participativeness | N | Mean | SD | Std. Error Mean |
|-----------------------------|----|--------|---------|-----------------|
| No | 49 | 6,3061 | 2,39099 | ,34157 |
| Yes | 23 | 8,6087 | 1,26990 | ,26479 |

Table 9. Perceived control over the project and participative and non-participative projects – t-test.

| | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|------|------------------------------|--------|-----------------|------------|------------------|--------------------------------------|----------|
| | F | Sig. | t | Df | Sig. (2-tailed) | Mean Diff. | Std. Error Diff. | 95% Confidence Interval of the Diff. | |
| | | | | | | | | Lower | Upper |
| Equal variances assumed | 6,011 | ,017 | -4,330 | 70 | ,000 | -2,30257 | ,53181 | -3,36323 | -1,24191 |
| Equal variances not assumed | | | -5,328 | 68,808 | ,000 | -2,30257 | ,43219 | -3,16480 | -1,44034 |

Hypothesis 5

The means and standard deviations of the success probability of the project in participative and non participative projects were $M = 7.91$ ($SD = 1.56$) and $M = 6.91$ ($SD = 2.38$). A two-tailed t-test showed that this difference was significant ($t(62) = -2.112, p = .039$), Levene's test indicated unequal variances ($F = 7.28, p = .009$).. Detailed scores in Table 10 and 11.

Table 10. Perceived success probability and participative and non-participative projects – means and SD.

| Projects' participativeness | N | Mean | SD | Std. Error Mean |
|-----------------------------|----|--------|---------|-----------------|
| No | 49 | 6,9184 | 2,37905 | ,33986 |
| Yes | 23 | 7,9130 | 1,56417 | ,32615 |

Table 11. Perceived success probability and participative and non-participative projects – t-test.

| | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|------|------------------------------|--------|-----------------|------------|------------------|--------------------------------------|---------|
| | F | Sig. | t | Df | Sig. (2-tailed) | Mean Diff. | Std. Error Diff. | 95% Confidence Interval of the Diff. | |
| | | | | | | | | Lower | Upper |
| Equal variances assumed | 7,277 | ,009 | -1,825 | 70 | ,072 | -,99468 | ,54504 | -2,08173 | ,09238 |
| Equal variances not assumed | | | -2,112 | 62,137 | ,039 | -,99468 | ,47104 | -1,93624 | -,05311 |

Discussion

Organizational aspects of participation are a subject of scientific inquiry more often than its psychological outcomes. The literature on participative personal projects is not existent, thus our discussion will have more general character.

The PPA method seems to be very promising in research on participation. Surely there is a need for more in-depth research on a larger sample that would allow to conduct analysis on the level of “set of projects” (person), not the project itself. It would make it possible to compare employees according to their education, tenure, business branch etc. The study suggests that people, no matter whether they receive support from organizational systems or culture or not, can conduct participative projects (assumed in hypothesis 1). Such approach is useful to explain inconsistent and very often contradictory results of studies on participation. It would also explain why only fully participative organization can produce effective and efficient work environment as some studies suggests (Summers and Hyman, 2005). When we perceive organizational systems in the variety of manifestations including job descriptions and certain tasks assigned to employees as an environment for an acting person, we can understand why limited participation (focusing on the narrow area) may not result in improving employees condition.

Research on participation was very often focusing on limited participation only. If we give employees freedom to set performance goals as it was done by Latham and his colleagues (Latham et al., 1978), it does not mean that employees’ personal projects become more participative. There might be other factors and organizational systems that still keep the employees focused on their individualistic or totalistic projects. In a similar manner our settlement helps to understand the psychological basis for total participation management success (Stocki, Prokopowicz, & Żmuda, 2008), which consist in the fact that creating participative organizational environment in the highest possible scope enables employees to set and pursue larger number of participative projects.

Thanks to engagement in personal projects that are participative, employees self-realize themselves in a significant way. There is not enough data to determine whether self-realization in a given number of projects leads to self-realization of the whole person. That issue should be examined in next studies. We can assume that in the same way as engagement in meaningful core projects leads to well-being, certain set of work-related participative personal projects lead to self-realization and personal development.

Orientation toward common good (personal and company’s interest at the same time) is a definitional condition of participation. Even if somebody pursues a project in the organizational context that is characterized by reflection, autonomy, responsibility and self-efficacy but is oriented on personal interest only or company’s interest only, it is not participation, it is individualistic approach (maximizing my own good) or totalistic approach (maximizing community good) described by Wojtyła (1985). So the question is not whether participative projects are oriented on the organizational interests, but how effective they are in achieving them. Again to completely test such a statement we would need a bigger sample and examination of sets of personal projects, not the separate personal projects. It is, however, possible to predict effectiveness of participative personal projects according to results connected with hypothesis 3, 4 and 5 and research of organizational personal projects described earlier. Participative projects are perceived as more important for the person (although the difference is not statistically significant), more controllable and more likely to end in success and what was described earlier are meaningful. It means that employees are (1) engaged in the projects and activities that they understand, can decide what and how to do to complete them, (2) perceive these projects as important, (3) exercise control over these

projects, and (4) believe that these projects will be successful. All of these together lead to intrinsic motivation and job engagement through which both personal and company's success can be achieved.

Conclusions

The results of the study show that the direction of research on participation focused on work related personal projects analysis can be fruitful. The results imply that people are able to conduct participative projects no matter if they receive support from organizational systems and culture or not. We may assume that the more participative work environment and organizational systems are, the easier it is to conduct participative personal projects. To examine that assumption further investigations on a larger sample would be advisable. Such study should control more variables, including level of participativeness of organizational systems and culture and should make it possible to examine psychological effects of certain "sets of projects" as well as compare individuals according to their education, tenure, business branch etc. Other results of the study suggest that participative personal projects lead to self-realization more often than non-participative projects as well as they are more controllable and perceived as more likely to end with success.

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Abstrakt

Pomimo faktu, iż obszar partycypacji pracowniczej jest obiektem zainteresowania wielu menadżerów, psychologów, socjologów czy też przedstawicieli innych nauk o organizacji, badania tego zagadnienia wciąż nie są satysfakcjonujące. W poniższym artykule prezentujemy alternatywne podejście do badania partycypacji opartą o koncepcję projektów osobistych. Podejście to pozwala na analizę partycypacji w wymiarze indywidualnym poprzez skoncentrowanie się na osobach działających wspólnie z innymi w kontekście organizacyjnym. Wyniki wskazują, że projekty o naturze partycypacyjnej prowadzą do samorealizacji znaczeni częściej niż projekty niepartycypacyjne. Dodatkowo, projekty partycypacyjne postrzegane są jako łatwiejsze do kontrolowania i bardziej prawdopodobne jest zakończenie ich sukcesem.

TOTAL PARTICIPATION IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT – FRIEND OR FOE

Joanna Pyrkosz, Grzegorz Żmuda²⁸

Abstract

The aim of this study was to examine how one's preferred management style (participative or autocratic), influences project-group effectiveness and his or her job satisfaction. The group experiment simulating a project management task has shown that people's preferred management style did not reflect their actual behavior. As predicted, members of participative project groups were more satisfied with the task they performed, and reported a more positive mood after the experiment. Members of autocratic groups were less satisfied and reported a more negative mood after the experiment. Contrary to the hypothesis, no significant effects on effectiveness were observed.

Keywords: total participation, project management, leadership

Introduction

Although Total Participation Management (TPM) and other participative management styles are currently becoming more and more popular (Stocki, Prokopowicz, & Żmuda, 2008), there are still no clear empirical findings regarding its impact on effectiveness (Glew, O'Leary-Kelly, Griffin, & Van Fleet, 1995; Wagner, 1994) or satisfaction (Miles, 1965; Heller, 1971; Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Kim, 2002). Despite the fact that research on participation can be found in almost every field of contemporary psychology (see: Cheney et al., 1998; authors present other scientific disciplines where studies on participation also include other disciplines such as sociology, political science, economy etc.), it is hard not only to find conclusive results on what the conditions or effects of participation are but also what participation is. The need for adequate and conclusive studies on participation grows even faster when we take into account that many different companies around the world (e.g. Semco, SAIC, Harley Davidson, SRC Holdings Corp. and many others) achieve extraordinary results implementing total participation management (the term was used first by Graham and Titus (1979)).

There is a whole spectrum of different approaches to organizational participation that array from different assumptions, use different measures and postulate different outcomes of participation. Participation is not always even labeled as 'participation', sometimes scientists use the term employee involvement, work democracy, empowerment or self-directed work teams (Cooper, 2002). The most popular approach uses participative decision-making as a synonym of participation (Locke & Schweiger, 1979). Defining participation as participating in the decision-making process would be incomplete (for more anthropological assumptions that we make here see Żmuda, Prokopowicz, Stocki, submitted). The autonomy should be broadened by reflection and thus we propose to define participation not only as a power sharing but also knowledge sharing process.

Opposite to the participative management style, autocratic management or leadership can be found in the literature (Lewin, Lipitt, & White, 1939; Tannenbaum & Schmidt, 1958;

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Vroom & Jago, 1988; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). This leadership style puts the manager on top of all decisions not necessarily demanding employees' involvement other than doing what one is told. Almost all Project Management methodologies (PRINCE2, PMBOK, PCM) require strict hierarchy of power. The project manager makes all the decisions. Group leaders are responsible for employees' work and report strictly to their immediate supervisor – Project Manager. The employees at the bottom of the hierarchy are only supposed to contact the Group leader, never the Project Manager. The roles are fixed, the information is dosed out if needed but mainly the tasks are given to the individuals without asking. This approach is typical for project management partially because of the nature of projects itself. Project is a management environment that is created for the purpose of delivering one or more business products according to a specified business case (Association of Project Management Group Ltd.). The vital factors in every project are: fixed time, resources and goals. The nature of those requirements mainly results in highly hierarchical, autocratic management style.

When it comes to the effectiveness of participation, as we stated before, the results are not consistent. As proven in some studies (Miles, 1965; Heller, 1971; Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Magjuka, 1989; Mitchell, 1996; Kim, 2002; Stocki, Prokopowicz & Żmuda, 2008) those employees who had the possibility to make decisions about their tasks were more satisfied with their work. Participation has been shown to have positive influence on general well-being (Stocki & Bielecki, 2007), motivation (Mulder, 1977; Deci & Ryan, 1985), different aspects of personal development or fulfilling the high-level needs (Mendel, 2001). But, according to Summers and Hyman (2005) there is plenty of research that found no association or even a negative association between the company performance and participatory management (Kelly & Kelly, 1991; Ben-Ner & Jones, 1995; Voughan-Whitehead, 1995; Summers & Hyman, 2005). The causal direction of the relationship remains to be discovered (Cooper, 2002). Similarly, the discussion on motivational vs. cognitive explanation for participation effectiveness is still in progress (Wagner et al., 1997). We believe that there is more credible data supporting the notion that participative management results in more positive mood together with higher work satisfaction when compared with autocratic management. Based on previous research mentioned in this section we assume that participants managed in a participatory way will be more satisfied with the work on the project as opposed to participants managed in an authoritarian manner (Hypothesis 1). Some research on leadership states that the outcomes of different management styles depend on employees' maturity (Hersey & Blanchard, 1977) or situational factors (Fiedler, 1964, 1978). In the situations similar to the experimental task presented in this study, namely: new, high time pressure, clear and difficult goals and changing environment - autocratic style seems to be more beneficial (Fiedler, 1964, 1978). Others (Magjuka, 1989) argue that satisfaction is partially responsible for effectiveness as a satisfied employee works better than an unhappy one. Heller et al. (1998) summarize research on participation with the claim that it has been shown to have neutral or slightly positive impact on individuals, groups and organizations. In this research, accordingly to the data mentioned above, we try to support the assumption that autocratic management in project management setting will be more effective than participative management style (Hypothesis 2).

However what is clearly missing in all mentioned research is taking into consideration managers' and employees' beliefs (convictions). The effectiveness of participative and authoritarian management styles may be mediated by the implicit theories about which style is the best one and should be used. In previous studies (Lewin, Lippitt & White, 1939) participants were assigned to certain managed groups without being asked about their own preferences. This might have affected the results. The positive relation between implicit

power theories and power sharing was found by Coleman (2004). In our study we want to examine satisfaction and effectiveness of participative and autocratic management styles taking into consideration the group members' and leaders' beliefs about the desired management style. We predict that participants will react during experiment accordingly to their preferred management style (Hypothesis 3).

Research question

What are the outcomes of participatory and autocratic management styles in a project group, taking into consideration the participants' beliefs about their preferred management styles?

Hypotheses

- Members of participative groups will be generally more satisfied with the job and will be in a better mood than members of autocratic groups.
- Autocratic groups will be generally more effective than participative groups.
- Participants will act according to their beliefs (preferred management style) – those who find participatory management most appropriate will act in a participatory way, those who find autocratic management style most appropriate will act in an authoritarian way.

Methodology of research

The preferred management style scale was used to assess people's orientations towards participative and autocratic management and their preferences in this matter. Participants answered seven questions on their beliefs regarding management style (e.g.: "Best scores are achieved by the teams where the leader makes most of the decisions", "If you involve many group members in the decision making process it will always result in chaos and waste of time") using 4 points scale ("I definitely disagree", "I disagree", "I agree", "I definitely agree"). The maximum in this scale means that the person holds highly autocratic preferences when it comes to the management whereas participants with low results leaned towards participative management. The reliability of the scale was low, but acceptable ($\alpha = .58$). According to the scores the participants achieved, they were assigned to be leaders or members of specific groups. Some groups were arranged in a way that guaranteed internal cohesion (e.g., all members had participative or autocratic attitude), while others were mixed. Groups took part in the project management simulation. Before as well as after the simulation, participants filled in the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS) by Mayer and Gaschke (1988) which contains a list of several adjectives (for details see Appendix 1). Two subscales of mood were used – pleasant-unpleasant (adjectives: active, calm, caring, content, happy etc.) and negative-relaxed (adjectives: gloomy, fed up, nervous). High scores on the first subscale stand for unpleasant mood, while low scores indicate good mood. When it comes to the second subscale, high scores stand for relaxed state, while low ones for upset-nervous one.

The projects goal was to produce, using given resources (paper, scissors, glue etc.), and sell on the improvised market different types of goods (cubes, cones, circles etc.). The task was not very difficult to avoid influence of participants' earlier experience. We expect that the final score will result from the way group work was organized and how members were motivated. At the beginning of the project each group leader received detailed instructions on what the specific goals were: the number of goods to produce and the amount of money to earn. Leaders were told not to show directly the written instructions to the group

members, but that they could reveal any information they wanted to. Leaders were asked to organize the work of the group in the way they wished to do. The time for the task was fixed – 54 minutes divided into 8 rounds. In each round prices on the market were changing as well as special occurrences (price changes, new standards of products, new products etc.) were appearing. The role of the occurrences was to make the work environment more dynamic and less predictable. Each group was monitored by observers in order to check the behavioral aspects of project management. The observers received training before the experiment and during the group work were filling out the behavioral questionnaire – rating behavior of each member and leader to assess whether it was participative or autocratic. When it comes to the leaders, observers were noting down behaviors concerning: decision making, power distribution and knowledge distribution. Each behavior was later on assessed on the scale from 0 (low participation with group) to 8 (high participation with group). Each group was monitored by one observer. The scale had average reliability ($\alpha = .66$). After completing the project, all participants were first asked to fill in the BMIS together with Satisfaction Scale (6 questions about general satisfaction, satisfaction with decision making process, atmosphere etc.; $\alpha = .87$). The higher result on Satisfaction Scale, the more satisfied participants felt after completing the task. Later on, participants were asked to assess their scores. The project groups were to produce and sell a certain amount of geometric figures and obtain as much money for them as they could. At the end of the simulation, groups added up the money they collected and the value of the tools they bought during the work. In that way the final score was calculated.

Participants

77 university students participated in the experiment (17 male and 59 female). The age average was 23,7 ($SD = 4.4$)²⁹. The group consisted of students of the following faculties: sociology, psychology, international relations. Participants were chosen on the basis of their interest in project management. Most participants were students. The number of groups taking part in the experiment was 20. Detailed demographic information can be found in Table 1. The participants were assigned to the 20 groups (1 group of 5 people, 15 groups of 4, 4 groups of 3).

Table 1. Demographic structure of the sample.

| Demographics | Category | Frequency |
|--------------|----------------|-----------|
| Gender | Female | 59 |
| | Male | 17 |
| | Missing | 1 |
| Age | <22 | 25 |
| | 22-25 | 24 |
| | >25 | 9 |
| | Missing | 19 |
| Education | Psychology | 39 |
| | Sociology | 15 |
| | Int. relations | 23 |

²⁹ As for the huge amount of age data missing there cannot be found any reasonable explanation why so many people decided not to reveal their age, however it is unlikely to have any influence on the research itself

Results

The descriptive statistics of the main study measures before categorization are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of main study measures.

| | N | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
|--------------------------------|----|-------|-------|-------|------|
| Preferred Management Scale | 65 | 10,00 | 22,00 | 14,98 | 3,94 |
| Behavior Assessment | 77 | ,67 | 8,00 | 3,93 | 1,78 |
| Satisfaction Scale | 75 | 8,00 | 24,00 | 18,26 | 3,83 |
| Group Management Style | 20 | ,67 | 7,67 | 3,47 | 1,81 |
| Pleasant-Unpleasant Mood Scale | 75 | 3,19 | 6,94 | 5,26 | ,86 |

Hypothesis 1.

The participants' satisfaction was measured by the Satisfaction scale (see the Appendix) and the mood was measured by the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). To examine both participants' satisfaction and group effectiveness each group was categorized according to the observers' ratings as either participative, "in-between" or autocratic. Out of 20 groups, 7 were assessed as using a participative style (27 participants), 8 were using an "in-between" style (30 participants), and 5 were using an autocratic management style (20 participants). In our further analysis we will compare participative and autocratic groups only.

The means and standard deviations of the Satisfaction Scale of participative and autocratic groups were $M = 20.33$ ($SD = 3.05$) and $M = 17.1$ ($SD = 3.94$), respectively. A two tailed t-test showed that this difference was significant ($t(44) = 3.13$, $p < .005$). Detailed scores can be found in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3. Management style in the group and members satisfaction – means and standard deviations.

| Management style in the group | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean |
|-------------------------------|----|-------|----------------|-----------------|
| Participative | 26 | 20,33 | 3,05 | ,60 |
| Autocratic | 20 | 17,10 | 3,94 | ,88 |

Table 4. Management style in the group and members satisfaction – t-test.

| | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|------|------------------------------|--------|-----------------|------------|------------------|---|---------|
| | F | Sig. | t | Df | Sig. (2-tailed) | Mean Diff. | Std. Error Diff. | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | |
| | | | | | | | | Lower | Upper |
| Equal variances assumed | 2,480 | ,122 | 3,134 | 44 | ,003 | 3,23077 | 1,03081 | 1,15330 | 5,30824 |
| Equal variances not assumed | | | 3,031 | 34,888 | ,005 | 3,23077 | 1,06604 | 1,06634 | 5,39520 |

Participants' mood was measured by two out of four BMIS scales: Pleasant-Unpleasant, and Negative-Relaxed. No differences in the mood were observed before the experiment. For the scale Pleasant-Unpleasant means and standard deviations of participative and autocratic groups were $M = 5.16$ ($SD = .75$) and $M = 5.03$ ($SD = 1.11$), ($t(44) = .44$, $p > .05$) and for the scale Negative-Relaxed $M = 2.25$ ($SD = .74$) and $M = 2.13$ ($SD = 1.00$), ($t(44) = .47$, $p > .05$). After the experiment the observed means and standard deviations of participative and autocratic groups were $M = 5.50$ ($SD = .76$) and $M = 5.01$ ($SD = 1.01$), ($t(44) = 1.91$, $p < .062$) and for the scale Negative-Relaxed $M = 2.33$ ($SD = .86$) and $M = 2.67$ ($SD = 1.01$), ($t(44) = -1.22$, $p > .05$). Although not significant and relatively small, the observed changes are interesting and suggest that members of participative groups were in better mood after the experiment than members of autocratic groups. To examine the changes within the groups Paired Samples T-test was used. The significant ($t(24) = -2.33$, $p \leq .03$) change was found towards more pleasant mood in Pleasant-Unpleasant Scale among participative groups, and negative change in Negative-Relaxed scale turned out to be not significant $t(24) = -2.33$, $p = .74$. Detailed scores are presented in Table 5. Among autocratic groups, the negative change in Pleasant-Unpleasant Scale turned out to be insignificant $t(19) = .16$, $p = .87$, and negative change in Negative-Relaxed scale turned out to be significant $t(19) = -2.83$, $p = .01$. Detailed scores are displayed in Table 6.

Table 5. Results of members of participative groups in BMIS mood scales – paired samples t-test.

| | | Paired Differences | | | | t | df | Sig. (2-tailed) | |
|--------|--|--------------------|-----------|-----------------|---|---------|--------|-----------------|------|
| | | Mean | Std. Dev. | Std. Error Mean | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | | | | |
| | | | | | Lower | Upper | | | |
| Pair 1 | Pleasant-Unpleasant Before - Pleasant-Unpleasant After | -,37333 | ,80255 | ,16051 | -,70461 | -,04205 | -2,326 | 24 | ,029 |
| Pair 2 | Negative-Relaxed Before - Negative-Relaxed After | -,06267 | ,95332 | ,19066 | -,45618 | ,33085 | -,329 | 24 | ,745 |

Table 6. Results of members of autocratic groups in BMIS mood scales – paired samples t-test.

| | | Paired Differences | | | | t | df | Sig. (2-tailed) | |
|--------|--|--------------------|-----------|-----------------|---|---------|--------|-----------------|------|
| | | Mean | Std. Dev. | Std. Error Mean | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | | | | |
| | | | | | Lower | Upper | | | |
| Pair 1 | Pleasant-Unpleasant Before - Pleasant-Unpleasant After | ,03146 | ,86359 | ,19310 | -,37271 | ,43563 | ,163 | 19 | ,872 |
| Pair 2 | Negative-Relaxed Before - Negative-Relaxed After | -,54333 | ,85847 | ,19196 | -,94511 | -,14156 | -2,830 | 19 | ,011 |

Hypothesis 2.

The means and standard deviations of the effectiveness of participative and autocratic groups were $M = 137.96$ ($SD = 41.22$) and $M = 121.04$ ($SD = 48.68$). A two tailed t-test showed that this difference was not significant ($t(10) = .65$, $p < 0.53$). Although the difference is not significant, it is worth mentioning that the direction of that difference was opposite to our hypothesis. Participative groups achieved a better score in effectiveness than autocratic ones. Detailed scores can be found in Tables 7 and 8.

Table 7. Management style in the group and group effectiveness – means and standard deviations.

| Management style in the group | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean |
|-------------------------------|---|--------|----------------|-----------------|
| Participative | 7 | 137,96 | 41,22 | 15,58 |
| Autocratic | 5 | 121,03 | 48,68 | 21,77 |

Table 8. Management style in the group and group – t-test.

| | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|------|------------------------------|-------|-----------------|------------|------------------|---|----------|
| | F | Sig. | t | Df | Sig. (2-tailed) | Mean Diff. | Std. Error Diff. | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | |
| | | | | | | | | Lower | Upper |
| Equal variances assumed | ,194 | ,669 | ,652 | 10 | ,529 | 16,92762 | 25,97303 | -40,94391 | 74,79914 |
| Equal variances not assumed | | | ,632 | 7,785 | ,545 | 16,92762 | 26,77212 | -45,10667 | 78,96191 |

Hypothesis 3.

To examine the link between one’s preferred management style and one’s real behavior we had to categorize the scores on the scale of Preferred Management as well as the Behavior Assessment. Scores in each variable were ordered into three categories. The Chi-Square Test was used, $\chi^2(4, N=65) = 4.11$, $p = .39$. No significant relationship between preferred management style and behavior was found. For the details see Table 3 and 4. The data does not support hypothesis 3. Detailed data can be found in Tables 9 and 10.

Table 9. Preferred Management Style and Behavior Assessment – cross-table.

| | | Preferred Management Style | | | Total |
|---------------------|---------------|----------------------------|--------------|------------|-------|
| | | Participative | “In between” | Autocratic | |
| Behavior Assessment | Participative | 10 | 11 | 5 | 26 |
| | “In between” | 10 | 6 | 7 | 23 |
| | Autocratic | 3 | 8 | 5 | 16 |
| Total | | 23 | 25 | 17 | 65 |

Table 10. Preferred Management Style and Behavior Assessment – chi-square test.

| | Value | Df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
|---------------------------------|----------|----|--------------------------|
| Pearson Chi-Square | 4,113(a) | 4 | ,391 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 4,440 | 4 | ,350 |
| Linear-by-Linear Association | 1,481 | 1 | ,224 |
| N of Valid Cases | 65 | | |

a) 1 cell (11,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4,18.

Discussion and conclusions

Our pilot study suggests that, indeed, people are more satisfied when working in participative groups than when working in an autocratic environment. Members of participative groups (in our study) reported to be satisfied with the decision making process, atmosphere in the groups, proud of the results and would like to work with the same group again. Working in a participative environment changed people's mood into a better one, while working in the autocratic environment made people experience more negative mood. These results are coherent with most of the studies on participation (Miles, 1965; Heller, 1971; Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Magjuka, 1989; Mitchell, 1996; Kim, 2002; Stocki, Prokopowicz, Żmuda, 2008) that suggest that when it comes to satisfaction, participatory environment, providing people with autonomy and a chance to execute their freedom, is more beneficial than an autocratic one. Participative groups were also more effective than autocratic ones, but this difference was not significant. It is however worth mentioning, because the characteristics of the situation – novelty of the task, time pressure etc – would rather favor autocratic management (Fiedler, 1964, 1978). It looks like working in good mood in participative groups allowed participants to achieve slightly better results. It is possible that the results could be more unequivocal if the team task lasted longer and allowed for the development and change of more advanced strategies etc. This should be a case in further investigations.

Interesting findings were noticed when it comes to the relation between one's preferred management style and their behavior during experiment. We were not able to find any significant relation between those two. In other words, people say one thing and then do another one. We suggest a couple of different explanations for this phenomenon. First of all it is possible that when answering the questions in the Preferred Management Style questionnaire people do not answer according to what they really think or feel but according to what is dominant in their culture – present in media, thought in the business schools, etc. The second possible explanation is connected with the nature of participation. As Żmuda, Prokopowicz and Stocki (submitted) wrote, the participation is rooted deep in the human nature and it may be manifested in different situations, no matter what people say. Participation would not be a simple belief but rather an attitude or an even more complex mental structure. Alternative explanations may be formulated according to the sense-making process (Weick, 1995). According to the sense-making process people first act, then try to make sense of what and why they did. Another possible explanation of these findings is the context of the research and group dynamics – it is possible that people would act in a different manner in the occupational environment, as opposed to academic setting. Further research on a larger sample is required to examine which explanation is more relevant here. The absence of any relation between preferred style and behavior made it impossible to reasonably

examine the possible mediation of the preferred style and satisfaction (the situation resulted in small number of participants in important experimental conditions). Preliminary analysis shows that one's preferred management style may influence the satisfaction and effectiveness, but a larger sample is needed here before we can draw any conclusions.

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Appendix 1

Brief Mood Introspection Scale J. D. Mayer, Y. N. Gaschke

Instruction:

Circle the response on the scale below that indicates how well each adjective or phrase describes your present mood, where 1 stands for *I definitely do not feel this way* and 7 for *I definitely feel this way*.

In this moment I feel:

| | <i>I definitely do not feel this way</i> | | | | | | <i>I definitely feel this way</i> |
|---------|--|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------------------|
| Happy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Lively | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Sad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Tired | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Gloomy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Drowsy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Caring | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Content | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Jittery | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Fed up | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Active | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Peppy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Calm | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Loving | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Grouchy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Nervous | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Appendix 2

Satisfaction scale

Instruction:

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements using the scale below where:

1 – I definitely disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I agree, 4 – I definitely agree

| Statement | I definitely disagree | I disagree | I agree | I definitely agree |
|--|-----------------------|------------|---------|--------------------|
| Generally speaking I am satisfied with the cooperation in this group. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| I am happy with the decision making system in this group. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| I enjoyed the atmosphere during the group work. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| As a team we accomplished as much as was possible. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| If I were to do this task one more time, I wish I worked in exactly the same team of people. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| I am personally proud of our team accomplishments. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Appendix 3

Preferred Management Style

| Statement | I definitely disagree | I disagree | I agree | I definitely agree |
|---|-----------------------|------------|---------|--------------------|
| Best scores are achieved by the teams where leader makes most of the decisions | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| If you involve many group members in decision making process it will always result in chaos and waste of time | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Revealing some of the information can be much worse than not meeting the deadline or failing to accomplish some tasks | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| When setting tasks and responsibilities you always have to take group members' personal situation into account* | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Everybody in the team should have access to all information regardless of their position* | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| There are cases when you should put your own good over the group good | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Good leader makes the analysis first, then makes the decision and after all convinces group members to follow it | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

* reversed questions

Appendix 4

Observation check

- Leaders behavior

| How often did he/she make the decisions without consulting the group members? | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| 0 Never | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 Always |

| How often did he/she assign duties to the group members without asking about their opinion? | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| 0 Never | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 Always |

| How often did he/she share his/her opinions with the group members ? | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| 0 Never | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 Always |

- Group members behavior

| How often did he/she share opinions different than the rest of the group? | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| 0 Never | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 Always |

| How often did he/she agree on decisions that he/she wasn't convinced to? | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| 0 Never | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 Always |

| How often did he/she ask questions? | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| 0 Never | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 Always |

| How often did he/she share his/her opinions with the group ? | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| 0 Never | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 Always |

Abstrakt

Celem opisanego poniżej badania jest zbadanie relacji pomiędzy preferowanym stylem zarządzania danej osoby (na skali partycypacyjny-autorytarny) a efektywnością pracy w projekcie oraz zadowoleniem uczestników. Eksperyment grupowy, polegający na pracy w symulowanym projekcie, pokazał, że preferencje osób badanych nie przekładały się na ich rzeczywiste zachowania. Zgodnie z przewidywaniami członkowie grup zarządzanych partycypacyjnie byli bardziej zadowoleni z wykonywanych zadań a ich nastrój po eksperymencie był lepszy niż grup zarządzanych autorytarnie. Członkowie grup zarządzanych autorytarnie byli mniej zadowoleni oraz zanotowali obniżenie nastroju. Wbrew oczekiwaniom nie zanotowano istotnych różnic pomiędzy efektywnością obu stylów zarządzania.

TRUST TOWARDS MANAGERS, PERCEIVED MANAGERIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVENESS: EXPLORING ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES OF TRUST BELIEFS

*Piotr Prokopowicz*³⁰

Abstract

Trust has become a very useful explanatory device in organizational science. This paper presents and clarifies the current psychological debate on trust, verifies the Integrative Model of Organizational Trust in the natural organizational setting, suggests perceived responsibility as additional trust antecedent and analyzes the possible influence that trust towards managers has on employee engagement and performance. The results imply that among trust antecedents, perceived managerial benevolence and integrity influence trust towards managers heavily, while perceived ability of managers has substantial impact on employee work engagement. The possibility of distinguishing domain-general trust and domain-specific confidence as separate aspects of trust is discussed.

Keywords: trust, responsibility, individual effectiveness, industrial and organizational psychology

Introduction

Trust has become one of the most popular concepts in social sciences during the last three decades (e.g. Luhman, 1979; Sztompka, 1996, 1998; Fukuyama, 1994; Rotter, 1980; Bateson, 1988). This influence is especially apparent in organizational psychology in general and, more specifically, in studies on organizational effectiveness. Complex theoretical frameworks have been developed and redeveloped both by theorist and business practitioners in order to describe trust as one of the most important, if not the most important, assets of contemporary business (Levering, 2000; Covey, 2006; Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 2007; Rousseau et al., 1998, Sitkin & Pablo, 1992, Mayer et al., 1995; Robinson, 1996). Numerous research programs and studies have tried to prove that there is a direct link between trust and organizational effectiveness (e.g. Levering, 2000; Mayer & Gavin, 2005; Davis et al., 2000). Is this interest in trust legitimate? Can trust be considered the ultimate resource that an organization can create, sustain and employ in order to maximize its performance?

This paper shall be an attempt to indicate that while trust has become a very useful explanatory device in organizational science, most theories of trust still tend to ignore important facets of trust beliefs in organizations, bringing both conceptual and empirical confusion into an already disorganized field. While theoretical and empirical body of knowledge suggests that trust, construed as a relationship-specific cognitive model individuals hold about other individuals regarding their cooperation-relevant dispositions (e.g. Dietz & Hartog, 2006), influences substantially the outcome of every group-based activity, it

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is still to be established what conditions must be fulfilled in order to distinguish trust from other types of beliefs and behaviors.

The purpose of this paper is threefold. Firstly, it is to present and clarify the current debate on trust, relating it to the fields of cognitive sciences and philosophical anthropology. Secondly, it is to verify the Integrative Model of Organizational Trust, (Mayer et al., 1995) in the natural organizational setting, possibly supplementing it with additional dimension of perceived responsibility. Finally, it is to analyze the possible influence that trust and its antecedents have on individual engagement and performance.

What is trust?

Even though the literature on organizational trust remains dispersed (e.g. Dietz & Hartog, 2006; McEvily et al., 2003), there is a set of key papers and reviews that attempt to identify the essence of trust (Rotter, 1967, 1980; Mayer et al., 1995, Rousseau et al., 1998; Butler, 1991). In order to construe the current state of debate on organizational trust, it is necessary to recapitulate them briefly.

In psychology, trust has been traditionally regarded as a dispositional trait. The main proponent of this approach was Rotter (1967), who in his seminal work described interpersonal trust as a generalized expectancy of others' reliability. Rotter (1980) argues that people differ in their propensity to trust others. Other authors, who followed Rotter's argument, agree that socio-economic factors like life experiences, personality types, cultural background, and education determine one's propensity to trust (Mayer et al., 1995). As for the role of context, according to Rotter, unfamiliar environmental circumstances cause the influence of trusting dispositions to rise (Rotter, 1980).

Rotter's approach proved effective in measuring the trait-like aspects of trust. Nevertheless, organizational psychology abandoned this perspective in favor of more situational, contextual and interactive approaches, leaving some aspects of Rotter's interpersonal trust and describing it as caution or propensity to trust (see: Rousseau et al., 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Schoorman et al., 2007). The majority of definitions of trust in modern organizational science and psychology focus on trust as a specific set of beliefs about partner's dependability (McAllister, 1995; Dirks, 1999), integrity and good will (Robinson, 1996, Cook & Wall, 1980), as well as competence (Mishra, 1993). Nevertheless, a large number of theoretical and empirical perspectives leave the field disorganized and call for a paradigm-like solution to advance the research on organizational trust.

Integrated Model of Organizational Trust

Due to the chaotically increasing number of publications related to trust, it is important to recognize an appealing effort in organizational science to clarify the most important issues in the field (Mayer et al., 1995). The integrative model of organizational trust (IMOT), created and refined by Mayer et al. (1995; Schoorman et al., 2007) constitutes the basis for this paper. It is the first fully relational approach to trust, focusing on organizational trust between two parties: a trusting party (trustor) and a party to be trusted (trustee). This unique relationship-specific boundary condition is what makes IMOT approach especially useful for this paper as it focuses on the relationship between employees and managers.

By the definition proposed by Mayer et al. (1995), trust is "a willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party" (p. 712). It is crucial to recognize two important aspects of this definition. Firstly, trust is not synonymous to risk, but is rather a willingness to take risk.

Secondly, this willingness, as based on the structure of expectations, is a conative fact, and as such, is hard to be studied by means of cognitive measurement. It means that while the will to become vulnerable to other person's actions is represented mentally, it is problematic to perceive those representations as a direct indicator of further behavioral tendency. Notwithstanding these limitations, trust expectations and mental representations of such willingness described by Mayer et al. (1995) can and should be studied with the methods and theoretical background of cognitive psychology.

The definition offered by Mayer et al. (1995) seems to encompass everything that is crucial for understanding organizational trust – the fact that trust always arises in social relationships (and as such is embedded in the cultural context of trust situations), involves risk and something of value for the trustor, allowing disappointment as an outcome (hence the vulnerability). The integrated character of the model takes into account the fact that while trust is a willingness to become vulnerable, it is preceded by a set of trust antecedents – propensity to trust and perceived trustworthiness (including trustee's ability, benevolence and integrity).

Propensity to trust

In one of the most popular theories of trust in psychology, Rotter defined interpersonal trust as “an expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon” (1967, p.651). His approach treated trust as generalized expectations about trustworthiness of others, somewhat similar to psychological trait. In Mayer et al. (1995) model this generalized trait is called “propensity of trust”, and is understood as a general willingness to trust others (Dietz, Den Hartog, 2006). This dispositional approach, as described earlier, may prove to be interesting, although, due to its general character, not very useful in organizational science. It is similar to Sitkin and Pablo's (1992) risk propensity, construed as “the tendency of a decision maker either to take or avoid risk”, and is especially important in the initial phase of every social relationship (Mayer et al., 1995). Of course, propensity is not enough to explain trust beliefs and behaviors – trust is always relationship-specific. This is to say that in every social relationship one holds a set of beliefs about trustworthiness of other party that influence and mediate the initial propensity to trust. Mayer et al. list three most important factors of trustworthiness: ability, benevolence and integrity.

Ability

The first aspect of trustworthiness mentioned by Mayer et al. (1995), ability, is “that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain.” (Mayer et al., 1995: 717). In IMOT, ability is a key factor for understanding trust, as it relates to competencies that a person has considering the area in which he or she is being trusted. To put it simply in Dietz and Den Hartog's (2006) words, ability is „other party's capabilities to carry out her/his obligations (in terms of skills and knowledge)” (p. 560).

Similarly to other factors of perceived trustworthiness, ability depends on the context. One can trust a friend with an important secret, because one knows he or she is good at keeping them, but it is possible that one will not trust him or her with taking care of one's daughter, as one knows he or she lacks skills in this aspect. In similar fashion, in organizational context, a CEO can be trusted with making an important strategic decision related to the future of the company, but will not be trusted with running a complex analysis

of the market. Thus, ability, and in consequence trust, should be construed as domain-specific (Zand, 1972).

Benevolence

According to Mayer et al. (1995), benevolence is “the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive.” (p. 718). This area covers intentions and motives of the trustee which are crucial to the act of trust. Although it may seem similar to Rotter’s interpersonal trust, it is important to see a notable difference: benevolence is not a generalized personality trait of a trustor but observed and cognitively represented trait of a given trustee. It „reflects benign motives and a personal degree of kindness toward the other party, and a genuine concern for their welfare” (Dietz, Den Hartog, 2006, p. 560). People attributed with high benevolence are perceived as willing to genuinely engage in the actions to the benefit of a trustor.

Taking that into consideration, it is also important to emphasize at this stage of analysis that benevolence, as defined by Mayer et al. (1995), appears very similar to the meaning of trust given by the authors, which may artificially intensify the relationship between benevolence and trust. This possibility will be verified and discussed further in the paper.

Integrity

Belief in other party's competence and good will does not cover all aspects of trustworthiness listed by Mayer et al. (1995). Apart from perceiving the trustee as knowledgeable and benevolent, one needs to be sure that he or she upholds a certain set of values, cherished by the trustor. As Mayer et al. (1995) describe, integrity is “trustor's perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable.” (p. 719) This dimension, related to a value structure shared by both parties is crucial for perceived accountability and credibility of the trustee. It involves observed consistency in trustee’s behavior as well as the congruence of values. It encompasses “honesty and fair treatment, and the avoidance of hypocrisy” (Dietz, Den Hartog, 2006, p. 560).

Analyzing the notion of perceived integrity, Dietz, Den and Hartog (2006) seem to assume that values of honesty and fairness are universal and, in consequence, treat them as a hallmark of the dimension. In this paper, as it is focused specifically on relational character of trust, integrity is treated more closely to the original definition by Mayer – as a degree of accordance between trustee’s and trustor’s values.

Interrelationship of trustworthiness factors

These three factors of trustworthiness – ability, benevolence and integrity – allow Mayer et al. to formulate one of the main propositions related to the model: “Trust for a trustee will be a function of the trustee's perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity and of the trustor's propensity to trust.”(1995, p. 720)

The three basic factors of organizational trust have a considerable rate of independence: ability, benevolence and integrity, though related, are separable and can change independently (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 720). As trust is relationship-specific, one can imagine situations in which a benevolent and experienced manager cannot be trusted due to lack of knowledge in some area or, on the other hand, a first-class professional cannot be trusted because of his lack of integrity or good will toward the trustor. All those three factors are the basic building blocks of trust. In the authors’ words: “If ability, benevolence, and integrity were all perceived to be high, the trustee would be deemed quite trustworthy.

However, trustworthiness should be thought of as a continuum, rather than the trustee being either trustworthy or not trustworthy. Each of the three factors can vary along a continuum.” (1995, p. 721) In situations where the levels of the factors are not very high or vary, “whether or not the employee will trust the manager depends in part upon the employee’s propensity to trust.” (1995, p. 721)

Further development of IMOT

The emphasis that Mayer et al. (1995) put on the relational character of trust implied that trust varies across relationships and within person – this premise has been accepted by the papers and research that followed. The meaning of the role of context, risk and control on trusting behavior has been further analyzed in a paper published in 2007 by Schoorman et al. Other refinements of the model has been proposed by many (see: Dietz, 2006)

One of the most interesting arguments for adding another dimension of trustworthiness has been made by Cunningham and McGregor (2000) and Mishra (1996). They argue that perceived predictability or reliability is not included in dimensions offered by Mayer et al. (1995). This approach appears to be problematic, mostly because of the misguided understanding of the nature of interpersonal relations – it enforces mechanical framework on relationships that have clear volitional character. Even if it were possible to predict other party’s behaviour entirely (that means the highest possible level of reliability and predictability, as proposed by Cunningham and McGregor, 2000, and Mishra, 1996), it would not imply the situation of complete trust. If one is certain that other party is a notorious wrongdoer, one will not take risk with him or her, although the wrongdoing is something to be predicted. Other person’s behavior might also be predictable on the grounds of brutal control, but that excludes the possibility of trust as well. This is why responsibility (Wojtyła, 1994), as a dimension considered with the consistency in acting freely based on the value-based obligation towards trustor is to be proposed as a supplement for IMOT.

Trust and responsibility

According to definition provided by Mayer et al. (1995), trust beliefs and behaviors can only exist if the trustor believes that the trustee is free to make his or her decisions, has real impact on trustee’s situation and upholds certain system of values. This set of factors is characteristic for, but not exclusive to, situation of human act (Wojtyła, 1994), especially in the context of individual responsibility. While it is possible to treat responsibility as a psychological concept, psychologists usually do not operationalize it for research and prefer to use the construct of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1992) for describing “the belief in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to manage prospective situations” (Bandura, 1995, p. 2). The main flaw of this approach it that it is purely cognitive, without the necessary link to “the real impact” on a particular domain. In order to find that link and understand the role of responsibility in trust situations, one can refer to the philosophical concept of human act and its connections with notions of responsibility, applied in the context of organizational psychology.

Wojtyła describes the concept of personhood stemming from the basic experience of human existence – human act. An act, a philosophical concept that could be defined psychologically as a behavior subjectively experienced as free and self-determined, is truly possible only in the situation when a person has a real choice and is conscious of the difference that choice makes in the world (Stocki, Prokopowicz & Żmuda, 2008). Freedom – given in the elementary cognitive experience of “I can – I don’t have to” – is an obvious precondition of an act. The qualitative difference between the experience of human acting and

something's acting in human is given in the moment of efficacy – the experience of “I am the doer of this” (Stocki, Prokopowicz & Żmuda, 2008)

Efficacy is a notion that connects directly experience of acting to responsibility. A person is responsible for something only if he or she can influence something or is a conscious doer of something. It is important to emphasize that responsibility is not a relation, let alone social relation – it is an intra-personal, cognitive fact. A person can be responsible because he or she is response-able, has a will that is able to respond to values. Furthermore, a person is responsible for something or someone but is also responsible to something or someone, and that relationship can be only formed based on obligation stemming from values and experiencing others as selves, as persons.

Given the fact that responsibility is a subjective, intra-personal phenomenon, in the context of interpersonal relations it has to be analyzed as perceived responsibility. In this study, responsibility will be understood as a perceived consistency in acting freely based on the value-based obligation towards trustor. As such, it is ignored by Mayer et al (1995), and should be included in the comprehensive model of relational trust. Perceived responsibility of trustee will be analyzed as one of the dimensions (additional to ability, benevolence and integrity) of trustworthiness that is expected to influence trust towards trustee. Furthermore, in order to deepen the understanding of the role responsibility plays in trust relations, a qualitative method for analyzing the perception of managerial responsibility needs to be employed. The method most suited for representing the relationships of concepts is concept mapping (Novak and Cañas, 2008). This methodological approach shall be described in details further in the paper.

Trust and effectiveness

The relationship between trust and effectiveness has been verified in numerous studies. The source of the link has been identified in cost reduction (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995), collaboration and cooperation (Roberts & O'Reilly, 1974) or engagement and performance (Friedlander, 1970; Dirks, 1999). Trust has also been connected to organizational citizenship behaviors (McAllister, 1995; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman & Fetter, 1990; Robinson, 1996) and effort (e.g., Williams & Karau, 1991). It is still not clear whether this influence is direct or moderating (Dirks, 1999), but this investigation goes beyond the scope of this paper.

The relationship between trust and high performance has been suggested by many authors (e.g., Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Butler, 1991; McAllister, 1995) - attempts to link trust to effectiveness are as old as the reflection on trust. Rotter (1967) claimed that there is a direct link between trust and effectiveness. He believed that efficiency, adjustment and survival of social groups depended upon the presence of trust (1967, p. 651). Lately, more psychologists have been interested in team performance and trust (Dirks, 1999; Costa, Roe and Tailieu, 2001; Kiffin-Petersen, 2004). Moreover, perceived task performance has been found correlated with more objective measures and relationship continuity (Smith & Barclay, 1997).

What is even more relevant to this paper is the relationship between trust in management and performance. This link has been analyzed by Mayer and Gavin (2005). Their study suggests that trust in management is directly related to employees' ability to focus attention on value-producing activities. Similarly, Davis et al. (2000) find that trust is significantly related to sales, profits and employee turnover in the restaurant industry; managers who were either more or less trusted differed significantly in perceptions of their ability, benevolence and integrity.

Managerial Trust and Responsibility Scale (MTRS)

Trust is a cognitive aspect of social interaction between two parties, in which free will, consideration of risks, as well as responsibility for a given action, are concerned. In the relational theory of trust, which currently dominates the field of trust research, there are two major factors to be distinguished: the propensity to trust (a trait-like feature of every trust relationship) and the trustworthiness of the trustee (relationship-specific perceptions about the trustee). While both of them are important to understand the dynamics of every trust relation, trustworthiness is key to both organizational analysis and intervention, as it relates to possibly modifiable aspects of relationships. Perceived ability, benevolence, integrity and responsibility of a trustee should be measured accordingly in order to determine their interrelation and influence they have on trust beliefs and behaviors.

To measure trust and its antecedents, a survey “or other similar methodology that taps into the person's willingness to be vulnerable to the trustee” (Mayer et al., 1995:729) is considered a valid and well examined approach. Managerial Trust and Responsibility Scale, introduced in this paper, is a survey method devised to measure propensity to trust and its antecedents defined by Miller et al. (1995), as well as responsibility, as defined in this paper. The details about the questionnaire will be provided in the Method section.

Hypotheses

Based on the theoretically supplemented model by Mayer et al. (1995; Schoorman et al., 2007) it is possible to formulate the following hypotheses:

- Hypothesis 1: Trust for a manager will be positively related to manager's perceived ability, benevolence, integrity, responsibility and to an employee's propensity to trust
- Hypothesis 2: Job engagement will be positively related to manager's perceived ability, benevolence, integrity, responsibility and to an employee's propensity to trust.
- Hypothesis 3: Job performance will be positively related to manager's perceived ability, benevolence, integrity, responsibility and to an employee's propensity to trust
- Hypothesis 4: Employees' constructs of managerial responsibility will be connected to the notions of efficacy, self-determination and value-based obligation (exploratory hypothesis)
- Hypothesis 5: Employees' constructs of managerial responsibility will be closely associated with trust (exploratory hypothesis).

Method

Participants

40 persons (11 male, 19 female; 10 did not provide information about their gender) out of 53 employees of a training and consulting company, took part in the study. Employees were asked to participate in the study by the management, who was offered a short report after studies, providing the generalized data about managerial trust in organization. Demographic structure of the sample is presented in Table 1, and the summary of research tools (with subscale reliabilities) can be found in Table 2.

Table 1. Structure of the Sample

| Demographics | Category | Frequency |
|--------------|--------------|-----------|
| Gender | Male | 11 |
| | Female | 19 |
| | Missing | 10 |
| Age | <26 | 3 |
| | 26-35 | 14 |
| | 36-45 | 6 |
| | Missing | 17 |
| Education | High school | 1 |
| | Graduate | 29 |
| | Missing | 10 |
| Tenure | <2 | 9 |
| | From 2 to 5 | 13 |
| | From 5 to 10 | 2 |
| | Missing | 16 |

Table 2. Research tools used in the study

| Questionnaire | Author(s) | Subscale(s) | Crobnach's Alpha |
|--|----------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| UWES (Utrecht Work Engagement Scale) | Schaufeli et al. (2002) | - | .92 |
| In-Role Job Performance Questionnaire | Podsakoff and MacKenzie's (1989) | - | .78 |
| MTRS (Managerial Trust and Responsibility Scale) | Prokopowicz (this paper) | Ability | .87 |
| | | Benevolence | .85 |
| | | Integrity | .81 |
| | | Propensity to trust | .72 |
| | | Trust | .77 |
| | | Responsibility | .8 |

Measures

The scale for measuring multi-faceted character of managerial trust (as defined by the Integrated Model of Organizational Trust; Mayer et al., 1995) and responsibility (as defined by Wojtyła, 1994) was constructed in three subsequent steps. The first step consisted of conceptualization and operationalization of the Integrated Model of Organizational Trust (Mayer et al., 1995) and responsibility (Wojtyła, 1994). In the second step, a number of items were developed using the Likert format for trust antecedents (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity and Responsibility), Propensity to trust, and Trust itself, all relationship-specific (employee-manager). The third step consisted of supplementing the initial subset of items by adapting modified items from Rotter (1967), Gill et al. (2005) and Schoorman et al. (2007). The final scale was constructed as a set of six additive sub-scales, in which high score would indicate high ability (or benevolence, or trust etc.) in employee-manager relationship.

Ability

Manager's Ability was measured by 7 additive items. Cronbach's α for Ability reached the level of .87. A sample item for this sub-scale is "My manager is very competent at performing his job."

Benevolence

Managerial Benevolence was measured by 7 additive items. Cronbach's α for Benevolence reached the level of .85. One of the items used for this sub-scale is "I am confident that my manager wants the best for me."

Integrity

Manager's perceived Integrity was measured by 6 additive items, with Cronbach's $\alpha = .81$. A sample item from this sub-scale is "I share my manager's values."

Propensity to trust

Propensity to trust (Cronbach's $\alpha = .72$) was measured by 7 additive items. In an Integrated Model of Organizational Trust, propensity to trust is understood as a dispositional trait, similar to Rotter's interpersonal trust (1967). Miller and Mitamura (2003) make a further argument against homogeneity of this construct, claiming that generalized trust is rather caution level than trust. Hence, caution level in relationships is probably the closest to what Mayer et al. (2005) call the propensity to trust. A sample item from this sub-scale is "These days, you cannot rely on anyone but yourself."

Trust

Trust towards managers, as defined by Mayer et al. (1995) was measured by 7 additive items (Cronbach's $\alpha = .77$). One of the items measuring this construct in the questionnaire is "I would be willing to let my manager have complete control over my future in this company."

Responsibility

Trust is a cognitive state of willingness to be vulnerable in the relationship, and can take place only if a trusted party is equipped with efficacy, self-determination, and takes responsibility for his or her actions. This set of factors is characteristic for human act (Wojtyła, 1994). Perceived efficacy, self-determination and responsibility of the manager, as well as the truth-based communication underlying the relationship of both trusting parties, are measured in this sub-scale of the questionnaire. Cronbach's α for this sub-dimension reached the level of .8. Exemplary items for this facet include: "My manager has a direct influence on how the company works.", "My manager avoids making hard decisions", and "My manager always takes full responsibility for his or her mistakes."

Masking questions

A number of items intended to partially disguise the purpose of the Propensity to trust sub-scale were developed and included in the questionnaire. Sample items from this group are: "I believe I am an optimist." and "In achieving success, hard work is usually more important than natural talent."

Subjective in-role job performance

One of the aspects of an individual employee effectiveness is the manner in which an employee perceives his or her job performance. In order to measure perceived In-role job performance, Podsakoff and MacKenzie's (1989) five-item scale was selected and adapted for employee self-evaluation. Test items have been transposed from third to first grammatical person, e.g. "This worker always completes the duties specified in his/her job description." has been changed into "I always complete the duties specified in my job description" and „This worker fulfills all responsibilities required by his/her job" into "I fulfill all responsibilities required by my job". All participants rated their perceived In-role job performance on 5-point Likert type scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree). Cronbach's α for this sub-scale reached the level of .78.

UWES – Utrecht Work Engagement Scale

Engagement, as defined by Schaufeli et al. (2002), is "a positive, fulfilling, work-related state of mind that is characterized by vigour, dedication, and absorption." (p. 74). They describe it as a persistent affective-cognitive state, not focused on any particular object of reflection. In order to measure engagement, Schaufeli and Bakker (2003) created a 17-item UWES (Utrecht Work Engagement Scale) . The scale has been verified in many cross-cultural studies, proving to be of high validity and reliability. The questionnaire consists of three additive subscales: absorption, vigor, dedication. All participants rated their engagement on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (never) to 6 (always/every day). Cronbach's α for UWES reached the level of .92. A sample item from this sub-scale is "When I am working, I forget everything else around me".

Understanding of managerial responsibility

Concept maps are visualization techniques designed to graphically represent relationships (especially causal relations) between concepts. Novak and Cañas (2008) define concept maps as "graphical tools for organizing and representing knowledge" (p. 1). In practice, concept maps usually consist of concepts and relationship between those concepts, represented as concept boxes and a line linking two concepts. Also, in the version used in this study, concept maps include words describing the relationship, so called linking phrases, that characterize the relationship between two concepts (Novak and Cañas, 2008).

In our analysis propositions, understood as "statements about some object or event in the universe, either naturally occurring or constructed" (Novak and Cañas, 2008, p. 1), created by participants regarding a given topic, constituted the basic tool of analysis. Propositions consist of two concepts connected using linking words or phrases, forming a meaningful statement.

In order to analyze participants' understanding of managerial responsibility, a tool for drawing and analyzing maps was employed. IHMC Cmap Tools is a free software developed at the Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition, rooted in traditional cognitive theories of learning (Novak and Cañas, 2008). In the study, all participants were instructed to use the software and form the concept map around the central concept of the map: Responsible manager.

Procedure

All employees (53) of a small training and consulting company were invited to participate in the study. Subjects were provided with electronic versions of a set of questionnaires (MTRS, UWES and modified In-role Job Performance Questionnaire) and

software for creating a concept map of Responsible manager (IHMC Cmap Tools). Participants also received detailed instructions about the nature and order of the study.

In the first part of the research, employees were asked to construct a concept map of a concept of a Responsible manager – all associations, concepts and links that come to their mind when they think about their experience with responsible managers. Apart from detailed instructions on how to use the software and elicit causal maps, they were also provided with a sample concept map on “the ideal vacation trip”.

In the second part of the study they were asked to fill out a set of trust and performance questionnaires. Both maps and filled questionnaires were to be sent anonymously from a created email account to researcher's address. Participants were not supervised during the procedure due to the electronic form of the tools and the specificity of work environment (it was important for the company that employees had freedom to participate in the study at work or home, depending on their preferences).

Results

In the quantitative part of the study three linear regression analyses were conducted. Coefficients for three dependent variables are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5 (all models were checked for linearity and homoscedasticity, independent variables in each model lacked high multicollinearity). As the sample is not random, reported significance levels lack their usual interpretation but are reported here in compliance with social science convention.

Table 3. Coefficients of Linear Regression Model

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | t | Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|--------|--------------|
| | B | Standard error | β | | |
| (Constant) | 13.473 | 5.314 | | 2.535 | .016 |
| Ability | .004 | .176 | .003 | .021 | .983 |
| Benevolence | .33 | .179 | .385 | 1.85 | .073 |
| Integrity | .34 | .177 | .361 | 1.92 | .063 |
| Propensity | -.261 | .153 | -.189 | -1.706 | .097 |
| Responsibility | .069 | .152 | .081 | 0.454 | .653 |

Note. Dependent Variable: Trust

In the first regression analysis Trust was analyzed as a dependent variable with trustworthiness dimensions (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity, Responsibility) and Propensity to trust as predictors. These five variables explained almost two thirds of the variance ($R^2 = .61$) in Trust scores, with significance level $p < .001$. The most influential predictors were Benevolence ($\beta = .38$; $p = .07$) and Integrity ($\beta = .36$; $p = .06$), followed by Responsibility and Ability, associated positively ($\beta = .08$; $p = .65$ and $\beta = .18$; $p = .98$, respectively), and Propensity to trust ($\beta = -.19$; $p = .1$), related negatively to Trust.

Table 4. Coefficients of Linear Regression Model

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | t | Significance |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|-------|--------------|
| | B | Standard error | β | | |
| (Constant) | 36.08 | 16.976 | | 2.125 | .041 |
| Ability | 1.335 | .568 | .496 | 2.351 | .025 |
| Benevolence | -.184 | .58 | -.092 | -.317 | .754 |
| Integrity | .158 | .565 | .072 | .281 | .781 |

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|
| Propensity | -.356 | .492 | -.109 | -.723 | .475 |
| Responsibility | .174 | .486 | .085 | .359 | .722 |

Dependent Variable: Work engagement (UWES)

In the second regression analysis Work engagement scores were regressed on trustworthiness dimensions (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity, Responsibility), and Propensity to trust. These five predictors accounted for about 30% of the variance ($R^2 = .301$) in Work engagement scores, with high significance level of $p = .035$. Ability was the most powerful predictor ($\beta = .5$; $p = .03$), followed by Propensity to trust ($\beta = -.11$; $p = 0,47$) and Benevolence ($\beta = -.09$; $p = .75$) – both negatively related to Engagement – and Integrity with Responsibility, positively associated with Engagement ($\beta = .08$; $p = .72$ and $\beta = .07$; $p = .78$, respectively).

Table 5. Coefficients of Linear Regression Model

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | t | Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|-------|--------------|
| | B | Standard error | β | | |
| (Constant) | 21.535 | 3.677 | | 5.857 | .000 |
| Ability | .132 | .121 | .275 | 1.092 | .284 |
| Benevolence | -.018 | .129 | -.052 | -.143 | .888 |
| Integrity | .096 | .121 | .249 | .795 | .433 |
| Propensity | -.103 | .104 | -.176 | -.994 | .328 |
| Responsibility | -.057 | .100 | -.159 | -.573 | .571 |


Dependent Variable: In-role job performance (PODS)

In the third regression analysis In-role job performance was regressed on trustworthiness dimensions (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity, Responsibility), and Propensity to trust. These five variables accounted for about one eighth ($R^2 = .129$) in In-role job performance scores with significance level $p = .523$. Ability ($\beta = .27$; $p = .28$) and Integrity ($\beta = .25$; $p = .43$) were the most influential predictors of In-role job performance, followed by Propensity to trust ($\beta = -.17$; $p = 0,33$), Responsibility ($\beta = -.16$; $p = .57$) and Benevolence ($\beta = -.05$; $p = .89$).

Exploratory analysis of concept maps

The quality of concept maps submitted by the participants render both the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the relationship between understanding of managerial responsibility and trust towards managers difficult. Only 14 maps have been elicited and submitted by the participants, and those submitted ones differ substantially not only in complexity, but in the quality of the data and understanding of concept maps specificity - sample concept maps are presented in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1. Sample concept map regarding “Responsible manager”



Nevertheless, an effort to reconstruct organizational perception of responsible manager has been made by comparing the understanding of managerial responsibility by the participants with the basic notions of Wojtyła’s (1994) concept of responsibility and the facets of Integrated Model of Organizational Trust by Mayer et al. (1995). Sample propositions involving Responsible manager are listed in Table 6.

In order to analyze the character of the maps, propositions have been classified in the categories of IMOT’s Ability, Benevolence, Integrity and Trust, as well as Wojtyła’s Responsibility. Benevolence, Integrity, and Trust were categorized using the definitions provided by Mayer et al. (1995), Responsibility - using Wojtyła’s (1994) perspective, while Ability, as related in the context of this study to managerial competencies, was characterized by the inventory of managerial skills listed by Cardona & Garcia-Lombardia (2005).

Table 7. Categories of Propositions Regarding the „Responsible Manager”

| Category | Propositions | Perc. | Accum. Perc |
|----------------|--------------|--------|-------------|
| Ability | 41 | 51.25% | 51.25% |
| Benevolence | 5 | 6.25% | 57.50% |
| Integrity | 5 | 6.25% | 63.75% |
| Trust | 3 | 3.75% | 67.50% |
| Responsibility | 12 | 15.00% | 82.50% |
| Others | 14 | 17.50% | 100.00% |

As indicated in Table 7, more than a half of propositions (51.25%) related to the concept of “Responsible manager” have been categorized as reflecting managerial skills and abilities. Those include propositions like “Responsible manager has business awareness”,

“Responsible manager means that they control their emotions” or “Responsible manager motivates individuals”, falling into basic leadership competencies listed by Cardona & Garcia-Lombardia (2005). Significantly fewer propositions have been categorized as Benevolence (e.g. “Responsible manager cares about subordinates”, 6.25%), Integrity (e.g. “Responsible manager is fair”; 6.25%) and Trust (e.g. “Responsible manager is trustworthy”; 3.75%). Propositions categorized as “Others” did not fall into any of the categories (e.g. “Responsible manager is usually somebody I like”; 17.5%). Category “Responsibility” signified propositions related to efficacy, self-determination, obligation and those close or synonymous to “Responsible manager”, such as “Responsible manager is responsible for achieving goals” or “Responsible manager is responsible for results”. 15% of concepts fell into this category.

Discussion

Determinants of trust

In course of testing the relationship of trust antecedents and trust beliefs (assumed in Hypothesis 1) an interesting pattern emerged. Perceived Benevolence, understood as good will of a manager, along with Integrity, that is his or her fairness and honesty, influenced trust beliefs heavily compared to Ability and Responsibility, which had minimal impact on the willingness of employees to become vulnerable in the relationship with their manager. Propensity to trust, a trait expressing employees’ generalized trust, was related slightly negatively to trust.

There is a possible interpretation of this result pattern. Firstly, benevolence, as described earlier, is related closely to trust on theoretical level – while trust is understood as willingness to become vulnerable, and benevolence as perceived good will, it is possible to observe their direct dependence. If a person believes that another person has good intentions toward him or her, it is natural that he or she would be more willing to trust that person. Perceived integrity utilizes similar link – a trustee upholding strong ethical values will be generally more likely to act in favor of a trustor than a person of low integrity. However, the connection is not that clear when it comes to Ability – out of all trust antecedents, whose predictive power was tested in the study, it is probably the most domain-specific facet of trust beliefs.

This context-dependence is probably the cause of small impact that perceived Ability had on Trust in the study. In the questionnaire, employees were asked about competencies of the manager as a manager, that is his skills in leadership, business and management, while questions related to Trust focused on more general aspects of the relationship, like the willingness to give the manager complete control over one’s future in the company. In further studies, two possibilities could be pursued: separating domain-general and domain-specific aspects of Trust or transforming dimension of Trust by adding more domain-specific questions related to Trust.

Work engagement

An entirely different set of factors accounting for the variance of Work engagement emerged in the test of Hypothesis 2. It seems that perceived Integrity and Benevolence of a manager, having substantial impact on Trust towards managers, have minor impact on the effort employees put in their jobs. One variable showing a clear connection to Work engagement was Ability, that is, in the context of this study, leadership competencies of the evaluated manager (Cardona & Garcia-Lombardia, 2005).

This might seem counterintuitive, as perceived competencies could be expected to have lesser impact on individual effort than e.g. Benevolence, connected with acceptance and good will. The possible explanation behind it may be that motivating people and providing them with the engaging work conditions is widely perceived as being a part of a manager's job description.

Different patterns of relationship between trust antecedents, Trust and Work engagement may suggest the possibility of a new conceptual framework of trust. It may be possible that trust (understood as the willingness to become vulnerable) and confidence (understood as the belief that the trustee has certain competencies needed for consistent and successful task completion) may be distinguished in course of research and analysis as two separate constructs. This has been indirectly suggested by Rousseau et al. (1998). According to them, trust "is a psychological state that manifests itself in the behaviors towards others, is based on the expectations made upon behaviors of these others, and on the perceived motives and intentions in situations entailing risk for the relationship with those others." (1998, p. 228). When accepting this definition of trust, it is possible to eliminate Ability as an antecedent of trust, distinguishing domain-general trust (as defined in IMOT) and domain-specific confidence (based on the notion of professionalism and predictability) as two separate phenomena.

In-role Job Performance

In the third regression analysis In-role job performance was analyzed as a dependent variable with trustworthiness dimensions, and Propensity to trust as predictors. These five variables showed to account for comparatively low part of In-role performance scores. Weak explanatory power of the model is directly the product of small variance in the results of In-role job performance subscale.

Poor quality of In-role job performance data is most likely connected to the self-appraising character of the subscale. Small variance of results concentrating around the highest scores suggests that self-evaluation of job performance might lead to biases in the evaluation process. In further studies, more objective measurement of job performance should be applied.

Responsible Manager

In none of the analyses conducted in the study Responsibility had any significant relationship with dependent variables. It seems that neither trust nor work engagement are influenced by the perceived efficacy, self-determination and value-based consistency of the manager. It is possible that this result is caused by similar understanding of Responsibility and Ability by the participants.

This argument is supported by the qualitative analysis of propositions related to Responsible manager that were elicited by the participants. For the majority of subjects, the main associations with managerial responsibility are closely connected to leadership competencies, as described by Cardona & Garcia-Lombardia (2005). These results suggest that employees did not represent a deep understanding of responsibility, focusing on describing "ideal manager" and not "responsible manager". Furthermore, focusing on skills may suggest that perceived responsibility, similarly to ability, is domain-specific.

Conclusions

The general findings of the study indicate the necessity of further investigation of the key elements of trust beliefs. It is important to remember that the study, while conducted in

the natural setting, concentrated only on trust beliefs and subjective indicators of effectiveness. In order to study trust in natural environment, more behavioral aspects of trust should be included, answering the fundamental question posed by the study: Are people truly willing to trust those who they perceive as benevolent and ethical rather than competent and responsible?

One of the findings of the study that appears to be hard to comprehend within the framework of IMOT is the consistently negative relationship of Propensity to trust and dependent variable such as Trust, Work engagement and In-role job performance. This finding, along with the more domain-specific role of perceived responsibility in trust still needs to be analyzed.

The results of the study suggest the possibility of analyzing domain-general trust and domain-specific confidence as two separate theoretical constructs. While perceived integrity and benevolence clearly influence trust relationship in general, trustee's ability and possibly responsibility, seem to influence only domain-specific aspects of interpersonal relationship. The former should be understood as trust, according to definition by Mayer et al. (2005), the latter should be construed as confidence. This theoretical framework could explain different influence trust and confidence have on employee engagement and performance and would possibly bring more order to the diversified field of trust research.

Trust, as a complex variable, has a potential for explaining a vast variety of organizational behavior. Traditionally it has been used mainly to explain team and individual effectiveness in organizations. While the study indicates a promising way of orchestrating that, it is important to remember that neither trust nor effectiveness are one-dimensional constructs. Each of their aspects deserves deeper analysis and a place in the integrated framework of organizational trust.

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Abstrakt

Zaufanie to jedno z najbardziej użytecznych pojęć eksplanacyjnych w naukach o organizacji. Artykuł prezentuje i wyjaśnia stan współczesnej debaty psychologicznej na temat zaufania, poddaje weryfikacji Integracyjny Model Zaufania Organizacyjnego w naturalnym kontekście organizacyjnym, sugeruje postrzeganą odpowiedzialność jako dodatkowy warunek zaufania oraz analizuje możliwy wpływ, jaki zaufanie do menedżerów ma na zaangażowanie i poziom wykonania pracowników. Wyniki przedstawione w artykule sugerują, że spośród wszystkich antecedensów zaufania, postrzegana życzliwość i integralność moralna menedżerów wpływa najmocniej na zaufanie do nich, podczas gdy ich postrzegany poziom umiejętności wpływa najbardziej na zaangażowanie pracowników. W artykule zaproponowane zostaje wprowadzenie rozróżnienia między dwoma aspektami zaufania do menedżerów: ogólnodomenowym oraz domenospecyficznym.